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Chapter 1
In April 2010, offshore drilling rig Deepwater Horizon was engaged in deepwater drilling 
operations in the US Gulf of Mexico when it lost pressure control over the Macondo 
well. Oil and gas violently blew out of the well, found an ignition source, and exploded. 
Eleven workers on the platform got killed in the explosion, which subsequently set off the 
largest accidental offshore oil spill in worldwide history. An estimated 4 million barrels 
(636 million liter) of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico during 87 days before the well got 
capped and the oil spill stopped (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). The oil spill had devastating effects. Involved companies 
BP, Transocean and Halliburton were charged in a civil lawsuit and had to pay heavy fines 
and compensations. The price of BP shares plummeted, almost leading to bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the oil spill had catastrophic effects on wildlife and local communities in 
the Gulf and coastal regions. Coastal industries, like fishery and tourism, were heavily 
impacted due to ecological damage, while inhabitants got exposed to toxic oil residue 
during clean-up operations.
Technologically intensive organizations and industries play an important role in our 
society. They contribute to the achievement of public values, such as energy production, 
by conducting complex tasks that involve complex technologies. However, as the Macondo 
disaster illustrated, the very organizational processes that produce benefits for society may 
also produce potentially catastrophic risks. When organizations do not properly manage 
these risks they turn into hazards with serious consequences, such as industrial disasters. 
The literature on risk states that it is impossible to completely reduce the risk of disasters 
to zero, which implies that industrial disasters will sometimes happen. Therefore, when 
disasters occur, organizations have the ethical, financial, social and political responsibility 
to learn from this rare experience and improve risk management practices. Yet, as the 
Macondo case illustrates, directly experiencing a catastrophic disaster is highly undesirable 
for organizations and society. To avoid direct disaster experience, but still benefit from 
the opportunity to improve risk management practices, hazardous organizations should 
collectively learn from the disaster experience of one of their peers. Collective learning 
from disaster at the level of an organizational field is a process of ongoing interactions 
between field actors – corporations, regulators, associations, unions etc. - to improve 
disaster risk management practices. This allows an organizational field as a whole to 
improve its resilience, lowering the potential for negative effects on organizations and 
society.
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Despite its importance, field-level learning from disaster is a complex and ambiguous 
process and there is evidence that it may fail to make substantial improvements in risk 
management. A failure to learn lessons at the level of an organizational field may result 
in the recurrence of similar disasters across organizations. The objective of this doctoral 
thesis is to better understand how actors in an organizational field collectively attempt to 
learn from disaster. I aim to achieve this research objective in a step-wise fashion. As a first 
step, I substantiate theoretically and empirically why field-level learning in the wake of a 
disaster is necessary in high hazard sectors. Second, I aim to shed light on the processes 
of field-level learning from disaster, to better understand how it unfolds, and explain why 
it unfolds in a particular direction. In particular, I will investigate the political nature of 
field-level learning from disaster, conceptualizing it as a process of contestation between 
field actors with different interests, knowledge, and positions in the social hierarchy, about 
the interpretation of a disaster’s causes and formulation of solutions. As such, the main 
research question for this dissertation is: How and why do actors in an organizational field 
initiate and maintain the contested process of field-level learning from disaster?
While the focus of this dissertation is on politics of learning from disaster, I would like to 
stress that I do not refute the efforts of individuals and organizations in the North Sea 
offshore industry to learn from the Macondo disaster. Various important lessons learned 
have been learned, especially about well control, oil spill containment, and response. 
For instance, the offshore industry developed capping stacks to stop subsea blowouts 
(International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, 2011a), guidelines on well operations 
crew resource management (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, 2014), 
guidelines on competency and for well crews (Oil & Gas UK, 2014), and updated oil spill 
response capabilities (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, 2011b). These 
examples illustrate that the oil and gas industry learned important lessons. However, by 
approaching learning from disaster from a political perspective I highlight the struggles 
between disparate interests involved in learning. These are frequently overlooked, 
because learning is predominantly understood as a means to improve the effectiveness 
of organizational practices and structures (Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009). As such, this 
dissertation provides an alternative perspective on how learning from disasters takes place.
In this introduction, I position this dissertation in the literatures on learning from disasters, 
collective learning, politics of learning, and institutional theory. First, I introduce the core 
theoretical concepts of this dissertation and I further elaborate the theoretical contribution. 
Then, I paint a more detailed picture of the Macondo case and introduce the research 
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setting. At that point I zoom in further on the societal and managerial relevance of this 
research project. Then, I explain the research design that was used to achieve my research 
objective. And finally, I provide an overview of the following chapters and introduce my 
research questions.
ORGANIZATIONAL RISK AND DISASTER
As the risk society thesis claims, we currently live in a society in which wealth production is 
increasingly accompanied by the production of risk (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990; 1991; Rosa, 
Renn, & McCright, 2014). Technological development since the Industrial Revolution has 
contributed to a decrease in some risks, for instance health risks due to improved hygiene 
and health care. However, the use of increasingly complex technologies has introduced 
a new type of risk: low-probability, high-consequence technological risks, which may 
materialize as “man-made” disasters (Turner, 1976). In this thesis, I define disasters as 
low-probability, high-impact organizational accidents that are triggered by the failure 
of complex, hazardous technologies; inflict immediate damage on people, the natural 
environment, local communities, and organizational assets; and which may threaten the 
legitimacy and survival of organizations, industries, and technologies. (Beck, 1992; Pearson 
& Clair, 1998; Perrow, 1999; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Turner, 1976; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). 
Disasters develop slowly over time, as diverse small errors accumulate and poor decision-
making gets normalized, until an operational error finally triggers a disaster (Dekker, 2011; 
Reason, 1997; Turner, 1976; Vaughan, 1996). Hence, while indications of a looming disaster 
may be evident in hindsight (Dekker, 2014), disasters are a catastrophic surprise for the 
people involved. As such, we conceptualize a disaster as an organization-induced extreme 
event – “a discrete episode or occurrence that may result in an extensive and intolerable 
magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to – or in close physical or 
psycho-social proximity to – organization members” (Buchanan, 2011; Hallgren, Rouleau, & 
De Rond, 2018; Hannah, Uhl-Bien; Avolio, & Cavarretta 2009, p. 898). Hence, disasters differ 
from other organizational crisis in that they “pose a direct risk to life and limb” (Hallgren et 
al., 2018, p. 112; Hannah et al., 2009; Pearson & Clair, 1998). Furthermore, in our definition, 
disasters are rare events that disrupt previously accepted norms and beliefs and trigger a 
legitimacy crisis. Hence, while disasters are per definition organizational accidents, we do 
not perceive all organizational accidents to be disasters. For instance, the Burmah Agate 
oil spill did not trigger a legitimacy crisis, while the Exxon Valdez oil spill – having similar 
impact – did (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001).
13
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Organizational scholarship has reported well-known case studies into organizational 
disasters, such as the Bhopal gas release that killed approximately 3000 people (Shrivastava, 
1987); space shuttle disasters like the NASA Challenger explosion (Vaughan, 1996) and 
Colombia explosion (Vaughan, 2005); the Tenerife airline collision (Weick, 1990) and many 
others. Only in the offshore oil and gas industry the last 30 years, society has experienced 
the Piper alpha disaster in 1988 (McGinty, 2008), the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 (Hoffman, 
1999), the Montara oil spill in 2009 (Hayes, 2014), and the Macondo disaster in 2010 
(Hopkins, 2012) to just name the most well-known incidents. It has even been reported 
that the amount and impact of organizational disasters seems to be increasing (Buchanan 
& Denyer, 2013; Perrow, 1999). This illustrates the importance to manage organizational 
risks (Power, 2007; Van der Vegt, Essens, Wahlstrom, & George, 2015). Risk has become a 
central principle for organizing and managing in organizations, leading to an explosion 
of administrative practices to represent and manage risk (Beck, 1992; Power, 2007) In 
line with these societal developments, the topics of risk and disaster have become an 
increasingly recognized area in organization research. This is indicated by special issues 
on this topic in Organization Studies (Gephart, Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009) and 
Journal of Management Studies (Scheytt, Soin, Sahlin-Anderson, & Power, 2006), as well 
as an increasing number of conceptual and empirical research studies on organizational 
risk (Van der Vegt et al., 2015; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; 2013; Hardy & Maguire, 2016; Currie, 
Lockett, Finn et al., 2012; Power, 2007); organizational crisis management (Bundy, Pfarrer, 
Short, & Coombs, 2016; Denyer & Buchanan, 2013; James, Wooten, & Dushek, 2013; Kahn, 
Barton, & Fellows, 2013; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010; Williams, Gruber, Sutcliffe et al., 2017), 
and extreme events (Buchanan, 2011; Hallgren et al., 2018; Hannah et al., 2009).
FIELD-LEVEL LEARNING FROM DISASTER
Learning is an important response to disasters and crises as it aims to prevent potential 
future recurrences (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Hallgren et al., 2018; 
Jasanoff, 1994; Lindoe, Baram & Renn, 2014; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smith & Elliott, 2007; 
Williams et al., 2017). I define learning from disaster as a change process initiated in 
response to an organizational disaster, which involves the identification of lessons learned 
and their institutionalization in organizational practices and structures, with the purpose 
to enhance disaster prevention and response capacity to avoid similar disasters in the 
future (Crossan, White, & Lane, 1999; Deverell, 2009; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Lampel et 
al., 2009; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). Given the apparent increase in 
amount and impact of disasters and other crises (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Perrow, 1999), 
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learning from disasters has become an increasingly important research topic (Lampel et 
al., 2009). Learning from disaster is a distinct form of learning with particular implications 
and challenges for organizations (Lampel et al., 2009). First, as opposed to incremental 
organizational learning in which actors accrue experience over time, learning from disasters 
occurs in a punctuated fashion based on small samples of experience (Lampel et al., 2009; 
March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991; Miner & Mezias, 1996). Second, as opposed to behavior-
based and routine trail-and-error learning, learning from disaster is a form of non-routine 
inferential learning (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Miner & Mezias, 
1996), as it involves making deductions about what caused a disaster and what solutions 
should be implemented to avoid recurrence (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Elliott & Smith, 
2006; Lampel et al., 2009; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). However, the 
complexity of disaster causation patterns and their infrequent occurrence create problems 
for organizations; it is challenging to draw useful inferences from such complex and limited 
experience (Lampel et al., 2009; March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991; Perrow, 1999). In order to 
better understand how organizations learn from rare experiences like disasters and crises, 
there has been an increase in scholarly focus on the topic across academic disciplines, 
as indicated by special issues in Organization Science (Lampel et al., 2009), Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management (Deverell & Hansen, 2009), and Safety Science (Carroll 
& Fahlbruch, 2011). Nevertheless, despite the increase in attention, it is argued that the 
phenomenon is still insufficiently understood (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Elliott & Smith, 
2006; Lampel et al., 2009). Most studies that do address learning from disaster or crises in 
general focus on learning by involved organizations (cf. Lampel et al., 2009), but ignore the 
fact that learning may take place in higher-level learning ecologies, such as populations 
of organizations or industries (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008; Knight, 2002; Knight & Pye, 
2004; Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1999; Shrivastava, 
1983; Wenger, 2000). Several scholars have indicated the importance of investigating 
learning from disasters and crises at higher levels of analysis (Bundy et al., 2017; Elliott, 
2009; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Kim & Miner, 2007; Lampel et al., 2009; Shrivastava et al., 1988). 
Yet, detailed empirical investigations of the mechanisms of such higher-level learning 
following disasters remain scarce (Lampel et al., 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007).
In this dissertation we address this gap and contribute to the literature on learning from 
disaster by investigating learning at the level of an organizational field following a disaster. 
An organizational field – a central concept in new institutional theory – is defined as a 
community of organizations with disparate interests that interact frequently with each 
other about a central issue of interest, including competitors, suppliers, consumers, 
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regulatory agencies, special interest groups, and associations, (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Hoffman, 1999). An organizational field perspective is essential for understanding change 
in an industry (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Hoffman, 1999). Rather than focusing on a single 
type of organizations, such as the concept of population or industry, the concept of 
organizational field places organizations from an industry in a wider context of social 
relations and institutions (McAdam & Scott, 2005). For instance, Hoffman (1999) took 
an organizational field perspective to study how actors like NGOs, government bodies, 
and insurance companies became increasingly influential in the U.S. chemical industry 
between 1960 and 1993 by engaging in federal legal cases to shape institutional norms 
about corporate environmentalism. Furthermore, an organizational field perspective is 
relevant for learning research, as it sensitizes learning researchers to the embeddedness 
of learning processes in a wider institutional environment (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; 
Elliott & Smith, 2006; Haunschild & Chandler, 2008). From the perspective of organizational 
institutionalism, an institution is a “more or less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior 
that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning 
to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008 , pp. 4-5). Elliott and Smith (2006) have shown how learning in the 
UK football industry in the wake of four stadium disasters was constrained by institutions, 
in particular regulatory arrangements. Hence, an organizational field perspective will better 
explain collective learning in the wake of a disaster.
We build on our definition of learning from disaster as well as the literatures on population-
level learning (Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Miner & Anderson, 1999; Miner, Kim, Holzinger, 
& Haunschild, 1999), network learning (Knight, 2002; Knight & Pye, 2004), and institutional 
learning (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008) to define field-level learning from disaster as 
a collective learning process involving ongoing interactions between field actors with 
different interests, knowledge, and positions in the social hierarchy, in the wake of a 
disaster, aimed at improving disaster prevention and response by identifying lessons 
learned and changing the nature and mix of institutionalized risk management practices 
and structures enacted in an organizational field. As such, field-level learning may trigger 
institutional change (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008). As our definition indicates, we are 
primarily interested in collective learning by a group of organizations as a whole – i.e. 
learning as a group – as opposed to learning by single organizations within a collective 
(Knight, 2002; Miner et al., 1999). Hence, field-level learning can be understood as a form 
of vicarious learning performed by a collective of actors. Furthermore, while learning tends 
to be motivated by aspirations for increased efficiency and performance, we conceptualize 
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field-level learning primarily as a process, focusing on the interactive practices of actors, 
rather than an outcome.
Field-level learning from disaster is important for organizations for several reasons. Because 
of their catastrophic impact, trail-and-error learning from direct disaster experience is 
unfeasible (Pearson & Clair, 1998; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Turner, 1976; Vaughan, 1999). 
Instead, organizations may learn from the disaster experience of other organizations in 
their industry (Sagan, 1994). Quantitative studies have provided evidence that vicarious 
learning from crises and disasters may decrease the likelihood of hazardous events in a 
population of organizations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Kim & 
Miner, 2007 Madsen, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Second, disasters may have universally 
applicable lessons, which are also relevant for organizations beyond those involved in the 
disaster (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). Disaster causation may be partly 
driven by the influence of harmful institutional factors that exist in an organizational 
field (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Hynes & Prasad, 1997; Power, 2007; Wicks, 2001). Since these 
factors pervade all organizations in a field, other organizations may also be affected. As 
Shrivastava et al. (1988, p. 297) argue, this has implications for learning:
Crises cannot be understood simply as organizational phenomena. Crises have fundamental 
trans-organizational causes, involving social, political, and cultural variables. Therefore, their 
prevention and management cannot be achieved at the organizational level alone. Changes 
must occur in social and cultural institutions, and strategies must be developed to promote 
more effective social control of technologies.
As such, field-level learning from disaster may be initiated to change institutionalized, 
trans-organizational causes and improve safety practices (Elliott & Smith, 2006). However, 
field-level learning may also be an important means for restoring legitimacy (Barnett & 
King, 2008; Brown, 2000; Lampel et al., 2009). This is important as the legitimacy crises 
that are implicated in disasters may spill over to other organizations when stakeholders 
them as being similar (Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 2011; Jonsson, Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 
2009; Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008). By demonstrating their involvement in learning activities, 
organizations may avert political interventions (Barnett & King, 2008).
Despite the empirical evidence that field-level learning takes place, and its relevance 
in the context of learning from disasters, so far there has been limited attention to this 
phenomenon in the organizational learning literature in general (Miner & Haunschild, 1995; 
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Haunschild & Chandler, 2008), and learning from disaster and crises literature specifically 
(Kim & Miner, 2007; Lampel et al., 2009). For instance, the quantitative studies of vicarious 
learning from crises do not tease out the mechanisms by which field-level learning from 
disasters or other rare events may occur. In particular, it is unclear from these studies 
whether any collective field-level learning occurred, or whether individual organizations 
learned vicariously (Kim & Miner, 2007). Furthermore, those studies that did pay attention 
to field-level mechanisms in the wake of disaster tend to focus a particular kind of learning, 
namely policy learning (e.g. Birkland, 2009; Clarke, 1999; Hoffman, 1999; Jasanoff, 1994) – 
i.e. developing new policy instruments, or changing the definition of policy problems, the 
scope of a policy, or the objectives of a policy (Birkland, 2004; May, 1992). Also, studies 
on learning from disasters tend to focus on public inquiries as the arena in which learning 
takes place (cf. Hardy & Maguire, 2016; see also Brown, 2000; 2004; Dwyer & Hardy, 
2016; Gephart, 1984; 1993; 2007; Topal, 2009). While these mechanisms are important, 
we argue that more research is needed on the diversity of field-level learning processes 
in the wake disaster. In particular, the role of industry organizations – corporations or 
industry associations – as drivers in field-level learning has received less attention. Yet, 
there is evidence, for instance, that industry organizations may create a new association 
in the wake of a disaster to avoid future failures and/or develop new procedures (Knight, 
2002; Miner et al., 1999). For instance, the Bhopal disaster triggered chemical companies 
in various countries to organize themselves in the Responsible Care program to drive 
field-level improvements in risk management practices (Barnett & King, 2008; Bowman & 
Kunreuther, 1988; Nathan & Kovoor-Misra, 2002). Also, firms may organize industry-level 
cooperation following a disaster in the population. In the wake of the Three Mile Island 
disaster in 1979 in the US nuclear industry, organizations cooperated through associations 
and promotional networks to regain public confidence and improve technology (Miner 
et al., 1999).
LEARNING FROM DISASTER AS A CONTESTED PROCESS
Despite examples of successful learning from accidents (e.g. Madsen, 2009) it has 
been argued that disaster or crisis learning is not straightforward (Antonacopoulou & 
Sheaffer, 2014; Jasanoff, 1994). For instance, learning from disaster may not go beyond the 
adaptation of established goals and practices, leaving underlying assumptions and values 
untouched (Deschamps, Lalonde, Pauchant, & Waaub, 1997; Deverell, 2009; Drupsteen & 
Guldemund, 2014; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
In this dissertation I explain the challenges of learning from disaster by zooming in on the 
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issue of politics of learning, which I define as the contestation of alternative interpretations 
and proposals for learning among actors with different interests, knowledge, and positions 
in the social hierarchy (Coopey, 1995; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; Fox, 2000; Wenger, 1998). 
Risk is a highly contested issue, as different actors struggle to define risks in terms of cause 
and effect, instigator and affected, and limits of appropriateness (Beck, 1992; Gephart, 
Van Maanen, & Oberlechner, 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2016; Tsoukas, 1999; Renn, 2008). 
Especially disasters have sociopolitical consequences that may disrupt societies (Hallgren 
et al., 2018). Research on public inquiries in the wake of disasters has indicated the political 
nature of learning from disaster (Brown, 2000; 2004; Gephart, 1984; 1993 Gephart, Steier, 
& Lawrence, 1990; Topal, 2009). Political struggles involved in learning from disaster may 
involve conflicting narratives about the disaster and proposed solutions (Smith & Elliott, 
2007). In line with these insights, I recognize that learning from disaster takes place in a 
highly politicized and non-transparent environment with varying interests and differential 
power positions and relations (Easterby-Smith, Crossan, & Nicolini, 2000). A focus on 
politics is important for understanding learning, as it helps to explain why and how learning 
occurs, or why it may not happen at all (Coopey and Burgoyne, 2000; Easterby-Smith, 
Crossan, & Nicolini, 2000; Fox, 2000; Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005). From this 
perspective, politics are perceived the central mechanism of change (Coopey & Burgoyne, 
2000; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2010). Yet, despite these insights, the issue of politics and 
power remains relatively under-investigated in learning from disaster, which largely focuses 
on the issue of effectiveness – i.e. becoming better at preventing incidents and decreasing 
in accident rates – rather than issues of politics and contestation (Hallgren et al., 2018; 
Lampel et al., 2009). Yet, as Sagan (1993; 1994, p. 236) has pointedly remarked: “however 
much organizational members want to learn, they want to protect parochial interests too”. 
For instance, organizations may deny the need for vicarious learning from the disastrous 
experience of other organizations, because managers believe that a similar accident could 
not happen in their own organization (Elliott & Smith, 1993; 1997; 2006; Sagan, 1994; Smith 
& Elliott, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 2005).
My conceptualization of an organizational field – an arena in which actors with different 
interests debate with each other over a central issue – draws attention to political processes 
in organizational fields (Hoffman, 1999; Mazza & Pedersen, 2004; Brint & Karabel, 1991). 
From this ‘conflictual’ perspective, organizational fields are “structured by the composition 
of interests” (Mazza & Pedersen, 2004, p. 877). However, Brint and Karabel (1991) have 
emphasized that the influence of different field members on this debate and the direction 
of field evolution is not equal among field members. They argued that organizational fields 
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are “arenas of power relations, with some actors – generally those possessing superior 
material and/or symbolic resources – occupying more advantaged positions than others” 
(p. 355). Similarly, from this perspective institutionalized structures are manifestations of 
power relations, embedding dominant meanings and interests that have become taken-
for-granted (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2005; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2010). Focusing specifically on learning, Coopey (1995) recognized that actors 
have different opportunities to influence learning processes. The social hierarchy – formal 
or informal – affects the potential for negotiation and may restrict learning (Bunderson & 
Reagans, 2011; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; Lawrence et al., 2005). Institutionalized meanings 
and epistemic disciplines may impose particular interpretations onto actors, thereby 
fundamentally shaping the learning process (Carroll, 1995; 1998; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). 
Hence, it is argued that “the presence of disciplines, institutions, and authoritative voices 
are both the medium for, and the product of collective activity” (Easterby-Smith, Crossan, 
& Nicolini, 2000, p. 793).
While institutionalized power relations may shape learning, I argue that the phenomenon 
of learning from disaster at the level of an organizational field introduces new implications 
for these relations. First, while organizational fields are characterized by an informal 
hierarchy with central and more marginal actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011), fields do 
not have a formal hierarchy like organizations (Knight, 2002). As such, field actors maintain 
more autonomy and thus are better able to strive for their interests (Hoffman, 1999; Miner 
& Haunschild, 1995; Moynihan, 2009; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013). Second, following 
a disaster or other high-impact crisis, established social positions in an organizational field 
may become contested (Hoffman, 1999). Actors that previously occupied a marginal field 
position may try to become more involved in the practices that define the field (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009). In the wake of a disaster, actors aim to make sense of the event through the 
construction of diverse accounts of what happened, which drive the generation of different 
solutions for improving risk management practices (Brown, 2000; 2004; Gephart, 1984; 
Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013). Meaning becomes highly 
contested and often negotiated among a wide range of actors who are likely – because 
of their different positions, interests, and identity – to construct it differently from one 
another. In fact, following disasters, field-level discourses may resemble a war of meaning 
(Hoffman, 1999). Marginal actors may improve their position by using their political will 
and skill to influence established understandings and practices and embed new ideas 
and practices in routines, structures, and cultures (Fligstein 1997; 2001; Howard-Grenville, 
2007; Lawrence et al., 2005, Macpherson & Jones, 2008; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Still, this 
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remains a challenging process, as it is generally the interpretations and lessons of powerful 
actors that will take precedence, limiting the types of lessons that will be accepted (Brown, 
2000; Deschamps, et al., 1997; Elliott & Smith, 1993; 2006; Gephart, 1984; Hoffman & 
Jennings, 2011; Sagan, 1993; 1994).
RESEARCH CONTEXT
The offshore oil and gas industry is an extreme context (Hallgren et al., 2018; Hannah et 
al., 2009, p. 898) – i.e. “an environment where one or more extreme events are occurring or 
are likely to occur that may exceed the organization’s capacity to prevent and result in an 
extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences 
to—or in close physical or psycho-social proximity to—organization members.” This is 
clearly demonstrated by the occurrence of the Macondo blowout and oil spill, whichs 
killed 11 offshore workers and became the largest accidental oil spill in the history of 
offshore oil and gas operations (Read, 2011). This large-scale accident is a relevant case 
for studying field-level learning from disasters. Several studies have already labelled the 
Macondo blowout as a major crisis (Antonacopoulou & Sheaffer, 2014; Buchanan & Denyer, 
2013; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; James et al., 2011). Also, the Macondo blowout and oil 
spill matches Shrivastava and colleagues’ (1988) key defining characteristics of industrial 
crises, such as large-scale damage to human life and the environment; large economic 
costs; large social costs; and multiple stakeholder involvement and conflict.
The Macondo disaster did not just trigger a crisis for the involved companies – BP, 
Transocean, and Halliburton – it was a shock throughout the US and even the global 
offshore industry. Also in Europe did actors perceive the need to re-evaluate established 
risk management practices and regimes to assess their appropriateness (EC, 2011). As such, 
it seems that the crisis spilled over from the involved companies to the European offshore 
industry, causing European actors to establish learning initiatives. In this dissertation, I 
focus specifically on learning activities in the North Sea offshore oil and gas industry. This 
is a useful setting for studying contested field-level learning from the Macondo disaster for 
several reasons. First, the North Sea region is the most productive offshore oil production 
region in Europe (Lindoe, Baram, & Renn, 2014), hence, it is likely that stakeholders like the 
public or governments will question whether a similar accident could happen there, thereby 
creating appropriate conditions for crisis spillover. However, contestation of learning by 
industry actors may also be expected. The North Sea region is a mature region with a 
long history of oil operations (Hale 2014; McGinty, 2008), which is both geographically 
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and culturally distanced from the Gulf of Mexico (Baram, 2014). In 1988 the North Sea 
region experienced the Piper Alpha disaster in which 167 people got killed. This disaster 
triggered a major overhaul of the risk governance regime in the North Sea, which since 
then is perceived as one of the premier regimes in the world (Baram & Lindoe, 2014). As 
such, industry actors may not perceive the lessons learned from the disaster to be relevant 
for them (Sagan, 1994; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Furthermore, studies on social learning in 
fields (Kraatz, 1998; Strang & Macy, 2001) have shown that a focal organization is more 
likely to imitate a network member when it has a sub-standard performance. However, 
in our case the opposite is true – the Gulf of Mexico had recently experienced a disaster, 
while the North Sea region had not – which may cause industry actors in the North Sea 
region to resist adoption of lessons learned.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Extreme events and contexts “may provide particularly rich insights into organizational 
processes” (Hallgren et al., 2018, p. 112). I take a qualitative approach to studying the 
institutional origins of disaster (Chapter two) and the contested nature of field-level 
learning from disaster (Chapters three and four). Qualitative research is particularly useful 
for the research objective of this dissertation as it explains the how and why of complex 
social phenomena (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). In particular, qualitative research is rooted in 
an interpretivist epistemology, which emphasizes that knowledge is socially constructed 
and actors assign different meanings to social phenomena (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; 
Bryman, 2012). This is relevant for this dissertation because the contestation of learning 
from disaster involves a struggle among different meanings (e.g. Gephart, 1984). As such, 
a qualitative approach will emphasize actors’ interpretations of the Macondo disaster, 
why they develop particular accounts and learning solutions, and why different actors 
contested each other. Furthermore, qualitative research is sensitive to the influence context 
on social phenomena (Yin, 2008). I take an organizational field level of analysis to learning 
from disaster, in which we recognize the importance of the institutional context in shaping 
learning processes (Smith & Elliott, 2006; Wicks, 2001).
My inquiry focused on field-level learning processes and dynamics in the North Sea region 
following April 20, 2010, when the Macondo disaster occurred. We collected a variety of 
data sources from diverse actors playing a key role in the field-level learning dynamics. I 
focused particularly on nationally operating actors from the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, as well as actors operating on the transnational level. Industry bodies, such as 
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associations - trade, industry, and professional –, and regulators played a central role in this 
dissertation. Associations generally play a central organizing role in mature organizational 
fields (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), such as the North Sea offshore industry 
(McGinty, 2008), and may play an important role in field-level learning from accidents 
(Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988) so we expected these actors to be involved in learning and 
distributing lessons from Macondo. Regulators play a fundamental role in high hazard 
industries to maintain high levels of safety performance and they frequently respond to 
disasters by formulating new regulations (e.g. Jasanoff, 1994). As such, we also expected 
these actors to play an important role in field-level learning from Macondo. We identified 
other actors through our data collection.
I collected a variety of data sources to empirically investigate the contested nature of 
field-level learning. The main data source in my dissertation include publicly available, 
secondary data sources, such as, accident investigation reports, industry reports, regulatory 
documents, speeches, power point slides, website content, etc. Secondary data is relevant 
for this dissertation for two reasons. First, secondary data is produced “naturally” instead 
of “at the request of a social researcher” (Bryman, 2015, p. 543). This limits the potential 
reactive effect of data collection, increasing the validity of the data. Second, because 
secondary data is produced during the process, potential problems with retrospective bias 
– a well-known shortcoming in research on unexpected events (Lampel et al., 2009) - are 
limited. Importantly, I do not perceive secondary documents as a neutral window to an 
underlying reality (Bryman, 2015). Instead, secondary data are produced with a particular 
purpose and aimed at a particular public (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). Since I aim to uncover 
and explain contestation of learning, I consider secondary data to be relevant data source 
for our research objective. Furthermore, I read several books about the offshore oil industry 
in general, and risk management in particular.
Furthermore, I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews with experts in the North Sea 
region, which were either recorded and transcribed verbatim, or notes were taken. The 
interviewees included individuals working, for instance, for the European Commission, 
national regulators, the government, oil companies, consultancies, associations, training 
providers, and unions. In these interviews, I was interested in their perspectives of the 
Macondo disaster, focusing on on what the Macondo blowout meant to them – e.g. 
how they interpreted the event, their perception of what should be learned –, what their 
organizations were doing in response to Macondo, and how they perceived learning 
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initiatives organized by other actors. Hence, our interviews provided more insight in the 
why and how of actors’ sensemaking of Macondo, learning initiatives, and contestation.
Finally, the third body of data consisted of notes taken during various (non-)participant 
observations. I attended four industry conferences – in London, Aberdeen, Esbjerg, and 
Amsterdam - in which I focused on industry responses to the Macondo disaster, as well 
as broader Health, Safety, and Environment (HSE) topics. These conferences contributed 
substantially to my understanding of the organization and operation of the North Sea 
offshore oil and gas industry, the learning initiatives that were organized in the wake of 
Macondo, and how HSE was organized and perceived in the industry. I also conducted 
observations at a well control training center in the Netherlands to experience how offshore 
crews are trained and learn how training practices changed in the wake of Macondo.
The data analysis followed a similar pattern in the chapters of my dissertation. In line with 
my definition of field-level learning from disaster, I focused on interactions between actors 
about changing risk management practices. The first step in the analysis was to identify 
important events, such as the organization of task forces and the publication of reports 
and order them according to moment of occurrence. I was particularly sensitive to what 
our interviewees mentioned as important events. After the identification of events, I used 
MAXQDA to code the data inductively and create first order concepts that were close to 
the empirical data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). After reorganizing the first order concepts into 
conceptually distinct labels, I grouped together similar concepts to create second order 
categories, resulting in increased abstraction of data. By going back and forth between 
our empirical strategies and theory, we were able to refine our empirical categories and 
connect these to theoretical constructs.
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation consists of three main chapters in which I empirically investigate field-
level learning from the Macondo disaster. Each chapter focuses on a different research 
question and draws upon different elements of my data set. Table 1 presents an overview 
of the empirical chapters.
Chapter two presents the starting point for the line of argumentation in this dissertation. It 
proposes new institutional theory as a useful theoretical perspective for studies of accident 
causation, as it helps to better understand how the institutional environment affects 
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disaster development and recurrence in and across organizations in an organizational 
field. I argue that applying a institutional perspective on disaster causation has important 
implications for learning from disaster: from an institutional perspective, learning from 
disaster should not just occur by the organization(s) involved in the causation of a disaster, 
but should take at the level of an organizational field to resolve potentially harmful 
institutionalized beliefs and practices in an organizational field. As such, I argue that 
field-level learning should not be perceived as just a possibility for learning, but rather as 
a necessary responsibility.
Chapter three builds upon the insight from chapter two that field-level learning is important 
in high hazard industries, to investigated how field-level learning occurs and why in a 
particular ‘direction’. Field-level learning from disaster is conceptualized as a contested 
process between powerful, established- and less powerful, marginal communities for 
participation in field-level learning processes. The chapter introduces notions from the 
transformation perspective on knowledge sharing and the communities-of-practice 
literature to highlight that field-level learning from disaster is a process in which marginal 
communities struggle to overcome epistemic and political boundaries to transform 
established knowledge in an organizational field.
In chapter four we again investigate how a marginal actor challenges established actors 
in the North Sea offshore sector in the wake of Macondo. However, while chapter three 
illustrates the contested learning between powerful established communities and less 
powerful marginal community, in chapter four the challenging marginal actor is particularly 
powerful – the European Commission (EC), which triggers alternative dynamics of 
contestation compared to chapter three. In chapter four, I argue that field-level learning 
becomes especially urgent when a disaster triggers a legitimacy crisis that spills over to 
the organizational field. Field-level learning following crisis spillover is conceptualized as a 
dynamic, contested process in which opposing actors continuously enact their competing 
interests in response to opposing actors’ actions.
Chapter five delivers on the research objective of this dissertation by reflecting on and 
discussing the findings of the previous empirical chapters. This chapter brings the different 
chapters together to elaborate the theoretical contributions, societal and managerial 
relevance, and boundary conditions of this dissertation.
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ABSTRACT
Accident researchers have long tried to understand why similar disasters and near misses 
keep recurring within and across organizations in high hazard industries. So far such 
explanations have primarily addressed technical, human and organizational factors. 
However we argue that these models of disaster development do not adequately capture 
the influence of the external institutional environment that often affects an entire sector. 
If the external context has been considered at all, it has mainly been conceptualized in 
economic or regulatory terms. We propose institutional theory as a broader theoretical 
perspective that helps to conceptualize how the institutional environment affects disaster 
development in organizations, and why similar disaster development patterns can persist 
even after they have been identified and targeted in recommendations before. Based 
on an empirical illustration from the offshore oil and gas industry, we demonstrate the 
added value of institutional theory for accident research. Our qualitative analysis shows 
how institutionalized beliefs about risk, and institutionalized practices of risk management 
have failed to keep up with the increasing operational complexity in the offshore drilling 
industry. Despite this mismatch, we find that these harmful beliefs about risk are reinforced 
in occupational training practices. As such, harmful institutionalized beliefs and practices 
become the accepted normality across many organizations in the industry, leading to 
systemic shortcomings in risk management in the entire sector. Hence, we argue for the 
need for professionalization in occupational training in the offshore drilling industry to 
improve risk management.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we argue that the new institutional theory in organizational sociology 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008) (hereafter ‘the institutional perspective’) is helpful 
to further understand how disasters develop. We support our argument by providing 
an empirical illustration from the offshore drilling industry to show the potential of the 
institutional perspective. We illustrate that similar dysfunctional practices can be found 
across organizations, which contribute to the occurrence of similar blowout accidents and 
near misses. We conceptualize these as institutionalized practices that are shared across 
an industry.
Organizations are open systems whose internal processes are affected by their external 
context (Thompson, 1967). Here, the concept ‘external context’ is not used to refer to the 
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immediate task environment, which may be complex and uncertain (Bigley & Roberts, 
2001), but to the broader social context in which organizations are embedded and how 
this affects organizational safety performance (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004). Shrivastava, 
Miller, Mitroff and Miclani (1988) argue that disasters “cannot be understood simply as 
organizational phenomena. Crises have fundamental trans-organizational causes, involving 
social, political, and cultural variables. Therefore, their prevention and management cannot 
be achieved at the organizational level alone. Changes must occur in social and cultural 
institutions, and strategies must be developed to promote more effective social control of 
technologies.” (p. 297). Organizational accident research has increasingly acknowledged the 
influence of external context on how disasters develop over time. For instance, Rasmussen 
(1997) developed a multi-level model of nested decision-making, involving actors such 
as governments, regulators, and associations that influence safety decision making in 
organizations. It has been investigated how dysfunctions in the regulatory context, such 
as political pressures for efficiency, inadequate safety regulations, and under-resourced 
regulators, have contributed to disaster development (Dekker, 2011; Johnson, 2014; 
Leveson, 2011; Lindoe, Engen, & Olsen, 2011; Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997; Vaughan, 
1996; 2005; Wilpert, 2007). Also, researchers have studied how the economic context 
of organizations, especially market competition, may create cost-saving pressures that 
undermine protective measures in organizations (Dekker, 2011; Johnson, 2014; Reason, 
1997).
While the influence of the economic and regulatory context on disaster development is 
very relevant, we agree with Dyhrberg and Jensen (2004) that a broader perspective on 
external context is required to create a more nuanced understanding of the complexity 
of contextual influences on disaster development in organizations. Specifically, we follow 
Dyhrberg and Jensen’s recommendation to integrate the institutional perspective in 
accident research to better account for the institutional environment of organizations 
(see also Vaughan, 1999). Institutions – e.g. rules, norms, values and beliefs – are relatively 
stable social structures that channel the behavior of social actors in a particular direction 
by defining socially accepted ways of behavior (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Jepperson, 
1991; Scott, 2008). As such, institutions are ‘shared’ - actors expect from each other that 
they conform to institutions. In this sense, institutions create social control. By enacting 
institutions in practices, an actor is granted social approval – or legitimacy – by other 
actors, which increases the actor’s potential for survival (Suchman, 1995). For instance, 
an organization may incorporate best-practice safety procedures in its organizational 
practices because this is expected by the regulator, their employees, or the industry 
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association. These social expectations for legitimate behavior – as predefined by various 
institutions – drive similar behavior across organizations in an industry (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 2008). As actors continuously enact institutions over time in their practices, 
certain behavior becomes increasingly habitualized (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). Practices 
have become persistent and are not actively questioned anymore, they are taken-for-
granted as ‘the way we do things’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Jepperson, 1991). In other 
words, practices have become institutionalized. To summarize, institutions are blueprints 
for action that are reinforced by action, which have become stable over time (Jepperson, 
1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
While conforming to institutions provides an organization with social legitimacy, the fact 
that institutionalized practices are resistant to change may create problems, especially 
when operational conditions in which these practices are applied are changing rapidly. 
This may result in a mismatch between operational requirements and institutionalized 
practices in an industry (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Wicks, 2001). As such, institutionalized 
practices in an organization may become dysfunctional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In 
high-hazard industries, dysfunctional practices may have serious implications for safety. 
Hence, an institutional perspective on disaster development explains that institutions, 
which transcend individual organizations, may contribute to the development of disasters 
in organizations (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004; Elliot & Smith, 2006; Wicks, 2001). Furthermore, 
the institutional perspective on disaster development provides an alternative explanation 
for the persistent recurrence of similar disasters across organizations or plants (Elliot 
& Smith, 2006; Wicks, 2001). The observation that similar disasters seem to recur has 
driven various scholars to search for explanations why this happens (Carroll & Fahlbruch, 
2011; Hopkins, 2008; Le Coze, 2013; Leveson, 2011; Vaughan, 2005). From an institutional 
perspective, harmful practices that seem to be specific to organization(s) involved in a 
particular disaster may in fact be institutionalized across an industry (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 
2004; Elliot & Smith, 2006; Wicks, 2001). In this case, they may influence other organizations 
in a similar fashion. If the influence of the institutional environment is not recognized in 
disaster investigations, the same harmful practices may contribute to similar disasters in 
other organizations (Elliott & Smith, 2006).
Due to its specific focus on the institutional environment, the institutional perspective 
complements organizational level analyses and other environmental perspectives 
(Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004; Elliot & Smith, 2006). Yet, few safety scholars have systematically 
applied the new institutional perspective to uncover the diversity of institutionalized 
33
How many blowouts does it take to learn the lessons? 
rules and practices, and how these play a role in the development of disasters. Explicit 
regulative forces are usually acknowledged (e.g. Vaughan, 1996), but the influence of 
less evident, taken-for granted occupational beliefs and norms lacks investigation (for 
three exceptions notably in the management literature see the empirical studies of Elliott 
& Smith, 2006; Hynes & Prasad, 1997; and Wicks, 2001). Hence, it seems that Dyhrberg 
and Jensen’s (2004) suggestion to incorporate the institutional perspective in accident 
research has yet to be fully addressed. We aim to continue where these authors have left 
us and apply the institutional perspective to investigate the influence of taken-for-granted 
occupational beliefs and norms on disaster development. We support our theoretical 
argument by providing an empirical illustration in the offshore drilling industry to show 
the potential of the institutional perspective. We analyzed multiple investigation reports 
of blowout accidents and serious near misses, industry reports, interviews, and non-
participant observations to illustrate the role of institutional factors in similar development 
patterns across organizations. The drilling industry has experienced rapid changes in 
operational conditions due to technological innovations and subsequent advances in 
deeper waters and harsher natural environments (Read, 2011). We find that institutionalized 
beliefs about major accident risk have not co-evolved with the increasing complexity of 
drilling operations. Despite this mismatch, we find that these beliefs are reinforced through 
occupational training practices. This negatively affects offshore workers’ risk management 
competencies. Based on our analysis, we argue that offshore workers are not adequately 
prepared to oversee and address the complexity of operations. We argue that this gap 
between working conditions and risk management competences is an industry level 
problem, and we argue that professionalization of occupational training is required to 
improve how major accident risk is managed.
THE ADDED VALUE OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR 
DISASTER RESEARCH
To indicate the added value of the institutional perspective for disaster research, we 
first introduce institutional theory and discuss its core premises and concepts. Then we 
specify these insights to the issue of disaster development and argue why the institutional 
perspective is a relevant contextual theory for disaster research, and particularly useful for 
explaining why the recurrence of similar disasters is so persistent in industries.
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Institutional theory
The notion of institution has different meanings in economic, political, and sociological 
theories (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008). In this paper, we adopt the organizational 
sociology perspective on institutional theory (Scott, 2008; Jepperson, 1991; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). From this perspective, institutions are understood to be relatively stable 
social structures that shape the behavior of social actors – e.g. rules, norms, values and 
beliefs (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; Scott, 2008 Jepperson, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Concerns for legitimacy drive actors to enact institutions in their practices (Suchman, 
1995). Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). It is beneficial for organizations 
to incorporate institutions into organizational practices and structures, and behave 
accordingly, because legitimacy will provide – either explicitly or implicitly – a social, 
political and regulatory license to operate, which improves their access to societal resources 
and chances of survival. In contrast, non-conformity with institutions will result in a variety 
of pressures aimed to realign behavior. As such, institutions provide both guidelines for 
and constraints on action (Scott, 2008). Concerns for legitimacy pushes organizations 
towards comparable conduct (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This process of homogenization 
is called institutional isomorphism, defined as ‘‘a constraining process that forces one unit 
in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environment conditions’’ 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p. 66). As actors increasingly enact institutions in their practices 
to be deemed legitimate; it becomes more likely that other actors will conform to the 
institution in the future as well (Scott, 2008). As such, certain patterns of behavior 
become increasingly taken-for-granted in organizations and industries. Such persistent 
and customary practices do not tend to get questioned anymore – these practices have 
become institutionalized (Scott, 2008; Jepperson, 1991; Berger & Luckmann, 1991).
Scott (2008) distinguished between three types of institutions – regulative, normative, 
and cultural-cognitive. Regulative institutions include regulations and other formal rules 
that are backed by enforcement power (Scott, 2008). Regulative institutions are explicit 
and written down, in other words, they are the formal ‘rules of the game’. Specialized 
actors, like regulators, inspect conformity to regulative rules and, when necessary, provide 
rewards or punishment to influence future behavior. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) called 
this process coercive isomorphism. Normative institutions include values – notions of what 
is desirable – and norms, which define how to pursue values (Scott, 2008). Normative 
institutions may be explicit, like standard operating procedures, while others are implicit, 
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such as unwritten and tacit expectations. Furthermore, they are often role-specific: we 
have different expectations of people in their family role than in their professional role. 
Normative isomorphism is normally associated with professionalization – e.g. definition 
of professional standards, extensive training (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Wilensky, 1964). 
Finally, cultural-cognitive institutions include shared frames of reference - assumptions, 
beliefs, and worldviews - through which actors unconsciously make sense of the world 
around them (Scott, 2008). Cognitive interpretive processes are shaped by “external” 
cultural frameworks, creating similarities in perspectives among actors in a collective. For 
instance, Carroll (1998) has shown that occupational groups, like engineers, have particular 
ways of interpreting and understanding how industrial incidents occur. To a large extent, 
cultural-cognitive institutions are reinforced through imitation, for instance when actors 
are socialized in a particular group. This is called mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). For taken-for granted cultural-cognitive institutions, non-conformity is inconceivable 
and will lead to confusion, because particular behavior is understood as ‘the way we do 
these things’ (Jepperson, 1991; Vaughan, 2005).
An institutional perspective on disaster development
We use the concept disaster development (Turner, 1976), rather than disaster causation, 
to avoid simplistic images of ‘broken parts’ that cause disasters (Dekker, 2011) and 
to acknowledge that disasters incubate over long periods of time through complex 
interactions of contributing factors. As such, we don’t perceive institutions as immediate 
causes for disasters, but recognize that they will interact with organizational, human, and 
technological factors inside organizations in a complex disaster incubation phase.
It is important for organizations to conform to the institutional environment, but in some 
cases institutionalized practices can turn into contributing causes of major accidents (Elliot 
& Smith, 2006; Vaughan, 1999; 2005; Wicks, 2001). For instance, Wicks (2001) and Hynes 
and Prasad (1997) investigated the 1992 explosion at the Westray mines in Canada and 
found that a variety of implicit normative institutions contributed to the disaster. Social 
expectations associated with the miners’ roles as providers for their family, their blue-collar 
identity, and a culture of masculinity widely pervaded the mining industry. These normative 
institutions, related to the miners’ occupational culture, negatively affected miners’ risk 
perception and created a mindset of invulnerability among miners (Wicks, 2001). Elliott and 
Smith (2006) investigated soccer stadia disasters in the UK and found how widely shared 
and persistent, but incorrect beliefs of regulators and stadium officials about risks eroded 
safety levels in football stadia across the industry. These actors persistently believed that 
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hooliganism was the primary risk in the soccer industry, leading to an absence of attention 
for crowd safety management. This contributed to similar disaster development patterns 
in four stadia. These examples show that dysfunctional practices and beliefs may persist in 
organizations across an industry, even when they are no longer appropriate for particular 
situations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Dysfunctional practices may be so taken-for-granted 
that actors do not question the appropriateness of these practices, even following disasters 
(Elliott & Smith, 2006). Hence, a mismatch may emerge between operating conditions and 
institutionalized rules. In this situation, institutionalized practices become harmful and 
contribute to the recurrence of similar disasters across different organizations.
In this paper we are primarily interested in the role of taken-for-granted institutions in 
disaster development patterns, because these have so far been overlooked in accident 
research compared to the extensively documented influence of more evident regulative 
institutions (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004). We focus specifically on taken-for-granted 
occupational beliefs and norms. We use the example of major accident risk management 
in the offshore drilling industry to illustrate how harmful beliefs about risk contributed 
to multiple disasters and serious near misses, and lower levels of safety in general in 
the industry. Furthermore, we show how harmful beliefs about major accident risks are 
reinforced by occupational training practices. Occupational training plays an important role 
in the development of normative rules about professional behavior in industries, shaping 
the assumptions and competences of the workforce (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). We show that occupational training practices in the drilling industry have 
not co-evolved sufficiently with increasing complexity of operations. Hence, we argue that 
professionalization of training is necessary.
METHOD
Research context
We chose the offshore drilling industry as a suitable research context to illustrate the 
influence of the institutional environment on disaster development. First, the offshore 
drilling sector experiences blowouts and other high potential well control incidents rather 
frequently. The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2014) reported that 
the global offshore drilling industry experienced 11 severe and 69 lesser loss of primary 
control events in 2013. Several sources indicate that many of these accidents and near 
misses – despite differences in specific technical variables, and people and companies 
involved – closely resembled each other in terms of underlying contributing causes 
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(National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
2011; Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, 2014; SINTEF, 2011). Most reports state that 
this problem originates from the growing gap between a) the increasing complexity of 
drilling operations as the industry approaches reservoirs in increasing water depths and 
more complex geological formations, and b) stagnant practices of safety management 
employed in industry and regulators (e.g. SINTEF, 2011). One area in which this gap 
manifests itself is major accident risk management and occupational training for offshore 
workers. Compared to other high hazard settings, such as aviation and nuclear energy 
production, the degree of professional safety training in the offshore drilling is deemed 
relatively low (National Academy of Engineering, 2011). It is recognized “that the industry 
must strive to improve well control competence of personnel involved with all oil and gas 
well operations consistently throughout the world” (International Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers, 2012 , p. 1). We focus on this example because it provides a clear illustration 
of how institutionalized beliefs and practices in an industry may negatively affect safety 
levels, and contribute to disaster development in organizations. And while this example is 
specific to the offshore drilling industry, harmful institutionalized practices may be present 
in various industries (e.g. Elliott & Smith, 2006).
Research design and strategy
To uncover the influence of institutionalized practices on disaster development and safety 
levels in organizations, we apply an exploratory qualitative research approach. We compare 
multiple cases of major accidents and serious near misses in the offshore drilling industry. 
Per definition, low probability-high consequence disasters are rare events, so when they 
occur they present a formidable opportunity to develop an in-depth understanding of 
the phenomenon and its causal dynamics (Flyvbjerg, 2006). It has been argued that the 
uniqueness of a disaster limits our ability to extract generalizable lessons (Lampel et al., 
2009). From the perspective of a single investigation into one particular disaster, a disaster 
development trajectory may appear as a unique interaction of organization-specific causes. 
However, we argue that the analysis of multiple investigations into different disasters 
may uncover similarities in contributing causes that point to the impact of institutions 
and institutionalized practices beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual organizations. 
Additionally, we include several investigations into high potential near misses in our 
sample. Near miss investigations are useful to increase our sample size, because they follow 
similar causation trajectories as major accidents, and happen more frequently (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007). As such, we take a similar approach as Christiansen, Farkas, Sutcliffe, and 
Weick (2009) who see rare events not as unique occurrences, but as “exaggerations of a 
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type of stimulus that organizations routinely encounter on a smaller scale” (p. 846). We 
argue that this redirects attention towards more general patterns, like institutionalized 
beliefs and practices, which are per definition generalized.
Data collection
Our data collection followed several steps. Initially we became aware of the influence 
of institutionalized practices on accident causation and recurrence through informal 
conversations with experts during industry events, such as the Society of Petroleum 
Engineering’s Summit on Human Factors in Houston in 2012 and its workshop on “Getting 
to Grips with Human Factors on Drilling Operations” in London in 2014. In parallel we 
gathered various industry reports and publicly available investigation reports about the 
Macondo and Montara accidents that occurred in the offshore drilling industry in 2009 and 
2010. While reading these documents it struck us that these disasters seemed to follow 
similar development patterns, which clearly had institutional causes.
The second phase consisted of a more structured approach to data collection. The first step 
was to collect multiple accident investigation reports of the Macondo blowout disaster. 
A myriad of Macondo reports has been published, but we only included reports in our 
data set that investigated at least the causation trajectory of the accident. As such, reports 
that focused solely on the oil spill response, as well as the environmental, financial, and 
judicial impact were not included. On the basis of this criterium, we selected thirteen 
Macondo investigation reports. Then, we searched for investigation reports of other well 
control incidents in the offshore drilling industry that were similar to the Macondo disaster. 
Selection criteria were: 1) the investigation reports had to deal with well control incidents in 
the drilling phase, 2) they had to be publicly available and published in English. We ended 
up with six additional investigation reports of well control incidents across the world. 
Most of these well control incidents were also mentioned in the Macondo investigation 
reports because of similarities between the accidents. To triangulate our data from the 
investigation reports, we also collected industry reports published in the wake of the 
Macondo disaster by actors from the North Sea offshore drilling industry. The objective of 
this step was to investigate how actors from this offshore region – one of the most mature 
and advanced offshore areas in the world (Lindoe, Baram, & Renn, 2014) – assessed the 
relevance of the lessons of the Macondo investigation reports for the North Sea industry. 
We assumed that if actors from a mature offshore region would identify relevant lessons, 
this could indicate the presence of dysfunctional institutionalized practices. Because the 
Macondo disaster was perceived as a stress test for the global offshore drilling industry, a 
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myriad of secondary analyses into Macondo – based on the official investigation reports 
– and reviews of risk regimes were published. These documents included evaluations of 
lessons learned from Macondo and other incidents. In total, twenty-two documents were 
collected from governments, regulators, and (inter)national industry associations from the 
UK, the Netherlands, and Norway. We also included six expert interviews in our data sample 
that we conducted as part of a larger research project about learning from accidents in 
the offshore drilling sector. Our interviewees provided more information about industry-
wide safety problems. We conducted the interviews under the condition of anonymity, 
so we provide a description of the interviewees’ occupation instead of their name when 
we present an interview quote in the findings. Finally, we included observational notes 
of five days of non-participant observations and informal conversations at a well control 
training center in the Netherlands. The observations and conversations at the training 
center provided us with insights in how offshore workers acted in a simulator with realistic 
drilling scenarios and helped to generate a more detailed perspective of risk management 
and training practices in the industry. For an overview of our complete data set see tables 
2 and 3 below.
Data analysis
The objective of our data analysis was to identify harmful institutionalized practices in the 
offshore drilling industry. In our data analysis, we applied techniques from the Template 
Analysis approach (King, 2012). Template Analysis is “a style of thematic analysis that 
balances a relatively high degree of structure in the process of analyzing textual data with 
the flexibility to adapt it to the needs of a particular study” (King, 2012, p. 426). Central 
to Template Analysis is the development of a coding scheme that is based on a subset of 
data, which is then applied to further data, adapted, and reapplied. As such, it does not 
impose a rigid coding structure on the data, but is reshaped in a step-wise fashion through 
the data analysis phase as more data is analyzed. Template Analysis is particularly helpful 
when dealing with large sets of data, like our own, which made it very useful for this study. 
Template Analysis encourages the researcher to further develop those analytical codes that 
are backed by the richest empirical data. This matched the exploratory nature of our study 
well. In advance of the analysis, we formulated a few a priori themes that corresponded to 
some of the key theoretical concepts for our study. These were our sensitizing concepts 
(Blumer, 1954) that gave us a general sense of reference and guidance for our analysis, but 
which were used tentatively and could be redefined or discarded (King, 2012). Examples 
of our initial sensitizing concepts were institutional factors like regulations, industry-level 
professional standards, and shared understandings about safety.
2
40
Chapter 2
Ab
br
ev
iat
io
n
Do
cu
m
en
t t
itl
e
So
ur
ce
Ye
ar
Do
cu
m
en
t t
yp
e
# 
of
 p
ag
es
BO
EM
RE
 re
po
rt
Re
po
rt 
Re
ga
rd
ing
 th
e C
au
se
s o
f t
he
 A
pr
il 
20
, 2
01
0 M
ac
on
do
 W
ell
 B
low
ou
t
Th
e 
Bu
re
au
 o
f O
ce
an
 E
ne
rg
y 
M
an
ag
em
en
t, 
Re
gu
lat
ion
 an
d 
En
fo
rce
m
en
t
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
21
2
BP
 re
po
rt
D
ee
pw
at
er
 H
or
iz
on
Ac
cid
en
t I
nv
es
tig
at
ion
 R
ep
or
t
BP
20
10
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
19
2
Ho
pk
in
s 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n
D
is
as
tr
o
us
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 –
 T
he
 H
um
an
 a
nd
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l C
au
se
s 
of
 t
he
 G
ul
f o
f 
M
ex
ico
 B
low
ou
t
C
C
H
 A
us
tr
al
ia
 L
im
it
ed
 (P
ub
lis
he
r)
20
12
Bo
ok
 in
ve
sti
ga
tin
g 
th
e c
au
sa
tio
n o
f t
he
 
M
ac
on
do
 d
isa
ste
r
19
4
Re
pu
bl
ic 
of
 
M
ar
sh
all
 Is
lan
ds
 
re
po
rt
D
ee
pw
at
er
 H
or
iz
on
 M
ar
in
e 
C
as
ua
lt
y 
Inv
es
tig
at
ion
 R
ep
or
t
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f t
he
 M
ar
sh
al
l I
sl
an
d
s 
- 
O
ffi
ce
 
of
 th
e M
ar
iti
m
e A
dm
ini
str
at
or
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
65
 (e
xc
l. 
ap
pe
nd
ice
s)
Tr
an
so
ce
an
 
re
po
rt
M
ac
on
d
o 
W
el
l I
nc
id
en
t 
- 
Tr
an
so
ce
an
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
R
ep
or
t 
Vo
lu
m
e 
I
Tr
an
so
ce
an
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
22
3
US
 C
oa
st 
Gu
ar
d 
re
po
rt
Re
po
rt 
of
 In
ve
sti
ga
tio
n i
nt
o 
th
e 
Ci
rcu
m
sta
nc
es
 Su
rro
un
din
g 
th
e E
xp
los
ion
, 
Fi
re
, S
in
ki
ng
 a
nd
 L
os
s 
of
 E
le
ve
n 
C
re
w
 
M
em
b
er
s 
A
b
o
ar
d 
th
e 
M
ob
ile
 O
ff
sh
or
e 
D
ri
lli
ng
 U
ni
t 
D
ee
pw
at
er
 H
or
iz
on
 in
 t
he
 G
ul
f 
of
 M
ex
ic
o,
 A
p
ri
l 2
0 
– 
22
, 2
01
0,
 V
ol
um
e 
I
US
 C
oa
st 
Gu
ar
d
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
13
0 
(e
xc
l. 
ap
pe
nd
ice
s)
NA
E r
ep
or
t
M
ac
on
d
o 
W
el
l D
ee
pw
at
er
 H
or
iz
on
 B
lo
w
o
ut
 
– 
Le
ss
on
s 
fo
r 
im
p
ro
vi
ng
 o
ff
sh
or
e 
dr
ill
in
g 
sa
fe
ty
Na
tio
na
l A
ca
de
m
y o
f E
ng
ine
er
ing
 
an
d 
Na
tio
na
l R
es
ea
rch
 C
ou
nc
il o
f t
he
 
Na
tio
na
l A
ca
de
m
ies
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
19
7
DH
SG
 re
po
rt
Fi
na
l r
ep
or
t 
on
 t
he
 in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 
M
ac
on
do
 w
ell
 b
low
ou
t
D
ee
p
w
at
er
 H
or
iz
on
 S
tu
d
y 
G
ro
up
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
12
6
Pr
es
id
en
t r
ep
or
t
R
ep
or
t 
to
 t
he
 P
re
si
d
en
t: 
D
ee
p 
W
at
er
 –
 T
he
 
G
ul
f O
il 
D
is
as
te
r 
an
d 
th
e 
Fu
tu
re
 o
f O
ff
sh
or
e 
Dr
illi
ng
Na
tio
na
l C
om
m
iss
ion
 o
f t
he
 B
P 
D
ee
p
w
at
er
 H
or
iz
on
 O
il 
Sp
ill
 a
nd
 
O
ff
sh
or
e 
D
ri
lli
ng
20
11
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
39
8
CS
B 
vo
lu
m
e 1
In
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
R
ep
or
t 
Vo
lu
m
e 
1 
– 
Ex
p
lo
si
on
 
an
d 
Fi
re
 a
t 
th
e 
M
ac
on
d
o 
W
el
l
US
 C
he
m
ica
l S
afe
ty
 B
oa
rd
20
14
M
ac
on
do
 ac
cid
en
t 
inv
es
tig
at
ion
 re
po
rt
37
Table 2. Secondary data: Collected documents
41
How many blowouts does it take to learn the lessons? 
Table 2. Secondary data: Collected documents (continued)
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Table 2. Secondary data: Collected documents (continued)
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Our analysis started with the Macondo investigation reports and on the basis of this subset 
of data we developed an initial coding template. We coded the causes and contributing 
causes identified in the investigation reports. At the same time, we were sensitive to 
indications of potential harmful institutional practices. For instance, most of the reports 
indicated that similarities existed between Macondo and Montara and other accidents and 
near misses that had occurred in the offshore drilling industry (e.g. National Commission 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011; Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway, 2014; SINTEF, 2011). Based on this coding template, we analyzed the 
other well control incident reports and adapted our initial template. Some of the themes 
that emerged in the analysis of the Macondo investigation reports re-emerged in the 
analysis of the second subset of data. As such, these themes became more prominent 
in our readapted coding template. Finally, we used this coding template to analyze the 
subset of secondary analyses and risk governance review reports, as well as our interviews 
and observations, again adapting coding template. We went through multiple rounds of 
adaptation as we analyzed our other data sources to come up with a coding template of 
prominent themes and codes in our data.
Table 3. Primary data: Interviews and non-participant observations
Semi-structured interviews
Description of 
interviewee
Industry actor Duration of interviews
UK trade unionist 1 Trade union 103 minutes
UK trade unionist 2 Trade union 80 minutes
Well control instructor Well control training center 69 minutes
Drilling consultant External consultant 125 minutes
HSE manager Oil and gas company 103 minutes
Human factors specialist Oil and gas company 45 minutes
Non-participant observations
Location Purpose of observation Duration of observation
Well control training 
center in the 
Netherlands
To observe offshore workers during 
training on human factors. Both 
classroom training and scenario-based 
well control training in a simulator room 
were observed, which provided insight 
in their knowledge of human factors and 
level of non-technical skills
5 days in total (one 
training course of 3 days 
and one of 2 days)
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FINDINGS
We found that while the offshore drilling industry has evolved towards conducting more 
complex operations, organizational risk management practices have not sufficiently 
coevolved to match this complexity. In particular, we identify an insufficient degree of 
professionalization of major accident risk management in the drilling industry as a whole. 
This statement is based on three main findings. First, we find that risk management 
practices seem to built upon taken-for-granted conceptualizations of major accident risk 
that are inadequate for dealing with low probability-high impact disasters. Specifically, risk 
management practices depict a static, fragmented, and solely technical conceptualization 
of risk, rather than a more appropriate conceptualization of risk as holistic, integrated 
and dynamic. Second, we found that current practices of occupational training reinforce 
these inappropriate conceptualizations of risk in the industry, as training is focused on 
strengthening technical-procedural competence at expense of non-technical skills and 
systems risk management. Third, we found that variable practices of occupational training 
and selection prevent standardization of risk management competence in the drilling industry. 
The institutionalized acceptance of variability in training undermines opportunities to 
create a uniformly high level of risk management in the industry. Hence, we traced how 
harmful institutionalized conceptualizations of risk are reinforced by institutionalized 
practices of occupational training. We now zoom in on the three main findings.
Risk management practices depict a static, fragmented, and solely technical 
conceptualization of risk
Our analysis has indicated that risk is generally conceptualized in the drilling industry 
as a static, fragmented, and technical phenomenon. We argue that this represents an 
institutionalized belief that is taken-for-granted in the industry and generally not actively 
questioned. However, we also claim that this conceptualization is potentially harmful, 
because it does not match the complexity of major accident risk
A static conceptualization of risk
Offshore operations are characterized by the continuous occurrence of unanticipated 
events. According to the SINTEF report, “offshore drilling is often referred to as a continuous 
process of problem solving where new and unexpected situations arise and must be managed 
on the spot. This increasing complexity results in new demands on how we think about safety” 
(p. 1). This dynamic nature of offshore drilling requires practices to deal effectively with 
changing circumstances and risk levels. The offshore drilling industry commonly refers to 
45
How many blowouts does it take to learn the lessons? 
such practices as ‘management of change’ (MoC), which involves reassessments of risk and 
the implementation of mitigating measures. Despite the importance of MoC in drilling, 
our analysis shows that the inappropriate application of MoC was a recurring issue in the 
industry. For instance, the Norwegian drilling regulator argued “Post-Deepwater Horizon 
reports have exposed a number of deficiencies in risk management, including handling of 
uncertainty in different phases [and] change management” (PSA Deepwater Horizon report, 
p. 12). However, we found that this was not limited to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
Insufficient change management regarding well design, procedures, and personnel shifts 
were also found to have contributed to the Gullfaks C incident in Norway in 2010, the 
MG Hulme incident of the coast of West Africa in 2009, the Snorre A blowout in Norway 
in 2004, and the Montara blowout in the Timor Sea in 2009. In the MG Hulme incident, 
for instance, unique drilling conditions required the application of non-standard drilling 
equipment, which was “a significant change from conventional drilling and this change was 
not recognized by the rig management” (p. 14).
Following Macondo, there was a surge in attention for the importance of MoC, trying to 
create more awareness of the dynamic nature of risk and the inevitability of MoC in drilling. 
For instance, industry associations in the UK and Norway pointed to the need for better 
MoC (OGP 476, OLF Deepwater Horizon report). Nonetheless, it seems that this awareness 
of the importance of MoC still needs to trickle down to individual oil companies. For 
instance, the North Sea Offshore Authorities Forum (NSOAF) conducted a multinational 
audit and found that in some companies “MoC procedures were not covering changes to 
drilling and well operations” (p. 15). Similarly, an interviewed drilling consultant stated 
that “Collectively, there is an inability to deal with the unexpected […] Generally, operations 
are planned for in a detailed fashion, but when something unexpected happens, replanning 
does not always happen. We don’t train crews to do that.” Other informants explained that 
change management is a challenge in the industry, because it does not seem to match 
with the workforce’s pervasive “can do, get it done” mentality (interview with HSE manager) 
– the preference of offshore workers to get on with drilling rather than taking the time 
for replanning. Hence, our analysis suggests that the dynamic nature of risk was still only 
insufficiently recognized. Instead a static perception of risk seemed to dominate amongst 
the offshore workforce, which revolves around an implicit belief that changes in drilling 
conditions and operations will not have a major effect on risk levels.
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An fragmented conceptualization of risk
Our analysis shows that the conceptualization of risk as a static phenomenon is closely 
related to an implicit and taken-for-granted belief that risk is a phenomenon that is 
fragmented across system components rather than a system characteristic. Investigations of 
several well control incidents have concluded that risk management frequently focused on 
system components, rather than the system as a whole. For instance, the CCR (2011) argued 
that in the Macondo case “the lack of rigorous risk assessments led decision makers to solve 
problems in isolation instead of considering the cumulative impact their solutions might have 
on the rest of the project.” (p. 244). Similarly, in the case of the Snorre A accident, frequently 
“only the sub-operation was discussed [during the risk assessment]; and not the overall status 
of well barriers.” (PSA, 2004, p. 15). As these quotes show, a recurring contributing cause of 
drilling incidents was that unexpected problems in system components would be solved 
locally without the rig personnel recognizing the impact of their local solution on the 
overall risk level of the system as a whole. The fact that changes in a system component 
– human or technical – will have system consequences was often not addressed. Our data 
suggest that risk is conceptualized as fragmented in system components and managed 
as a component-level phenomenon.
A clear illustration of the institutionalized conceptualization of risk as a fragmented 
characteristic concerns barrier management in the drilling industry. To ensure a systems 
perspective on risk and barriers, best industry practice is to employ a defense-in-depth 
strategy that requires the application of at least two independent, physical barriers at 
all times during operations to ensure that if one barrier fails another barrier will prevent 
loss of control. This was generally referred to as the “common approach” (Deepwater 
Wells report, p. 16) in risk and barrier management and “widely understood” (OLF report, 
p. 24) in the industry. Yet our analysis shows that the application of defenses-in-depth is 
more problematic than reported by industry actors. In particular, it appears that barrier 
management has been largely approached from an fragmented component perspective, 
as illustrated by the emphasis on one critical physical barrier called the Blowout Preventer 
(BOP). Before Macondo, the BOP had “an almost mythical status” (Hopkins investigation, 
p. 4) in the industry as a fail-safe device. As Hopkins found, this belief undermined the 
importance assigned to other barriers in the barrier system, as people believed that the 
BOP would function when required. However, in the case of Macondo, the BOP had failed 
to prevent the blowout. Initially, this shattered the perception of the BOP as a fail-safe 
barrier. For instance, the UK regulator argued to “not regard the BOP as a fail-safe device” 
(HSE interim report, p. 2). However, our analysis shows that the utopic ambition to make 
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the BOP fail-safe still seems to persist in the industry. For instance, the UK House of 
Commons claimed “[The CEO of BP] told us ‘if it [the BOP] had functioned as designed, 
there would not have been the [Deepwater Horizon]’” (p. 14). This places a lot of emphasis 
on the BOP as the critical barrier. Similarly, following the Macondo disaster, the industry 
has spent significantly more attention on improving the technical design of blowout 
preventers than on improving other barriers. For instance, the NAE investigation report 
argued that, “the design capabilities of the BOP system should be improved so that the system 
can shear and seal all combinations of pipe under all possible conditions, with or without 
human intervention.” (p. 73). This is, however, a rather simplistic perspective on barrier 
management, which ignores the importance of the entire barrier system. As Hopkins 
argued in the Macondo case: “the BOP was only the last line of defence and, arguably, not 
the most important. The defence-in-depth metaphor is the key to a much more sophisticated 
understanding of this accident.” (p. 4). Furthermore, the UK regulator argued that, “a BOP 
is a secondary means of controlling a well, usually relied upon, after problems begin. The 
panel believes priority should be given to ensuring the primary methods of well control are 
sufficiently robust” (Maitland report, p. 12). Yet, we argue that the belief that the BOP is the 
most important barrier creates an fragmented perception of barriers management that 
undermines sensitivity to the need for management of the barrier system.
A technical conceptualization of risk
The focus on the BOP also shows the predominance of a technical understanding of 
risk management. The CSB (2014) argues that there is a “natural tendency [in the drilling 
industry] […] to focus on technical barriers because they are physical in nature, and in 
deepwater drilling they clearly show how they stop the flow of hydrocarbons from the well” 
(Vol 2, p. 61). Hence, the conceptualization of barriers as a physical piece of equipment 
tended to direct the attention of the rig crew towards tangible barrier elements rather 
than more intangible human or organizational factors. The response to the Macondo 
disaster demonstrated the focus on technical causes and solutions. For instance, the 
NSOAF (2014) found that in trying to learn from Macondo “considerable effort was being 
paid to address hardware failures” (p. 5). This technical focus may be unsurprising in an 
“industry dominated by engineers” (CSB Vol 3, 2016, p. 102), but several reports argue that 
a predominantly technical understanding of risk and accident causation fails to represent 
the complexity of an accident causation trajectory.. In particular, conceptualizing risk 
and barriers solely as technical matters ignores the non-technical dimension of risk. For 
instance, the OGP 460 report (2012) indicates that, “A focus on engineering issues alone may 
not be sufficient to prevent future incidents […] A better understanding of the psychological 
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basis of human performance is critical to future improvement.” (p. 2). Yet, our analysis shows 
that understanding of non-technical elements (i.e. operational/human, and organizational 
barrier elements) in risk management was lacking in the offshore drilling industry. The 
CSB (2016) observed, for instance, that incident investigations exhibited “still all-too-
frequent focus on technical causes without sufficient focus on systemic and organizational 
factors” (Vol 3, p. 245). Therefore, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (2014) argues 
for “a strengthened understanding of the interaction between technical, organizational, and 
operational elements” (p. 15). In fact, our analysis shows that of all incident investigations of 
the Macondo blowout, only Hopkins’ (2012) analysis and the third volume of the CSB (2016) 
investigation thoroughly addressed how non-technical factors fundamentally contributed 
to the disaster.
The importance of human and organizational barriers in the offshore drilling industry can 
again be clearly illustrated by the functioning of the BOP. In the case of Macondo, the rig 
crew placed substantial trust in an open BOP as a barrier because they assumed it would 
function as required:
“an open BOP was perceived as an acceptable barrier because it was assumed the BOP 
could either be closed manually to control the well during an influx of formation fluids, or 
automatically by backup emergency systems in the event of loss of well control.” (CSB Vol 
2, 2014, p. 22).
However, “the BOP did not operate independently of previous barriers. It depended for its 
effectiveness on the alertness of the drillers on the rig. Given that they had dropped their 
guard, the BOP was quite unreliable as a barrier against blowout” (Hopkins investigation, 
p. 59). As the second volume of the Chemical Safety Board report stresses, “failure of a 
technical barrier, such as the BOP, is rooted in inadequate operational and organizational 
barriers” (CSB Vol 2, 2014, p. 62). Hence, the effectiveness of the BOP as a technical barrier 
always depends on non-technical barrier elements. It is of essential importance for rig 
crews to realize. As industry association IOGP argued following Macondo: “we regard a 
BOP as a barrier for the purposes of [a two-barrier] policy even when operated in the open 
position”, as long as the BOP is “verified, tested, and certified” (Deepwater Wells, p. 7)). 
This emphasis on verification, testing and certification as a necessary condition for barrier 
functioning is a clear indication of the dependence of technical barriers on human and 
organizational barriers.
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Practices of occupational training reinforce institutionalized 
conceptualizations of risk
In the previous section we have showed how institutionalized conceptualization of risk as 
static, fragmented, and technical does not match the complexity of major accident risk in 
the drilling industry. In this section we show how this institutionalized conceptualization of 
risk, despite being inadequate, is reinforced by common occupational training practices. 
Specifically, we indicate how this is intricately linked to how workforce competence is 
conceptualized in the industry. We argue that improving risk management in the offshore 
drilling industry requires a critical re-evaluation of the institutionalized meaning of 
competence and occupational training practices.
Incident investigations often find that the workers involved in the incident were not 
adequately trained and did not have the right competence. According to a British HSE 
manager, the common reaction after incidents was: “‘How the hell did those guys do that in 
those circumstances? They must have been either incompetent or improperly trained or we 
didn’t have sufficient procedures.’” The issue of lacking competence and training, especially 
concerning complex topics like well integrity and control, resurfaced in most investigation 
reports. Consequently, “more job-specific training is often the recommendation in the 
aftermath of a catastrophic incident” (CSB Vol. 3, pp. 66-67). This approach to competency 
development appears to exhibit a belief that a lack of competence is a problem at the level 
of the individual, which can be solved by remedial training or by selecting appropriately 
trained individuals. However, our analysis indicates that the problem did not simply lie with 
individual workers. Instead, this supposed lack of competence seems to have institutional 
precursors: occupational training practices do not adequately prepare offshore workers for 
managing major accident risks. In particular, we find that occupational training practices 
reinforce the inadequate static, fragmented, and technical perspective on risk. For instance, 
the CSB (2016) observed how traditional training in the offshore drilling industry is “focused 
on technical skills” (Vol. 3, p. 82) and involves “teaching crews to manage conditions based on 
plans. As such, post-incident investigations often focus on the need to improve […] knowledge 
of procedures and ability to execute them, and steps are taken to revise procedures and 
manuals (p. 67). This training practice seems to create a reinforcing cycle of commitment 
to technical knowledge. Yet, a technical orientation appears to be just one part of the 
equation. As the CSB argued:
First, task-specific or technical competency training does not guarantee error-free performance. 
A highly skilled, technically competent person can make glaring human errors [….] Second, 
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within complex systems, “rules, regulations, policy or procedures cannot be written to address 
all the situations that people may face,”. Consequently, “expertise is required to recognize 
when the unexpected is present or may arise.” Thus, technical competency is only one aspect 
of an individual’s performance capabilities.” (CSB Vol 3, 2016, p. 67).
The quote indicates that task-specific and technical competence is inadequate for dealing 
with unexpected situations. Therefore, several reports recommend developing workers’ 
non-technical skills, such as “interpersonal communication, situational awareness, problem 
solving, decision-making and management” (OLF, 2012, p. 29). According to the CSB (2016) 
“non-technical skills are necessary to prepare individuals to manage the natural variability 
inherent within the complex system” (Vol. 3, p. 67). Our observations in the well control 
training center provided a clear example of the importance to improve non-technical 
skills among the offshore workforce. In one instance in the simulator room, the crew 
was working through a scenario that included a slowly developing well control incident. 
The crew realized that something was not right, but in their confusion they grew silent, 
focusing solely on their individual tasks and trying to figure out what was going on. This 
caused breakdowns in communication, situational awareness and collective decision-
making, contributing to a deteriorating situation. What this observational note, as well 
as the quotes show, is that an expanded conceptualization of competence that includes 
both technical and non-technical elements would arguably be beneficial for major accident 
risk management. However, our interviewees also point out that it would be difficult to 
achieve: “having this conversation [about non-technical skills] is extremely hard [because] 
that reflective attitude is pretty weak actually in the oil and gas culture” (interview British 
HSE manager).
Furthermore, we found that the training of technical-procedural competence promotes 
skills to do individual tasks at the expense of system risk management competences. For 
instance, the NAE (2011) investigation states “One indication of the lack of appreciation for 
an overall system safety view is the limited level of system safety training provided by the 
operators and contractors” (p. 96). This seems to undermine the ability of offshore workers 
to oversee the increasing complexity of offshore operations. The National Commission 
(2011) reports a “scarcity of experienced personnel that can grasp the complexity of offshore 
operations and make quick and correct decisions.” (p. 229). The Norwegian regulator similarly 
concluded “that drilling contractor personnel sometimes have a too narrow focus and that 
they do not have a big picture perspective” (RNNP report, 2011, p. 18).
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According to the CSB (2016), disasters like the Macondo blowout should raise questions 
“fundamentally about the meaning of competency” (p. 67). While our analysis showed that 
major accident risk management requires training in non-technical skills and systems 
risk, in the offshore drilling industry competency is mainly conceptualized as technical 
and task-specific. This institutionalized conceptualization of competence is reinforced 
through occupational training practices, which undermine the potential to attain a genuine 
systems perspective on risk. Hence, we claim that offshore workers are not sufficiently 
equipped with the competencies necessary to deal with the increasing complexities of 
offshore drilling. As such, we argue that a broader meaning of competency is necessary. 
The introduction of training on system risk management and non-technical skills will partly 
help to achieve that. Yet, we argue that the impact of such changes to occupational training 
will not be sufficient. We found that personnel training and selection practices are highly 
variable across the industry and of relatively low level. Without addressing this taken-for-
granted variability in training and selection, it is unlikely that occupational training in major 
accident risk management will reach a uniformly high level in the industry.
Variable practices of occupational training and selection prevent 
standardization of risk management competence
We found that variability in training and selection practices across installations and 
organizations was widely accepted and taken-for-granted in the industry as appropriate 
practice. For oil companies, maintaining the flexibility to adapt practices to organizational 
needs is a deeply embedded institutional norm. Therefore, attempts for standardization 
of practices is generally resisted. We argue, however, that while tailored training practices 
are beneficial for the technical side of operations, standardization of system safety and 
non-technical skills training are important to improve major accident risk management 
competence in the industry, since these issues pervade all high-risk operations.
The first element of variability that emerged in our analysis relates to diversity in tertiary 
education and company training, which contributes to a heterogeneous workforce in terms 
of competence. The NAE report (2011) emphasized the problematic nature of variability 
in tertiary education in their report of the Macondo blowout:
“Drilling personnel come from all walks of life. They usually start in the onshore drilling 
industry, learning by experience with hardly any formal education in key areas such as the 
overall drilling system, geology, fluid flow, and chemistry. Offshore drilling personnel can be 
recruited from a variety of institutions and organizations, including technical schools and 
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general colleges, and from those with specialized naval backgrounds. Few recruits are likely 
to have even a fundamental understanding of the overall drilling system and the environment 
into which the system is deployed.” (p. 107).
Hence, variability in educational background seemed to undermine understanding of 
the drilling system as a whole. Furthermore, the NAE report points out that variability in 
company training exacerbates this issue, as “different companies have training and career 
paths that vary greatly. There are few industry standards for the level of education and 
training required for a particular job in drilling.” (p. 107). While training standards certainly 
exist in the industry and have even been updated in the wake of Macondo, the application 
of standards is left to the discretion of companies. This allows companies to adapt training 
to local demands determined for instance by geological conditions or organizational 
structure. However, our analysis of investigation reports indicates this flexibility can also 
presents a risk, as competence levels may be insufficient to match the complexity of 
particular operations. For instance, in the case of Macondo, the Chief Council Report 
reported that, “Transocean has argued that the members of its rig crew were tradesmen, not 
engineers, and could not have been expected to interpret the complex results of the Macondo 
[well integrity] test” (p. 162).
An important reason for the persistent variability in workforce development practices in 
the offshore drilling industry is an industry-wide personnel shortage as a consequence 
of a recurring “boom and bust” cycle in the industry (interview with UK trade unionist 1) 
that has led to “years of underinvestment and lack of proper training schemes” (interview 
with UK trade unionist 2). Periods of underinvestment in training appear to have created 
chronic discontinuities in experience and competence across the pool of industry workers. 
Higher rig positions are reportedly filled with personnel who lack the necessary experience 
and training to adequately deal with the responsibilities and knowledge required of these 
positions. For instance, the NSOAF report (2014) has indicated:
“because of the general shortage of experienced drilling personnel, it was acknowledged [by 
companies] that staff were often being promoted into positions early on in their training and 
development. This caused some organisational difficulties in keeping planned competency 
assurance programmes for drill crews fully effective.” (p. 11).
While the NSOAF report states that premature promotions create only “some” difficulties, 
other sources are more critical. A well control instructor that we interviewed mentioned: 
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“Out of necessity people are promoted quickly. An assistant driller becomes driller after half 
a year. [He] can’t ever get the right experience, but after half a year he is training an assistant 
driller himself. This way poor competence is fostered.”
Our analysis shows that the practice of premature promotions and the absence of 
structured competence development programs for rig personnel have undermined 
the knowledge base of the profession as a whole. Given that workforce development 
mainly took the form of on-the-job training, the content and means of training depended 
predominantly on the knowledge and attitude of the on-site mentor, causing substantial 
variation between drilling rigs, as a well control instructor we interviewed explained: “if 
you have a shit driller [as a teacher], you will become a shit driller. It shouldn’t be dependent 
on one or two people who are responsible for your training”. This irregularity of competence 
development was also acknowledged in the reports. For instance, SINTEF stated that, 
“different accident investigations have identified needs for structured competency building” 
(p. 4), while the OSPRAG report indicated the need to develop minimum criteria to reduce 
the “high degree of variation in how Competency Management Systems (CMS) are structured 
across all organisations” (p. 12). The RNNP report (2011) added that, “informants were careful 
to point out that the competence ‘on paper’ [i.e. certification] was good enough, but that 
practical experience and technical system knowledge could be lacking” (p. 30).
The previous discussion shows how practices of occupational training vary across 
organizations and installations. It appears that career progression has become a ‘pull’ 
mechanism, where workers move up the rig hierarchy as soon as a higher position becomes 
available. But as one human factors specialist put it: “there seems to be a lack of respect 
for professional training, unless you are an engineer”. Similarly, the Montara Commission, 
focusing specifically on the issue of non-technical skills, identified that “decision-making 
about well control issues should be professionalized” (p. 158). While there are benefits to the 
customization of training practices to meet specific local and organizational demands, we 
strongly argue that at least some facets of occupational training should be standardized 
to professionalize competence development for the offshore workforce. In particular, we 
propose standardization of non-technical skills and system risk management training, given 
the relevance of such competencies regardless of specific circumstances. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the industry remains determined to reject standardized occupational training. 
For instance, the industry body International Association of Drilling Contractors as well as 
Oil and Gas UK have argued that competency management systems “should be tailored 
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to each company’s specific organization structure, culture, and operational requirements” 
(Government response to Maitland report, 5. 53).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper was to identify how taken-for-granted beliefs and institutionalized 
practices in an industry can contribute to recurring disaster development patterns in 
organizations. We illustrated this empirically with the example of institutionalized beliefs 
and practices of risk management and occupational training in the offshore drilling industry. 
Based on our findings we claim that risk management needs to be professionalized in 
the industry, involving standardized training in understanding and managing system risk 
and in non-technical skills, in order to overcome the dominant conceptualization of risk 
as static, fragmented, and technical. We found that worker competence was generally 
perceived as an issue to be addressed by ‘fixing the individual’ through more technical 
training. We argue that taking such an individualized approach to occupational risk is 
insufficient, because this does not recognize the influence of the institutional environment. 
Harmful conceptualizations of risk can be traced back to persistent institutionalized training 
practices in the industry, which have not co-evolved with the increasing complexity of 
offshore operations. To address the risk arising from the mismatch of complex operations 
and risk management and training, we claim that the nature of training in the offshore 
drilling industry needs to change to better equip the offshore workforce for these new 
circumstances. While it takes effort and perseverance to change institutionalized practices, 
we claim that it can be achieved through professionalizing these practices by means of 
standardization of worker training and career progression, and through balancing technical 
and non-technical skills training.
Call for professionalization of risk management and training
Highly professionalized occupations are characterized by actors with deep occupational 
knowledge acquired through long prescribed training and the existence of high-level 
professional standards (Wilensky, 1964). Hence, professionalization may be demonstrated 
by universality of credential requirements and the robustness of graduate training 
programs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Professionalization drives homogenization of 
the workforce, as individuals increasingly possess similar high-quality competence, 
assumptions and normative beliefs. One of our core findings was that the drilling industry 
lacks professionalization of the offshore workforce: there was little standardization of 
training and development with variability between organizations and locations and people 
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were often not sufficiently competent to deal with the complexities of offshore operations. 
According to Rasmussen (1997), variability in industry-wide competence represents an 
environmental stressor that can undermine the quality of organizational safety decisions 
across organizations. Yet, our evidence shows that the variability in competence of the 
offshore workforce were not just accepted in the field; it was the preferred and taken-for-
granted way of working in the offshore drilling industry. This assumption is problematic, 
because it leaves open the possibility that offshore workers may receive insufficient training 
to match the increasingly complex offshore drilling systems and technologies (Dekker, 2011; 
Read, 2011). When safety practices are stagnant in the face of technological advances, this 
creates a reinforcing cycle of decreasing safety (Marais, Saleh, Leveson, 2006).
Despite the taken-for-granted variability in workforce development and competence, 
workers still resembled each other in one respect: their static, fragmented, and technical 
conceptualizations of risk, and their ‘can-do, get-it-done’ mentality. These implicit 
assumptions are deeply engrained in the offshore occupational culture and seemed very 
persistent even in the wake of multiple disasters. Research on male-dominated occupations 
in hazardous, frontier workplaces, such as offshore drilling (Ely & Meyerson, 2010), mining 
(Hynes & Prasad, 1997; Wicks, 2001), NASA (Vaughan, 2005) and the Australian Air Force 
(Hopkins, 2006) has shown that this mindset is embedded in the shared identity and 
cultural beliefs of the workforce. Furthermore, men in physical and dangerous workplaces 
tend to be preoccupied with manual, technical work and “pride themselves on their skill in 
handling tools and machinery” (Ely & Meyerson, 2010, p. 7). Part of this persistence likely 
originates from the fact that the majority of offshore workers in the industry come from 
a technical or mechanical background, and that this training and education have created 
important normative determinants for behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Accident 
investigations and subsequent improvements are also likely to focus on technical issues 
(Lundberg, Rollenhagen, & Hollnagel, 2009), often resulting in the promulgation of more 
technical procedures (Hale & Borys, 2013; Thorogood, 2012). However, the predominant 
focus on technical competence in training and development will have only limited effect on 
organizational safety if it ignores the role of non-technical skills, which has been indicated 
by scholars as fundamentally important for understanding how disasters are caused (e.g. 
Dekker, 2014; Perin, 1995)
Institutional vs. organizational factors
An accident that seems to be a unique and isolated incident may in fact originate from 
practices and beliefs that are institutionalized in a wide variety of organizations (Elliott & 
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Smith, 2006; Wicks, 2001). The institutional environment may entail harmful institutionalized 
practices and beliefs that permeate organizational boundaries and have detrimental effects 
on safety levels across organizations. As such, harmful institutionalized practices make 
organizations more ‘crisis-prone’ (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). Yet, not all organizations 
in an industry experience the same kind of disasters or near misses, or at the same rate. 
While organizations in an industry is subject to similar institutional processes, not every 
organization will be affected by and respond to institutional influences in a similar fashion 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2008). Organizations can mitigate or interpret institutional 
influences differently based on specific internal organizational attributes. Mindful and 
resilient organizations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) with a strong safety culture may go beyond 
conforming to taken-for-granted, but dysfunctional practices and implement additional 
training requirements. For instance, Ely and Meyerson (2010) investigated two highly 
reliable oil platforms where workers reoriented away from the traditional and potentially 
disruptive masculine norms, identity and beliefs towards mindful practices and beliefs. As 
such, organizations may be able to avert penetration by and proliferation of an institutional 
source of risk in their organizational structure and practices. However, organizations that 
lack a strong safety culture may be rather susceptible these institutional risks, and even 
mindful organizations may have difficulties to protect itself from the continuous exposure 
of an institutional risk in the long run, slowly drifting into failure (Dekker, 2011). Hence, it is 
important for accident and safety research to recognize that organizational safety results 
from the combination of influences from the institutional environment and organizational 
characteristics.
Implications for learning from failure
Finally, we argue that the application of the institutional perspective to accident research 
has important implications for understanding learning from failure. The problematic 
nature of learning from failure is reflected in the fact that accidents with seemingly similar 
causation trajectories keep recurring (e.g. Vaughan, 2005). Some scholars have concluded 
rather pessimistically that we fail to learn (Hopkins, 2008; Kletz, 2003). Yet the institutional 
perspective can shed more light on why this failure to learn occurs: Because the occurrence 
of disasters ultimately is an organizational phenomenon, accident investigations tend to 
focus on identifying organizational causes (Carroll, 1998; Elliott & McGuiness, 2002). For 
instance, much has been written in accident investigation reports and accident literature 
(e.g. Hayes, 2012) on how worker competence plays a role in major accident causation. 
Yet, these practical reports and scientific studies tend to locate the lack of competence 
development in the organizational system. Consequently, recommendations aimed to 
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improve worker competence have focused on the individual, team, or organizational levels 
of analysis. Yet, we argue that the culmination of contributing causes into an organizational 
accident does not imply that all important contributing causes originate from within 
organizational boundaries. It is important for accident investigations to also deal with 
the institutional context outside the culpable organizations (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Wicks, 
2001). For instance, professions shape the collective and shared assumptions and norms 
from which individual actors work (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Perin, 1995). As such, an 
institutional perspective to accident research emphasizes the need for macro-level learning 
at the level of the industry (Elliott & Smith, 2006). Authors adopting a complex systems 
approach (e.g. Dekker, 2011; Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 2009) have emphasized 
the importance of analyzing macro-level factors in major accident causation. Similarly, 
researchers in the field of learning from accidents have increasingly stressed the need 
for macro-level learning to capture lessons of value for collectives of actors in a field 
(Cedergren, 2013; Hovden, Storseth, & Tinmannsvik, 2011). Yet true systemic learning that 
addresses relation between different levels of analysis is still rare (Dekker, 2011), and the 
institutional context rarely receives adequate attention (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004; Elliott 
& Smith, 2006).
Limitations and future research
Our study has focused on taken-for-granted beliefs and practices in one specific industry, 
and our specific findings about the institutionalized lack of professionalization may or may 
not generalize to other high-hazard domains. This limitation notwithstanding, the objective 
of this paper was to show that the impact of taken-for-granted institutionalized practices 
on organizational safety deserve more attention, and our case serves as an example to 
illustrate this point. There may be other taken-for-granted industry practices at work: 
harmful institutionalized practices have been found to contribute to accidents in industries 
as diverse as the UK soccer industry (Elliot & Smith, 2006) and the mining industry (Wicks, 
2001). Future research should aim to develop a deeper understanding of the influence of 
institutional environment on organizational safety (Elliott & Smith, 2006). We invite other 
scholars to apply the institutional perspective to identify other institutional sources of 
risk in diverse high-hazard industries to develop a better understanding of the role of the 
institutional environment in accident causation and recurrence.
Another limitation of this study is the focus on accident and near-miss reports as database. 
To be able to identify the influence of institutional sources of risk on organizational in an 
industry, one needs to compare the findings of multiple accident reports. Yet, disasters 
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are rare events, hence the availability of investigation reports on different accidents in 
one industry is limited. We partially solved this by triangulating accident reports with 
interviews, industry reports and near-miss reports, but more diverse accident reports 
would have solidified our findings.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we aimed to deepen our understanding of why similar disasters recur in 
high hazard industries. We build upon Dyhrberg and Jensen’s (2004) suggestion to 
apply institutional theory to accident research to understand the persistence behind 
this phenomenon. In particular, we argued that taken-for-granted beliefs and practices 
may become sources of risks if their rigid nature prevents them to co-evolve along with 
changing operating conditions. Institutionalized beliefs and practices will penetrate 
organizations in an industry and may contribute to similar accident development patterns. 
Empirically, we illustrated this by using the example of major accident risk management 
and occupational training in the offshore drilling industry. This example shows how 
causes for accidents that appear to originate from within the involved organizations may 
actually have institutional origins. We argue that to learn effectively from disasters and 
prevent their recurrence, one should look outside of organizations for the contributing 
influence of institutions on disaster development. Looking for similarities between disaster 
development patterns is one way to identify the influence of taken-for-granted beliefs 
and practices. By understanding the relation between the institutional environment of 
organizations and disaster development we provide an alternative insight on how external 
context affects organizational safety. We argue that harmful institutional elements will 
continue to contribute to similar disaster development patterns in organizations unless 
an industry-wide effort is made to change harmful institutional elements.
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ABSTRACT
Industrial disasters are important triggers for collective learning in an organizational 
field. Yet, research has indicated that disasters can trigger contestation between actors 
in an organizational field that limits field-level learning. Previous research has argued 
that powerful, established actors in the field may impose their perspective of event 
definition, causes, and required solutions on other actors, thereby shaping the learning 
process and re-stabilizing the status quo. However, learning from disaster studies have 
failed to investigate how marginal actors struggle to influence the learning trajectory. 
This is an important topic, because marginal actors may drive institutional change in a 
field following a crisis event. We borrow notions from the transformation perspective on 
knowledge sharing and the communities-of-practice literature to highlight that field-level 
learning from disaster is a process in which marginal epistemic communities struggle to 
overcome epistemic and political boundaries to transform established knowledge. We 
conducted a qualitative analysis into the activities of the marginal Human Factors (HF) 
community in the North Sea offshore oil and gas industry to influence field-level learning 
in the wake of Macondo disaster. Being convinced of their superior knowledge about 
human error and incident causation, they aimed to justify their specialist discipline and 
persuade the established drilling- and senior management communities to engage in 
radical learning. However, the HF community’s strategies failed to connect to important 
values and discourses of the established communities, thus failing to overcome knowledge 
and political boundaries, and transform knowledge about human error and incident 
causation in the field. Our study indicates the need for marginal communities to maintain 
awareness of potential institutional constraints such as institutionalized values, discourses, 
and learning mechanisms and responsibilities. The failure of marginal communities to 
overcome knowledge and political boundaries may contribute to field-level learning that 
reinforces established knowledge and practices, rather than change deeper assumption, 
values, and beliefs.
INTRODUCTION
When organizations in high-risk industries lose control over potentially hazardous 
technologies in their production processes, it may trigger catastrophic disasters that 
harm environment, people, and the organization’s survival (Beck, 1992; Perrow, 1999). 
Consequently, organizations must learn from their disastrous experience to prevent 
recurrences (e.g. Pearson & Clair, 1998). This is a costly strategy, however, given a disaster’s 
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tremendous impact. To avoid the cost of disaster, high hazard organizations may instead 
learn vicariously from the disaster experience of others (Madsen, 2009; Nathan & Kovoor-
Misra, 2002). This is important, since the harmful practices that contributed to a disaster 
may be institutionalized across organizations in an organizational field (Elliott & Smith, 
2006; Wicks, 2001). Furthermore, spillover mechanisms may expose organizations in a 
population to legitimacy crises triggered by a disaster (Shrivastava, 1987; Yu, Sengul, & 
Lester, 2008). Therefore, actors in an organizational field should learn collectively from the 
disaster experience of a field member. An organizational field is defined as a community 
of organizations with disparate interests that interact frequently with each other about a 
central issue of interest, including competitors, suppliers, consumers, regulatory agencies, 
special interest groups, and associations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999).
Through quantitative studies scholars have shown that learning from accidents – 
represented by a decrease in incidents – may occur at the level of a field (Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Madsen, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Yet, other 
research has shown that collective industry learning from disaster is not straightforward. 
Contestation between different communities may be expected in the wake of a disaster: 
Research on field disruptive events has indicated that crises may destabilize established 
rules, meanings, and social positions in a field and trigger a ‘war for meaning’ between 
field actors that limits learning and change (Hoffman, 1999; Muller-Seitz & Macpherson, 
2013). Despite these insights, the literature on learning from disasters and crises has paid 
insufficient attention to learning from disaster as a contested process (Lampel, Shamsie, 
& Shapira, 2009; Sagan, 1994). First, while research on disaster sensemaking in the 
wake of a crisis has studied contestation about disaster definition and identification of 
causes and solutions (e.g. Gephart, 1992), learning from disaster goes beyond this initial 
sensemaking phase (e.g. Toft & Reynolds, 2005). We propose that even when a particular 
event definition and set of solutions has pushed out alternative framings, contestation may 
still occur during later learning phases. Second, most disaster sensemaking studies focus 
on political strategies of dominant actors to restabilize the status quo by imposing their 
event definition, identified causes, and proposed solutions on other actors, for instance 
through formal public inquiries (e.g. Brown, 2000). In contrast, these studies do not pay 
sufficient attention to the attempts of marginal actors to influence the field-level learning 
process. We argue that this is an important topic. For instance, research has indicated 
that learning in destabilized social hierarchies – e.g. following a disaster – is likely to be 
triggered by low-ranking actors (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011). Also, research on social 
movements and institutional change following disruptive events has shown that marginal 
3
64
Chapter 3
communities may successfully use field crises to challenge the legitimacy of knowledge 
and practices enacted by established communities and drive changes in institutionalized 
practices, beliefs, and authority relations (Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; 
Hoffman, 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Micelotta & Washington, 2013). In this study we 
address these two gaps. Our research question is: how does a marginal community attempt 
to influence learning from disaster processes that are driven by established communities?
To better understand field-level learning from disaster as a contested process between 
established and marginal communities, we borrow notions from the knowledge 
transformation perspective on knowledge sharing across ‘communities of practice’ (CoP) 
(Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; 2004; Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). 
This body of literature highlights that collective learning between epistemic communities 
with different interests is a political process in which actors have to overcome knowledge 
boundaries and to merge their knowledge to create mutual understanding and engagement 
(Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2004; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). While this may involve searching 
for common ground and consensus, actors may also use their political skills to influence 
the learning trajectory according to their interests (Macpherson & Jones, 2008; Mork 
Hoholm, Ellingsen et al., 2010). By integrating the literatures on learning from disasters 
and knowledge transformation across communities, our study makes several contributions. 
First, the knowledge transformation literature helps to conceptualize the contested nature 
of field-level learning from disaster as a struggle over the transformation of knowledge 
between different communities. Second, we contribute to the literature on knowledge 
sharing by studying attempts for knowledge transformation in an organizational field, a 
setting characterized by the absence of formal hierarchy (Knight, 2002; Moynihan, 2009). 
Most studies on knowledge sharing and transformation have focused on joint projects 
in formal hierarchical settings, such as organizations (e.g. Bechky, 2003) or joint ventures 
(e.g. Tsang, 2002), where managers establish dependencies between communities for 
the sake of collaborative projects. Our case emphasizes a situation where collaboration 
is not presupposed as in joint projects and where established communities may easily 
resist marginal communities’ efforts for knowledge transformation (Bunderson & Reagans, 
2011), Finally, we contribute to the literature on knowledge transformation by introducing 
the influence of field-level institutions (Mork, Hoholm, Ellingsen et al., 2010). Knowledge 
transformation research has focused mainly on (inter)organizational collaborations, and the 
influence of the external institutional context on processes of knowledge transformation 
has so far been ignored. Yet, in high-risk industries the institutionalized risk regime plays an 
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important role in shaping how the lessons learned are likely to be transferred throughout 
the organizational field (e.g. Elliott, 2009).
In this paper we examine how a marginal community attempted to share its supposed 
superior knowledge about incident causation with established communities to learn from 
the Macondo disaster in April 2010. The Macondo disaster was a blowout on an oil platform 
in the Gulf of Mexico in which 11 offshore workers died and which became the largest 
accidental oil spill in worldwide history (Read, 2011). While the disaster occurred in the US, 
the corresponding legitimacy crisis spilled over to other offshore regions. We empirically 
investigate contestation in knowledge sharing in the North Sea region, because this setting 
provided a clear example of a struggle of a marginal community – the Human Factors 
(HF) community – to influence two established communities – the drilling community and 
the constituency of senior management. Their struggle involved attempting to persuade 
the established communities to adopt their call for radical change in the wake of the 
Macondo disaster. This call for change was based on specialist knowledge from the HF 
discipline about human error and behavior. Human error always plays some role in the 
causation of accidents in sociotechnical systems (e.g. Reason, 1997), as was also the case 
in the Macondo disaster (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2016). In 
technological industries human error is frequently identified as the root cause of accidents 
(Dekker, 2014). As such, learning from disaster tends to focus on prescribing more technical 
training or creating more detailed procedures to constrain human behavior and reduce 
human failure. This also happened in the wake of the Macondo disaster (U.S. Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2016). Yet, the HF perspective on human behavior 
recognizes that human error, while possibly being a direct cause to an incident, is often a 
consequence of situational influences, like job characteristics and/or organizational factors 
(Health and Safety Executive, 1999). The risk and safety literature has long championed 
the HF perspective as the appropriate view on safety in hazardous organizations (Dekker, 
2014; Reason, 1997). Macondo investigation reports also confirmed the value of HF by 
showing how human errors leading up to the disaster were rooted in various organizational 
and cognitive factors (e.g. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2016). 
Hence, the HF community argued that training of personnel was inappropriate. Instead 
they proposed that effective learning required oil companies to implement HF training 
and engage in organizational change processes to alter harmful job characteristics and 
organizational factors.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we first discuss field-level learning from disaster as a process of contestation 
between field actors. Then, we introduce the CoP perspective on learning and the 
core notions of epistemic communities and knowledge sharing. Next, we discuss the 
transformation perspective on knowledge sharing across epistemic communities (e.g. 
Carlile, 2004). Finally, we bring together the different literatures to develop a knowledge 
transformation perspective on field-level learning from disaster.
Field-level learning from disaster as a contested process
We build upon research on ‘network learning’ (Knight, 2002; Knight & Pye, 2004), 
‘population-level learning’ (Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 
1999), and ‘institutional-level learning’ (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008) to define field-level 
learning from disaster as a collective learning process involving ongoing interactions 
between field actors with different interests, knowledge, and positions in the social 
hierarchy, in the wake of a disaster, aimed at improving disaster prevention and response 
by identifying lessons learned and changing the nature and mix of institutionalized risk 
management practices and structures enacted in an organizational field. Despite some 
evidence that field-level learning from disaster and crisis is possible (e.g. Madsen, 2009), 
studies show that it may be limited by processes of contestation. For instance, research 
has indicated the political nature of sensemaking during crises. Gephart (1984) was one 
of the first who identified that different stakeholders have different views of reality and 
thus may develop conflicting disaster accounts. Sensemaking is political as stakeholders 
struggle to impose their account on others and thereby shape the future action. Similarly, 
Deschamps et al (1997) and Hoffman and Jennings (2011) found evidence that respectively 
the Nestucca oil spill and Macondo blowout each triggered contestation in the US among 
perspectives on the definition of the disasters, the causes, and the proposed solutions. 
They show that these conflicting perspectives were rooted in different assumptions or 
logics about the relationship between nature and society, oil consumption and energy 
demand. Yet, in both cases the oil industry’s perspective dominated other perspectives, 
hence no deep cultural change occurred following these disasters. Furthermore, Muller-
Seitz and Macpherson (2013) found that the search for causes of a disease outbreak in 
Germany unfolded to become a contested process in which field actors aimed to strive for 
political objectives rather than create consensus, which limited the potential for field-level 
learning about the outbreak.
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Other studies focused specifically on public inquiries as political arenas in which actors 
struggle to make sense during crises and disasters. Brown (2000; 2004; 2005) has 
shown that inquiry reports employ rhetorical strategies of normalization, observation, 
and absolution to create authoritative narratives. This serves to depoliticize disasters, 
restore trust in social institutions through the demonstration of control, and bolster the 
hegemony of dominant groups. Similarly, Gephart (1992) found that public inquiries are 
ceremonial events that reproduce the legitimacy of state action and control procedures 
as the legitimatory institutions control the inquiry discourse. Focusing on the transfer and 
implementation of inquiry findings rather than the inquiries itself, Elliott and Smith (1993; 
2006) showed how football stadia in the UK resisted new regulations following four stadium 
disasters by only symbolically complying. They showed how different regulatory styles 
of enforcement, such as a lack of enforcement, a punitive approach and a participative 
approach, resulted in different rates of organizational adoption of new regulatory rules 
in the wake of a disaster.
Hence, field-level learning from disasters and crises is a contested process that involves 
contested sensemaking during the crises, as well as passive resistance of political 
interventions. These mechanisms limit the depth of learning from disasters in a field. 
However, we argue that current studies on the contested nature of learning from 
disaster ignore several important points. First, while studies addressed how established 
perspectives often overcome sensemaking challenges concerning event definition and 
proposed solutions in the wake of disaster (e.g. Deschamps et al., 1997), learning goes 
beyond making sense of causes and lessons to learn (Toft & Reynolds, 2005): after the 
identification of lessons, actors engage in processes to ‘materialize’ these lessons learned. 
We argue that even when a particular event definition and set of solutions has pushed 
out alternative framings, contestation may still occur during these later phases. Second, 
studies on disaster sensemaking seem to emphasize how powerful communities impose 
their perspective on other, possibly weaker, communities to resist change (e.g. Brown, 2000; 
2004; Deschamps et al., 1997; Gephart, 1992; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). Nonetheless, 
in context of destabilized social hierarchies – like after a disaster – marginal actors may 
drive learning and innovation (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011). Weaker communities may 
attempt to transform the perspective of the dominant community through the use of 
influencing strategies (Howard-Grenville, 2007). To shed more light the dynamics of 
contestation between established and marginal communities in an organizational field 
in the context of learning from disaster, we adopt the transformation perspective on 
knowledge sharing between epistemic communities (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; 2004; 
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Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002). This literature is helpful for two 
reasons. First, it conceptualizes knowledge boundaries between communities that limit 
knowledge sharing (Carlile, 2004). Furthermore, it provides insights into the political nature 
of knowledge sharing (Carlile, 2004; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002; Macpherson & Jones, 
2008; Mork et al., 2010). In case of conflicting interests, communities have to negotiate 
and influence in order to create a shared understanding among the communities that 
enables mutual engagement.
The transformation perspective on knowledge sharing across epistemic 
communities
The knowledge transformation perspective on knowledge sharing is rooted in the literature 
on ‘Communities of Practice’ (CoP) (e.g. Lave & Wenger, 1991). The CoP perspective to 
learning was developed to overcome the mainly individual, cognitive perspective on 
learning, taking a sociocultural, situated perspective on learning that emphasizes that 
actors learn by participating in collective, distributed practices (Brandi & Elkjaer, 2011; 
Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998; 2000). CoPs originally 
were conceptualized as tightly knit communities in the workplace in which participation 
involved regular face-to-face interactions (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 
1991). Later, researchers also included more spatially dispersed social learning systems 
(Amin & Roberts, 2008). For instance, epistemic communities, such as occupational and 
professional networks, include dispersed members whose relationships are more ‘loose’ 
than in traditional CoPs, but nevertheless converge around shared practices, norms, values, 
assumptions, and identities (Amin & Roberts, 2008; Bechky, 2003; Brown & Duguid, 2001).
From the CoP perspective, becoming a competent actor requires participation in cultural 
practices of a social learning system – i.e. interacting with other culturally and historically 
shaped actors and artefacts (Brandi & Elkjaer, 2011; Wenger, 2000). From a political view, 
CoPs envelope struggles for legitimacy and participation, in which new actors work to 
participate legitimately in a particular practice, while central actors in a community may 
confer legitimacy to newcomers and provide ‘access’ to and ‘transparency’ of activities, 
processes, and artefacts (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Contu & Willmott, 2003; Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Osterlund & Carlile, 2005; Wenger, 1998). Hence, participation and mutual learning 
requires newcomers to engage in a trajectory of developing dependencies with other 
members and becoming increasingly legitimate members of the community.
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The literature on knowledge sharing in CoPs indicates that knowledge flows readily within 
a community because participants share sociocultural resources – i.e. language, stories, 
artefacts, practices, assumptions, and interpretations (Brown and Duguid 1991; 1998; 
2001; Wenger, 1998). However, this shared background can also lead to communities 
becoming “self-referential cultural systems” (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002, p. 425) that are 
predisposed towards the creation and absorption of knowledge that builds upon the 
community’s historically situated beliefs and values, at the expense of other interpretations 
and knowledge (Carlile, 2004; Carroll, 1995; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002; Roberts, 2006; Swan, 
Scarbrough, & Robertson, 2002). Hence, the development of knowledge may become 
path-dependent as a community’s established assumptions, values, and beliefs become 
reinforced. While the shared background facilitates knowledge sharing within communities, 
it complicates knowledge sharing across communities (Brown and Duguid 1991; 1998; 
2001). Knowledge transformation facilitates knowledge sharing across communities, 
because bodies of knowledge need “to be put to work by situated actors in situated 
work practices and in local interpretations of its meanings and constraints” (Gherardi & 
Nicolini, 2000b, p. 344). Boundary objects (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; 2004), boundary 
processes (Wenger, 1998), or boundary persons (Brown & Duguid, 1998) may be used to 
facilitate knowledge transformation. The literature provides several empirical examples 
of processes of and boundaries to knowledge sharing across communities, especially in 
technically complex environments. In the context of new product innovation, Bechky (2003) 
identified how differences in language, locus of practice, and conceptualizations of the 
product created knowledge-sharing difficulties between design engineers, technicians, 
and assemblers. She found that knowledge sharing succeeded when communities created 
common ground through ‘tangible definitions’, i.e. physically demonstrating a problem 
to a member of another community and thereby bypassing ineffective verbalizations. 
Similarly, Carlile (2002; 2004; Carlile and Rebentisch, 2003) investigated knowledge 
transfer in technology and product development settings. Carlile and Rebentisch 
(2003) identified that the potential for knowledge transfer between communities is 
complicated by the amount of novelty introduced by contextual changes, the amount 
of dependence between communities as it creates the need for mutual adaptation, and 
the amount and/or type of specialization or difference between sources of knowledge 
that introduces differences in language, methods, and artefacts. In other work, Carlile 
(2002; 2004) developed a knowledge transformation framework that involved different 
types of boundaries, boundary objects, and boundary capabilities. Syntactic boundaries 
emerge when knowledge differences and dependencies exist between communities, 
without a common language to facilitate interaction. Such syntactic boundaries may be 
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resolved by using common reference points of data, measures or labels to provide shared 
definitions that enable the transfer of knowledge. A semantic boundary emerges when 
a novel situation makes existing meanings ambiguous or knowledge differences and 
dependencies unclear. To resolve a semantic boundary, knowledge needs to be translated 
by defining and categorizing differences and potential consequences. Standardized 
forms and methods may provide mutually understood language and structure. Gherardi 
and Nicolini (2002) also focus on semantic issues between communities in the context 
of workplace safety in a construction site, and identified how foremen, engineers, and 
contractors – interconnected communities with different frames of reference – engaged in 
discursive practices to negotiate meaning and enable alignment between interconnected 
communities of practice. Finally, pragmatic boundaries exist when novel circumstances 
create conflicting interests between actors, which limit their ability to share knowledge 
(Carlile, 2002; 2004). This is essentially a political boundary that needs to be solved 
through the negotiating and defining of common interests. Knowledge developed in one 
community may create problems in other communities, leading to conflicts of interests. 
Hence, when negative consequences are identified, boundary objects like objects, models, 
and maps demonstrate differences, dependencies and enable the joint transformation of 
their knowledge. Other research has also highlighted how knowledge sharing is a political 
process affected by power relations. According to the relational perspective on CoPs 
(Contu, 2014; Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000b; Osterlund & Carlile, 2005), CoPs are per definition 
connected through power relations, because they cannot be seen in isolation from other 
CoPs (Brown & Duguid, 1991; 2001; Wenger, 1998). According to Contu (2014), communities 
shape social relations and identities through a continuous hegemonic struggle involving 
articulating and sedimenting differences while marginalizing alternatives. Macpherson and 
Jones (2008) identified that a managing director of a company invoked power by using 
influencing strategies to shape an organizational change process. Hence, they highlighted 
how knowledge transformation may involve the exercise of episodic and systematic forms 
of power (Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck & Kleysen, 2005). Similarly, Mork et al. (2010) showed 
how, following a technological innovation in surgery, an established medical community 
was able to exercise control over the innovation and stifle its progress because they were 
better integrated within institutional practices and enjoy privileges like legitimacy and 
resource control. These findings correlate with statements that actors or communities 
positioned low in a social hierarchy have fewer opportunities for participation or influencing 
organizational processes, hence have less opportunities to shape learning (Coopey, 1995), 
even if they have superior knowledge than high-status actors (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; 
Bunderson & Reagans, 2011). Yet, the literature also provides insights in the possibilities of 
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marginal communities and actors to shape learning. Giroux and Taylor (2002) emphasized 
that communities in multi-divisional companies engaged in processes of justification of 
knowledge to form coalitions and secure funding for proposed innovations. Howard-
Grenville (2007) showed that the effectiveness of issue selling strategies by marginal 
communities in the context of sustainability innovations depended on representations of 
novelty and difference (Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003), as well as its connection to established 
communities’ norms and schemas about what constitutes a (solvable) problem.
A knowledge transformation perspective on field-level learning from 
disaster
While Carlile’s (2002; 2004; Carlile & Rebentisch, 2003) framework of knowledge sharing 
was developed in product innovation setting, we argue that it helps to conceptualize 
difficulties of field-level learning in the wake of a disaster. Disasters, as other crises, are 
per definition non-routine events that may disrupt existing beliefs, assumptions, values, 
and practices and trigger re-evaluations of appropriateness (Hoffman, 1999; Lampel et 
al., 2009; Turner, 1976). Hence, first of all they clearly generate novel circumstances in a 
field. Subsequently, field actors may engage in learning to improving operational safety 
by strengthening disaster prevention and response practices (e.g. Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
Disasters also highlight the condition of knowledge differences between communities, as 
they use different frames of reference to make sense of incidents (Carroll, 1998; Gherardi 
& Nicolini, 2002). The different cultural resources and frames of reference may create 
syntactic and semantic boundaries (Carlile, 2004) between these communities, which 
need to be overcome to enable mutual engagement in learning from disaster. Finally, the 
condition of dependencies is also relevant in the case of field-level learning from disaster, 
but it manifests itself differently than in the setting of product innovation. For instance, 
product innovation in organizations or inter-organizational collaborations is subjected to 
a formal authority structure, in which dependencies are created by managers for the sake 
of achieving organizational objectives. However, in an organizational field, such formalized 
authority structures are absent (Knight, 2002, Moynihan, 2009). As such, while managers 
may decide to bring occupational communities together in (inter)organizational settings 
and create dependencies, such converging pressures are likely to be less powerful in 
a field. Instead, dependencies in a field are represented by institutionalized relations 
between field actors. For instance, dependencies exist between organizations, industry 
bodies that represent the industry, and the regulator who is tasked with supervision. The 
relation between regulator and regulated is partly determined by the regulators’ approach 
to the enforcement of regulations (Elliott & Smith, 1993; 2006). Also, several high-risk 
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settings are characterized by a co-regulatory regime in which field-level learning is driven 
by industry associations, who create voluntary standards that organizations may adopt 
(Baram & Lindøe, 2014). Regulators in turn may use these standards in their inspections of 
companies safety management systems and practices. Hence, institutional arrangements 
in an organizational field privilege certain organizations over others (Coopey, 1995). Yet, 
institutionalized dependencies between epistemic communities may change following a 
crisis. The field disruption may destabilize established social positions in a field (Hoffman, 
1999). As such, epistemic communities that played a central role in a particular practice in a 
field may be challenged by more peripheral communities that aim to secure a more central 
position in a field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Therefore, to influence processes of field-
level learning and risk management, peripheral communities may aim to alter authority 
relations and drive mutual engagement with established communities by developing 
dependencies between themselves and central actors in a field. This allows them to 
negotiate the learning trajectory and meaning of what is safe and dangerous (Gherardi, 
Nicolini, & Odella, 1998; Wenger, 1998). Nevertheless, the dominant epistemic community 
may not be willing to allow this. Established communities have better access to resources 
and thus may defend their dominance in a field by resist attempts of marginal actors to 
occupy more central positions (Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009). While regulators could assume the position of enforcer in a field and alter 
dependencies, trends of deregulation and the shift towards modes of co-regulation in 
Western societies indicate that regulators may lack the resources and/or cultural legitimacy 
to do so (Power, 2007; Short & Toffel, 2010). Hence, differences in interests may establish 
pragmatic boundaries between communities (Carlile, 2004). To overcome the differences 
and enable the development of dependencies with the central community in a field, actors 
have to use political skills (Lawrence Mauws, Dyck, & Kleysen, 2005; Fligstein, 1997).
METHODS
Research setting and design
We chose the Macondo disaster as our case, because HF issues were found as a key causes 
of the accident, leading to recommendations to improve HF awareness and understanding 
in the industry (US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2016). Hence, it created 
an opportunity for the marginal HF community to further the HF discipline in the offshore 
oil industry. We focused in particular on the efforts of the HF community in the North 
Sea region, because several industry initiatives were organized to improve HFs awareness 
and knowledge for the industry. Several major oil companies created a HF position in 
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their safety departments. Industry associations set up committees and task forces that 
issued reports to raise awareness and provide guidance about HFs (e.g. International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers, 2012). North Sea regulators also expressed interest 
in the topic and collectively engaged in a multi-national audit to assess how oil companies 
and contractors incorporated HFs in their operations (North Sea Offshore Authorities 
Forum, 2014). Despite these initiatives, there were several signs of struggles in knowledge 
sharing. For instance, it seemed that the knowledge produced in these initiatives was not 
widely adopted by the drilling community.
We use a case study to investigate how HF specialists struggled to participate in field level 
learning from Macondo by creating and attempting to share specialist knowledge with 
the drilling community. A qualitative research strategy is useful for this research purpose 
for two reasons. First, qualitative methods enable understanding a complex phenomenon 
– in this case field-level learning in the wake of a disaster – in depth and explain how 
it evolved and why (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Langley, 1999). Furthermore, a qualitative 
approach recognizes to the role of context of social phenomena (Yin, 2008), enabling us 
to contextualize boundaries to knowledge sharing in the wider institutional setting, in 
particular the risk regime in which field-level learning is embedded (Elliott & Smith, 2006; 
Hale, 2014).
Data collection
We collected a variety of data sources from diverse actors playing a key role in discussions 
about Human Factors in the North Sea drilling sector. The data collection phase consisted 
of two main phases. We were initially interested in understanding how the HF community 
attempted to change institutionalized practices of risk and safety management and 
workforce training. As indicated earlier, there was a lot of emphasis on and activity around 
HFs in the wake of Macondo, as several initiatives were organized to raise awareness and 
institutionalize HF knowledge in risk and safety management practices and workforce 
training. The second author - having researched the role of Human Factors in high-risk 
settings, and done research and consultancy for the oil and gas industry as an academic 
researcher at the University of Aberdeen - was involved as an HF champion in several of 
these initiatives. She contributed to an industry task force about Macondo, contributed 
to a HF conference in Houston in 2012; and co-organizing a HF conference in London 
in October 2014. There was a shared conviction in the HF community that they were 
effectively changing an industry. Hence, we initially set out to investigate how HF specialists 
institutionalized the HF discipline in the offshore industry.
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In this phase, the primary means of data collection were participant observations. Both 
authors participated in the HF conference in London in October 2014, where the first author 
contributed as a scribe and wrote extensive notes of the presentations and discussions that 
took place. Based on these notes an article in a trade journal was written. Both the notes 
and the trade journal article were included in the data set. Also, the first author conducted 
non-participant observations at a well control training center in the Netherlands. This 
well control center offered a scenario well control training that involved training in HFs. 
In total, the first author observed 5 days of training. These observations were valuable 
because they provided insights in how the trainers aimed to transfer HFs knowledge to 
offshore workers, and it provided several illustrations of workers’ unfamiliarity with HFs 
knowledge and their struggles to apply it in the scenario training. In the first phase we 
also conducted nine interviews with HF specialists from the second author’s professional 
network, between December 2013 and October 2014. We were interested in interviewees’ 
perceptions on the importance of the HF discipline for the offshore industry, initiatives 
in the field to create and institutionalize HFs knowledge following the Macondo disaster, 
and their perspective on the status of HFs in the offshore industry. Finally, we collected 
several industry reports, the majority of which was publicly available. Secondary data is 
useful for complementing interview data, because it is produced “naturally” instead of “at 
the request of a social researcher” (Bryman, 2015, p. 543). This limits the potential reactive 
effect of data collection, increasing the validity of the data. The publication of documents 
by industry actors allows us to trace the process of knowledge creation and transfer in 
the offshore industry over time. We collected the reports that referred to Human Factors 
from websites of industry actors that play an important role in field-level learning in the 
North Sea offshore industry, such as industry associations and regulators.
While we set out to investigate the institutionalization of HFs after the Macondo disaster, 
after the HF conference in London we began to realize that the change process was 
slowing down. During our interviews and observations, HF specialists had referred to 
challenges involved in the change process, but so far it had appeared to us that these 
were inescapable elements of change processes. Yet, it increasingly appeared that field-
level learning about HF did not proceed, so we decided to investigate further. First, we 
went to test our intuition by conducting another round of four interviews with people 
that we interviewed in the first phase. In these interviews we presented this new insight 
to the interviewees and asked them to comment. All four interviewees confirmed our 
intuition; hence we proceeded to discuss their perspective on what could have stopped 
the progress. These interviews increased our confidence in our observation so we decided 
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to change our broad research – ‘why did widespread learning about HFs not occur?’ – and 
engage in another round of data collection. We used a snowball method to let these four 
interviewees identify other potential interviewees. We then contacted these people and 
repeated the strategy. In the second phase we conducted an additional twelve interviews 
between March 2017 and October 2017. The interviews focused more specifically on 
historically situating the development of HFs in the offshore industry, and barriers that 
the interviewees encountered in their efforts to put HFs on the map as a safety issue in 
the offshore industry. Several of our interviewees indicated that the drilling community did 
not understand HFs, as they attempted to solve the issue of human error by prescribing 
more technical training. Hence, from the perspective of the HF specialists, the drilling 
community only focused on the technical competence of personnel. To better understand 
the drilling community’s understanding of HFs, human error, and competence, we collected 
additional documents. Again, we visited the websites of industry actors that played an 
important role in field-level learning in the North Sea offshore industry, but this time we 
also collected documents that referred human error or competency. These documents 
gave more insights in how the drilling community learned from the Macondo disaster. 
To understand the historical developments of HF knowledge in the North Sea offshore 
industry, we also included documents about Human Factors, human error, and competence 
published before the Macondo disaster occurred. We scanned these documents for 
references to other relevant documents and actors, visited these websites and repeated 
this strategy until no new key actors and relevant documents emerged. Similarly, our new 
interviewees frequently referred to documents, which we then collected. Three documents 
were not publicly available but shared by an interviewee. This way, we collected a body 
of interconnected documents (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004) that illustrated two wider, but 
conflicting discourses on human error. Finally, we included two interviews with drilling 
engineers in our interview data sample that were collected as part of an earlier research 
project on learning about the Macondo disaster, in which the interviewees discussed their 
perspective on the role of human error and technical competence in the causation of the 
Macondo disaster. This provided extra insight into the drilling community’s understanding 
of human error. In total, we collected 23 interviews.
Data analysis
In this paper we are interested in the struggles of one epistemic community to overcome 
knowledge boundaries and share knowledge with another epistemic community. We 
analyse the epistemic community’s activities in different communal settings. Lindkvist 
(2005) differentiates between ‘knowledge communities’ – i.e. CoPs – and ‘knowledge 
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collectivities’, which refer to temporary groups and project teams that are organized with 
the explicit objective to create and exchange knowledge. In such pressured collectivities of 
practice, there is no time to develop communal knowledge and tightly-knit communities, 
yet they may still be regarded as groups that learn as they operates on a collective goal 
instead of shared values and common understandings. In our analysis we identify three 
knowledge communities: the HF community, the drilling community, and the constituency 
of senior management. Furthermore, we identify ‘knowledge collectivities’: temporary task 
forces that were organized in the wake of the Macondo disaster and tasked with learning 
lessons. In our analysis we focus on two related practices in the field of offshore drilling 
around which the struggles for knowledge sharing revolve: learning from disaster, which 
occurred in the wake of Macondo, and the practice of risk and safety management which 
the learning process seeks to improve. We analysed how the HF community struggled for 
participation in both practices, within the workplace as well as task forces.
The first step in our analysis was to identify important events and order them in a timeline 
of events. Since task forces are important arenas of knowledge creation and sharing, 
in the wake of crises and disasters (e.g. U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
Board, 2016), we perceived the organization of task forces and publication of guidelines 
as important events. Furthermore, we were sensitive to what our interviewees mentioned 
as important events. After the identification of events, we used MAXQDA to code the 
data inductively and create first order concepts that were close to the empirical data 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994). Our analysis followed two analytical steps. In the first step, we 
focused on how the HF and drilling communities interpreted of the causes of the Macondo 
disaster and their what solutions they proposed strategies. Furthermore, we focused on 
the challenges experienced by HF specialists and the strategies they used to emphasize 
the relevance of HFs for the drilling community. Our initial codes were close to the data. 
Then we reorganized the first order concepts into conceptually distinct labels, grouping 
similar concepts to create second order categories, resulting in increased abstraction of 
data. We identified different calls for action, underlying assumptions, and three central 
knowledge transformation strategies that the HF community employed. During this first 
analytical step, tensions emerged from our data between the HF community’s strategies 
and institutionalized assumptions, beliefs, and responsibilities of the drilling community 
and senior management constituency. Therefore, we engaged in a second analytical step 
in which we went back to the data to further analyse these tensions. By going back and 
forth between our empirical strategies and theory, we were able to refine our empirical 
categories into aggregated constructs and connect these to theoretical constructs, such 
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as ‘synactic-’, ‘semantic-’, and ‘pragmatic knowledge boundary’. The codebook is shown 
in Appendix A.
FINDINGS
In this paragraph we demonstrate that sharing of HF knowledge with the drilling 
community was complicated by the presence of semantic and pragmatic boundaries that 
limited mutual engagement of the two communities in the wake of Macondo. First, we 
find that a semantic boundary – rooted in different assumptions about human error – 
contributed to the creation of divergent disaster accounts and calls for action. Second, we 
show how the HF community used the Macondo disaster as motivation to become more 
established in the drilling industry. They engage in strategies of discipline recognition, 
like emphasizing the success of HF in other hazardous industries, and showcasing their 
specialist non-technical knowledge to the drilling and senior management communities. 
However, we show how the self-referential nature of these strategies created pragmatic 
boundaries that limited sharing of HF knowledge. In particular, it undermined the HF 
community’s legitimacy, as they were unable to connect to the dominant drilling and senior 
management discourses and values. Third, we demonstrate how the separation between 
the HF and drilling and senior management community is reinforced by the North Sea risk 
regime that exists in the North Sea. Institutionalized mechanisms of and responsibilities 
for learning maintain community boundaries in place.
Developing different call for more radical action
The first official accident investigation report that was published on the Macondo disaster 
was from BP. One of the central findings of BP’s internal investigation report was that a lack 
of personnel competency was an important contributing cause of the Macondo disaster. 
To resolve this ‘lack of competence’, the report recommended to “Enhance competency 
programs to deepen the capabilities of personnel in key operational and leadership positions” 
(BP report, p. 183), by defining critical competencies and providing more technical and 
leadership training. The drilling community in the North Sea region embraced BP’s ‘lack 
of personnel competence’ account and call for more training. For instance, one of the 
workgroup leaders of a Macondo industry task force argued: “the competence of the 
people was 80% of the failure” (Drilling engineer in major oil company). Almost completely 
similar to BP, the task force’s call for action focused on establishing formal competencies 
and more training: “Leadership and Supervisory competencies should be established and 
assessed for [key] positions” (OSPRAG report, p. 12), while an association argued “The 
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critical competencies identified comprise ‘technical’ and ‘leadership and supervisory’.” (OGUK 
competency guidelines, p. 8).
We argue that the ‘lack of competence’ account and the call for more training are based 
a particular set of assumptions about how disasters caused and therefore should be 
prevented. The ‘lack of competence’ account seems to attribute accountability for the 
accident to the individual and the team. Hence, the drilling community’s learning initiatives 
aspired to achieve “a reduction in the frequency and consequence of well control incidents 
caused by lack of individual or team competence” (OGP 476, p. 5). This quote indicates 
the drilling community’s belief that a lack of individual or team competence is the root 
cause of accidents. In line with these beliefs, the call for action focused on limiting human 
fallibility and improving control over human behavior through strengthened training and 
competence management. Hence, call for action focused on ‘fixing the person’.
In contrast, the HF community has a radically different understanding of human error. 
From their perspective, human error cannot be wholly attributed to an individual, as 
human behavior is situated in contextual influences. Human error is thus not understood 
as a root cause of incidents, but a consequence of a complex interplay of organizational 
and contextual factors. HF consultant #1 emphasized the radical difference between these 
perspectives: “it is deeply fundamental whether you believe people behave in-context and 
situational, or that [human behavior is] individually driven.” Hence, lack of competence 
was not a satisfying explanation of the Macondo disaster for HF specialists, nor increased 
technical training an appropriate call for action:
“Improving human performance goes far beyond simply retraining individuals on the 
technical aspects of offshore operations […] The performance failures identified post-incident 
do not point to worker competency per se, but to a variety of situational, contextual, and 
organizational variables [that affected human behavior].” (CSB investigation report, p. 22-23).
Hence, we argue that the different beliefs about the notion ‘human error’ and corresponding 
calls for action reflect a semantic boundary between the two communities that drove the 
development of different calls for action. In contrast to the call for more training, the HF 
community proposed that more radical change was required to learn properly from the 
Macondo disaster. The majority of our interviewees argued for the importance of a deep 
cultural change in the drilling industry, driven by the implementation of HF knowledge 
in companies. For instance, one interviewee argued for the need to “get to that level 
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of cultural awareness where [HF knowledge] becomes part of the DNA of the industry” 
(HSE manager in small company). Hence, the HF community’s call for action focused 
on the need for fundamental cultural change in the industry, to be achieved through 
the institutionalization of HF awareness, competence, and procedures in oil companies. 
Therefore, while semantic differences caused different calls for action, we also argue that 
this difference in understanding and meaning motivated the HF community to engage in a 
political struggle to further the HF discipline. Our analysis indicated that the HF community 
plays a relatively marginal role in the drilling industry, but they perceived themselves as 
having superior knowledge about human behavior. For instance, HF specialists discredited 
the drilling community’s ‘naïve’ understanding of human error:
“The majority of people [in the drilling industry] have engineering backgrounds. They apply 
engineering metaphors to managing people. So, for instance, in engineering you program 
machines to follow a sequence of steps. This analogy is then applied to people, because they 
expect people to behave in the same way as a machine does and follow all the steps. And we 
all know that it doesn’t work like that.” (HF specialist in major oil company #2).
The claim ‘we all know that it doesn’t work like that’ indicates that for the HF community 
the inadequacy of this ‘engineering perspective’ on human behavior and the call for 
more training was evident. However, our interviewees frequently portrayed the drilling 
community as just not able to grasp HF knowledge. For instance, an interviewee argued: 
“They don’t understand it. I have tried to explain it to engineers, but I just don’t get anywhere. 
It is bizarre, because to me it is so simple, so straightforward” (HF specialist #4). Hence, we 
argue that the HF community perceived themselves as having superior knowledge of 
human error and behavior, and therefore were convinced that their call for culture change 
should be respected. Despite being a marginal community, they believed that they should 
play a central role in learning from the Macondo disaster, as well as daily risk and safety 
management practices in oil companies. Therefore, they engaged in a political struggle for 
discipline recognition to increase their status and influence, thereby aiming to become an 
established community in the industry in the wake of the Macondo disaster. They aspired 
to raise the profile of the HF discipline by legitimating it as a distinct safety aspect. For 
instance, an HSE manager of a small oil company said: “[HF] is something that needs to 
be debated and discussed much more coherently and consistently across the industry. As a 
discernable separate initiative.” Our analysis indicates that awareness of HFs increased in 
the offshore industry as a consequence of the Macondo disaster. For instance, several 
major companies created a HF position in their safety department or contracted external 
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consultants for HF advice. However, we will show that their strategies to increase discipline 
recognition were ineffective, because they were self-referential – i.e. they were convincing 
from their own frame of reference, but did not connect to established discourses. This 
limited their ability to share HF knowledge with established communities in the industry 
and drive cultural change. We focus in particular on their practices to engage with two 
established communities: drilling personnel and senior management.
Using generalized sales pitch to justify relevance of HF for drilling
One of our main findings is that HF community used ineffective rationalizations to explain 
why HF knowledge is relevant for the drilling industry. For instance, our analysis indicates 
that the HF community frequently made references to the successful implementation 
of HF knowledge and procedures in other industries, in particular civil aviation. One HF 
consultant that we interviewed used this example in a trade journal article: “Aviation was 
the first to recognize [the value of HF] and began training flight crews in HFs. Look at them 
– their safety has gone through the roof” (HF consultant #2). Yet, we argue that the drilling 
community likely will not be convinced by these rationalizations, because they are self-
referential in the sense that they put the success of the HF discipline at center stage, rather 
than making HF knowledge relatable to the drilling context. One of our interviewees 
reflected on this:
“We hold aviation up as the gold standard. And I think a lot of drilling personnel say: ‘that’s 
pilots, that’s not us.’ Maybe a different approach is needed. Maybe an operations technician 
on an oil rig cannot relate to a pilot […] How do we make HF relatable to the guy at the front 
line.” (HF specialist in major oil company #3).
Rationalizations referencing to civil aviation focus on bolstering the status of the HF 
discipline by emphasizing success stories in other settings, rather than emphasizing how 
exactly it may be of service to the drilling community. In particular, by emphasizing the 
success of the HF discipline in other high hazard industries, these rationalizations claim 
generalizability. However, we found that the drilling community perceives itself as unique. 
Our data presents several indications of this belief of uniqueness. First, even several of 
the HF specialists that we interviewed mentioned how drilling is a unique endeavor. For 
instance, one interviewee argued: “My belief is that the offshore industry is totally unique 
when it comes to its configuration of risks”(HF consultant #3). We argue that’s such beliefs 
may limit actors’ acknowledgement of insights from other industries. Furthermore, we 
found that beliefs about uniqueness also operated within the offshore industry. The U.S. 
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Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2016) identified that HF failures played an 
important role in the causation of the Macondo disaster. However, our data indicated that 
many actors in the North Sea seemed to believe that such a disaster could never happen 
in the North Sea. For instance, a drilling consultant argued: “I think there is a great deal of 
hubris in the North sea about ‘our regulations would not have allowed this to happen’”. We 
argue that these beliefs limited recognition of findings from the Chemical Safety Board 
investigation. But the differentiation goes even further than this. There even seems to be a 
dominant perception that individual rigs differ substantially from each other. For instance, 
while one interviewee was skeptical about this, he acknowledged that the drill crews tend 
to perceive themselves as unique:
“One rig will tell you that everything about them is different to the other one […] The guys 
on one installation and the guys on another one, everything they do and how they do it is 
almost entirely the same. But they will never tell you about the 95% common ground. They 
will identify the five per cent difference.” (HF consultant #1).
This emphasis on differences between individual rigs can also be found in essentially 
all guidelines that are produced in the industry. For instance, the industry association 
OGP mentioned in their Well Control Competency guidelines: “Training should always be 
tailored according to the specific operation, environment, rig type and type of well control 
equipment in use”. While we understand that different situations may require custom 
approaches to training, and that different rigs may have different cultures, we argue that 
these diverse examples also demonstrate an institutionalized belief in the uniqueness 
of drilling operations. This emphasis on uniqueness appears to be a core element of the 
dominant discourse in the drilling industry. As such, issue-selling strategies that showcase 
the success of the HF discipline in other industries ignore this institutionalized element 
of the drilling discourse. Instead, for rationalizations to be effective we argue that they 
should recognize this belief in the uniqueness of drilling.
Using decontextualized, non-technical knowledge in a technically dominated 
environment
Another of the HF community’s self-referential strategy involved the distribution of HF 
knowledge in the drilling industry. The HF community created several reports for the 
drilling community that incorporated HF knowledge. For instance, the Human Factors 
subcommittee of industry association OGP developed a report that focused on the 
cognitive aspects of HFs, which focused on explaining core psychological concepts. 
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However, the analysis of HF reports that were published in the wake of Macondo showed 
that they were focused heavily on the psychology of HFs, but were rather decontextualized 
from drilling practices. In an article in a trade journal, the decontextualized nature of the 
various HFs initiatives was challenged:
“The common thread throughout all of these publications and activities is that they are 
directed toward a narrow audience of human factors specialists who are concerned with 
researching human factors-related issues or setting up of training programs. However, 
there has been little attempt to communicate the central ideas to those who deal with the 
problems of human error in all its forms on a daily basis; in particular, the drilling operations 
community.” (Hsieh, 2014).
As these quotes shows, the HF community strived for discipline recognition by emphasizing 
HF as a separate initiative and producing artifacts, like reports, in which HF knowledge was 
illustrated. However, we argue that this approach to knowledge sharing was ineffective. It 
appears that the HF community operated largely from their frame of reference, using their 
specialist vocabulary and presenting HF knowledge in a decontextualized, abstract manner. 
Their reports included little reference to the specific drilling processes and context. Our 
analysis shows that this self-referential practice created pragmatic knowledge boundaries 
between the HF and drilling communities that complicated mutual engagement, 
knowledge sharing, and participation in the drilling community’s learning initiatives and 
daily risk management practices in oil companies. For instance, as several interviewees 
indicated, this specialist HF vocabulary creates legitimacy problems for the HF community. 
For instance, a consultant said: “[drillers] think [HF] is touchy-feely psychological babble” 
(Drilling consultant). This indicates that the use of the specialist HF vocabulary undermines 
the community’s credibility with the drilling community. In particular, their use of the 
specialist HF vocabulary appears to conflict with the established workplace discourse, 
which is dominated by the drilling community’s technical terminology. Our analysis 
indicates that the drilling community used their own technical specialist vocabulary to 
exercise authority in the workplace. A UK offshore inspector referred to this:
“I do think that drilling speaks another language. And I know that some of my colleagues, 
they go to inspect a drilling rig and they don’t go anywhere near the drill floor, because they 
don’t understand anything that happens there. That is a problem. There is so much jargon 
and so many acronyms […] fundamentally the physics and the engineering of it is quite 
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understandable but it is presented to you in this format that is just like a foreign language. 
So you do have to be able to breach that.” (Offshore inspector #1).
Another interviewee added: “[drillers] wear that jargon with such pride” (HF specialist in 
major oil company #1). Hence, we argue that the technical drilling vocabulary served 
as a mechanism for in- and exclusion, reinforcing the drilling community’s status, while 
excluding those who are not familiar with the technical terminology and practices. 
Succeeding in the offshore industry as a HF specialist therefore seems to require having 
technical knowledge of drilling processes, terminology and context. For instance, HF 
specialist in major oil company #1 argued: “to see the [HF] problem requires understanding 
the [drilling] context. And that takes some degree of expertise within the area that you are 
working in”. Yet, it seems that HF specialists did not always succeed in developing this 
knowledge:
“I’ve seen human factors people fail horribly when they get into industry. To have a good 
ergonomics or occupational psychology [degree] doesn’t equip you to go in to an oil rig and 
achieve very much. […] You need to understand the person and have the technical grounding.” 
(HF consultant #1).
Hence, we argue that the HF community has the implicit assumption that having specialist 
HF knowledge is sufficient for making a positive contribution to safety in the drilling 
industry. They did not deepen their technical and cultural understanding of the drilling 
context and processes. Hence, we argue that the HF specialists’ use of non-technical, 
specialist knowledge and vocabulary, and their lack of knowledge about the drilling context 
undermined their legitimacy in the drilling industry. Their attempt to engage with the 
drilling community while holding on to their own frame of reference was doomed to fail, 
as their language and knowledge did not resonate with the drilling communities technical 
specialist knowledge and discourse. In fact, the drilling community used their technical 
drilling discourse to maintain authority relations in the workplace. As such, an inspector 
of the UK regulator referred to the issue of language:
“If you are a HF specialist and you need to talk to the driller or their manager, you need to 
have that credibility, you need to be able to speak in their terms, and there probably are very 
few HF specialists who are that good.” (Offshore inspector #1).
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Similarly, HF specialist in a major company #2 argued for the importance of “being able 
to establish guidelines that someone with a non-human factors background can pick 
up and understand and see how this is helpful.” These quotes show the importance of 
contextualizing HF knowledge to the work setting in which it is supposed to be applied. 
This indicates that knowledge sharing with the drilling community requires the HF 
community to learn about the technical drilling practices and discourse and mold the 
two bodies of knowledge. Without such knowledge transformation, sharing HF knowledge 
is unlikely to occur.
Justifying HF as distinct safety discipline in a efficiency-focused management 
environment
Legitimacy problems did not just arise between the non-technical HF specialists and 
the technical drilling community. The HF community also had difficulties to relate to the 
constituency of senior management in oil companies. The aspiration to establish HF as a 
distinct safety discipline exposes it to management criteria for budgeting, and competition 
with other safety issues for attention and budget from senior management. This seems 
to be a serious hurdle for the HF community, as an external HF consultant argued in our 
interview:
“As soon as you get behind that first line management, then there is little recognition of the 
importance of [HF] skills. […] That is where it falls apart. And that’s where the question of 
‘what is the return on investment’ tends to come.” (HF consultant #2).
This emphasis on ‘return on investment’ indicates an important challenge for the HF 
community, namely to demonstrate the financial value of the HF discipline. As the majority 
of our interviewees indicated, there is something inherently difficult about showing the 
value of HF Another interviewee confirmed this challenge:
“A challenge I found is demonstrating how HF adds value. With engineering you can 
perform modeling, calculations, you can more or less put a money value on a project, piece 
of equipment, activity, etc. [But when] we do a task analysis and find some conditions that 
may increase the likelihood of error…so what? ‘What is the value of that? And does it really 
work? We can do so many things to improve safety, why should I as a leader prioritize this 
activity if it is only probabilistic. Can you guarantee me that it will prevent accidents?’ no I 
cannot. ‘Can you demonstrate the impact and value?’ No, you cannot. You cannot show any 
relationship with something that didn’t happen.” (HF specialist in major oil company #2).
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This quote is an indication of Weick’s (1987) famous claim that safety is a “dynamic non-
event”: actors continuously work to maintain reliability, so that no incidents will happen. But 
it is impossible to establish a causal relation between an intervention and the absence of an 
event. This complicates the potential for HF specialists to convince senior management that 
HF as a distinct safety issues that requires formal management. An HSE director of a small 
oil company reflected on difficulty to mobilize HFs as a distinct safety issue in his company:
“Getting the subject on the table is another aspect about safety alongside everything else 
that we are dealing with. I have got a whole range of stuff like risk management, competency, 
asset integrity management. These are items we need [safety] programs for […] and then you 
have got human factors. And then the question [from senior management] is: ‘Okay, what is 
human factors and what is really relevant?’ […] We need to hit big items first.”
In particular, the impact of quantifiable ‘big items’ like risk management, competency, and 
asset integrity is more readily measurable or simulated than the impact of HF on safety. 
As such, it seems that the HF discipline also suffers from a lack of legitimacy with senior 
management. Difficulties to establish the value of the HF discipline, for instance in financial 
terms, undermine the credibility of HF as an issue to be supported by management. 
Furthermore, it seems that this also threatens the position of HF specialists in oil companies: 
“when the downturn came, I was one of the first out of the door” (HF consultant #3). Instead, 
to get traction with senior management it seems that it is important to use other strategies, 
especially to connect it to their discourse and values. For instance, HF specialist in a major 
company #2 argued for the importance to “take a topic that they are concerned about. 
[…] My tone, language, phrasing was adapted to the needs of this particular group, which 
are based on their experience and context.” Similarly, HF consultant #1 argued that to get 
traction with senior management “We should not refer to human factors. The human factors 
people have got beyond themselves and tried to create themselves as the objective. They’re 
not. Human performance is the objective”. Instead, he argued:
“We should be going in with a really sound economic bottom line argument, but a lot of the 
human factors community are not comfortable with that, they’ve spent too long in the safety 
camp. You have got to be able to win an argument on business grounds because you are 
dealing with businesses. As long as people are still going in talking about human factors in 
terms of safety then it’s seen as an overhead in the boardroom.” (HF consultant #1).
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This was also recognized by another HF specialist: “sometimes the emphasis has had to be 
more on efficiency and that got us a little bit more of a hook than safety unfortunately. If it’s 
the only way forwards, then maybe that will have to be the way” (HF specialist in major oil 
company #3). This shows that the effectiveness of HF specialists depended on their ability 
to adapt to the senior management discourse of financial efficiency. We argue that the HF 
community was aware on the importance of convincing senior management, which we 
will illustrate with a short narrative from a HF workshop that the authors participated in.
Narrative of HF workshop – emerging awareness of the ‘HF business case’.
In October 2014, a handful of enthusiastic people from the HF and drilling communities 
organized a workshop in London under the auspices of professional association ‘Society of 
Petroleum Engineers’, titled ‘Getting to Grips with Human Factors in Drilling Operations’. 
The organizers of the workshop recognized that the HF community’s attempts to spread 
HF knowledge throughout the North Sea drilling industry in the wake of Macondo had 
limited effect so far. There was a shared awareness that they were engaged in an uphill 
struggle. Hence, one of the purposes of this workshop was to discuss how to improve the 
institutionalization of HF knowledge in the drilling sector. One of the main discussion points 
was the importance of senior management involvement. The participants were convinced that 
HF was not “just another initiative”, but recognized that “the HF message was not sticking 
at the top”. During the workshop sessions participants were allowed to raise issues that they 
perceived as important insights concerning this problem. One of the emerging topics was 
the importance of developing an “HF-sensitive business case” to convince managers of the 
value of HFs. The participants realized that they had “to frame their objective differently”. It 
was argued that HF was not supposed to be the objective, but they recognized the need to 
“push the business buttons” by connecting the HF objective to organizational goals, such as 
operational excellence, efficiency, and costs. Hence, participants agreed that justifications 
should stress that HF would be good for business and lead to competitive advantage. Issue 
selling strategies should to emphasize the “win-win situation” of generating benefit for safety 
and for business. These were fresh insights – the workshop conveners had not planned to 
conclude with an argument for a business case for HF; it was raised by participants. Still, the 
discussion did not produce a concrete strategy on how to create an HF business case. While 
the objective was clear, it remained unclear how participants could achieve this and relate 
to senior management in their own organizations.
Despite the realization that justifications for HF had to be linked to senior management 
values, like competitive advantage, efficiency, and financial value, it seems that it had 
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limited effect over time. As one of the participants argued in an interview in 2017: “we’ve 
not got it into the hearts and the minds of the CEOs of the companies” (Director of training 
center). We propose that the severe drop in oil price that occurred during this period, put 
extra emphasis on ‘efficiency’ as a management objective. Given the lack of a concrete 
strategy to develop an “HF-sensitive” business case, combined with difficulty to show the 
value of HF, we argue that this limited the HF community’s potential to sell the issue to 
senior management. However, this was further complicated by the HF community’s aim 
to strive for recognition of HF as a distinct safety issue, which exposed HFs to budgeting 
pressures.
Institutionalized learning mechanisms and responsibilities maintain 
knowledge boundaries
The previous paragraphs addressed how the strategies of the HF community to achieve 
discipline recognition limited their ability to spread HF knowledge through the drilling 
industry. Yet, our analysis also indicated that field-level institutions, especially the North 
Sea risk regime, presented an additional constraint on the HF community’s attempts 
for knowledge transformation. We found how institutionalized responsibilities of risk 
governance privileged the drilling community as the designated learning authority in 
the wake of Macondo. This limited the HF community’s opportunity to shape field level 
learning.
In the North Sea goal-setting risk regime, the drilling industry itself is responsible for risk 
and safety management. For instance, as a UK regulatory inspector argued: “companies 
manage their own risk, and we do occasional spot checks” (Inspector #1). In line with this 
division of responsibilities, industry actors were also responsible for learning in the wake of 
incidents. Industry learning tends to be driven by industry bodies, like industry associations, 
who develop guidelines of conduct for companies. UK regulatory inspector #1 explained 
how guidelines are used to direct company behavior: “if you comply with the guidelines 
you are likely to comply with the law. Guidelines provide that bare minimum. So, we do then 
use those guideline to hold people to account”. While the majority of interviewees endorsed 
this form of ‘enforced self-regulation’, it seems that this institutionalized mechanism of 
learning reinforced separation between the drilling and HF community during the field-
level learning trajectory following Macondo. For instance, to populate its Macondo task 
force, industry association OGP stated: “OGP will call for experts and resources from its 
membership” (GIRG Deepwater Wells report). However, since HF specialists tend to play 
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only a marginal role in oil companies, it seems that their contribution in these task forces 
is limited:
“Maybe there was no deep human factors specialist in the [task force] group that wrote 
[guidance]. That’s a vulnerability for the HF community. They’re not getting themselves 
around the table. But, because [guidance] was written by people with their feet very firmly 
in the industry it’s easy to adopt. It’ll be written by people like them, for people like them. It 
won’t be challenging from a human factors point of view because they can’t do that. They’re 
working at the level of current knowledge. They’re not in the profession to look at what is 
emerging knowledge. So it’ll always be a little bit out of date but it’ll always be better than 
what they’re doing now. And those [guidelines] are the ones that really get traction [in the 
industry] because they’re practical. They make a difference, not fantastic but they make a 
difference. But the HF community are pretty much outside that loop because they’re not in 
the rooms when those groups get put together to write it.” (HF consultant #1).
This shows how institutionalized learning mechanisms in the drilling industry privilege 
established communities as learning agents, thereby stimulating learning from disaster 
that is predisposed towards refining established knowledge, and reinforcing the 
dominance of the established communities in the field. Hence, these institutionalized 
learning mechanisms and responsibilities represent pragmatic knowledge boundaries, 
which limited knowledge sharing between the HF and drilling communities.
Still, the HF community did play a small role in several industry associations. For instance, 
some associations had a standing HF committee, or contracted HF specialists to specifically 
learn HF lessons from the Macondo disaster. In these project groups, the HF community 
wrote several reports and guidelines on HF. Yet, our analysis indicated that adoption of HF 
guidelines was limited. While regulators use guidelines to keep companies to account, our 
findings indicate that two institutional factors limited regulatory pressures for adoption of 
the HF guidelines. First, a fundamental principle of the risk governance regime in the North 
Sea is that the adoption of guidelines is voluntary. Companies have the right to diverge 
from guidelines if they are able to demonstrate that they have a proper alternative. Because 
of this voluntary nature of adoption, an interviewee argued: “because they’re guidelines 
rather than standards, the [HF] reports will never receive universal buy-in from everybody” 
(Director of training center). A second institutional factor limiting adoption was the lack of 
HF expertise in the regulator. Our findings show that HFs was not a high-profile topic for 
the regulator. An inspector with the UK regulator reflected: “there is a shortage of HF staff 
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[in the regulator] and that has definitely affected the kind of decision-making of companies, 
who have cut HF knowing that they are not getting an inspection next year” (Regulatory 
inspector #1). In particular, it seems that the HF expertise in regulators has been limited 
due to resource constraints. For instance, inspector #2 argued:
“[HF expertise] ebbs and flows within our organisation. Probably ten years ago it was very, 
very much resourced. And that resource is being depleted. But within the last six months 
the organisation has looked to increase that resource again [but] it has really just been very 
recent. And I don’t think we’re at the point of absolutely embedding that [in the organization] 
and then coming up with a forward strategy. They’re still piloting.” (Regulatory inspector #2).
Hence, while the adoption of HF guidelines in the offshore industry could be stimulated by 
the regulator, it appears that HF is not a high-profile issue for the regulator in the wake of 
Macondo. As such, adopting HF knowledge seems to largely remain a voluntary exercise in 
the offshore drilling sector. We found that institutionalized mechanisms and responsibilities 
of learning – task forces made up of established communities; the voluntary adoption 
of guidelines; and lack of HF expertise in the regulator – have limited opportunities for 
HF knowledge sharing in the offshore drilling industry. Initiatives for field-level learning, 
therefore, largely build upon and refined established drilling knowledge, as the drilling 
community was barely exposed to the knowledge of the marginal HF community. As such, 
the risk regime seems to limit opportunities for more radical learning.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to better understand the contested nature of learning from 
disaster. In this section we discuss the main findings and elaborate our theoretical 
contributions.
Field-level learning from disaster as a process of contestation
We contribute to the learning from disaster literature by conceptualization learning from 
disaster as a contested process in which communities struggle over the transformation 
of knowledge at epistemic boundaries. In particular, we argue that the inability of 
marginal actors to overcome knowledge- and political boundaries between themselves 
and established communities in the wake of a disaster results in ‘paradigmatic learning’ 
(Deschamps et al., 1997) in an organizational field – i.e. refining established knowledge 
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and practices, thereby reinforcing them, rather than changing deeper assumption, values, 
and beliefs.
Research on (technological) risk has argued that risk is heavily contested; different actors 
have different interests and perspectives on the nature and desirability of risk, leading to 
the production of conflicting knowledge claims and competing risk discourses – between 
experts and laypeople as well as among experts (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1990; 1991; Power, 
2007; Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2014). Following disasters these differences become explicit, 
as traditional authority relations in a field are destabilized (Hoffman, 1999) and different 
epistemic communities invoke different mental models of how incidents are caused and 
should be prevented in the future (Carroll, 1998; Deschamps et al., 1997; Gherardi & 
Nicolini, 2002; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). Hence, the notion of politics of expertise (Beck, 
1992; Fischer, 1990) is central to the topics of risk and learning from disaster.
Bunderson and Reagan’s (2011) review of literature on status and learning suggests that 
when social hierarchies become unstable – like in the wake of a disaster – high- and 
low-ranking actors assume different learning attitudes. Low-ranking actors become 
more proactive and change-oriented, while high-ranking actors become more reactive 
and defensive. This suggests that in the wake of a disaster, marginal communities may 
challenge the expertise and authority of established communities, and prompt radical 
learning initiatives. Similarly, the literature on institutional change shows that disruptive 
events, like disasters, may drive marginal communities to challenge authority relations 
and aim for institutional change (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Hoffman, 1999). This study 
confirmed that a disaster triggers a struggle between communities with conflicting calls 
for action. Our study showed that marginal communities may perceive themselves as 
having superior knowledge and expecting recognition of their expertise from established 
communities. Hence, marginal communities attempts to contribute to learning processes in 
the wake of disaster may be understood as having a dual function: improving prevention, 
as well as occupying a more central role in the organizational field. Nevertheless, we 
found that the marginal community experienced difficulties in their effort to influence 
field-level learning from disaster. We showed that the different understandings of how 
accidents are caused, and the strategic efforts for discipline recognition respectively 
created semantic and pragmatic knowledge boundaries (Carlile, 2002; 2004), which they 
were unable to overcome. Other studies on organizational and institutional change have 
indicated that a marginal community may be able to alter established authority relations 
when their proposal for change – meant to improve their authority position – draws on 
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traditional values (Lawrence, Malhotra, & Morris, 2012), familiar discursive resources from 
other institutional contexts (Levina & Orlikowski, 2009), or the established community’s 
interpretative schemes (Howard-Grenville, 2007). These studies suggest that a change 
initiative by a marginal community on one hand needs to radically break with existing 
authority relations, while still resonating with established and recognizable cultural 
resources. Yet, in our case, we found that the HF community did not connect to established 
cultural resources, in particular the dominant drilling and management discourses in the 
industry. They aimed to disrupt existing authority relations, but operated largely from 
their own frame of reference. Therefore, their strategies conflicted with established beliefs 
and values of the established drilling and senior management communities. For example, 
justifications based on generalization of success stories in other industries created a tension 
with the institutionalized belief that drilling operations are unique endeavors. Hence, 
our findings showed that the marginal community’s proposal for radical change did not 
connect to established values and discourses. Instead they aimed to share their knowledge 
by simply transferring it to the established communities, while the presence of semantic 
and pragmatic boundaries required them to engage in more active transformation to 
create common ground (Bechky, 2003; Carlile, 2002; 2004; Gherardi & Nicolini 2000b; 
2002). This limited their potential to participate in field-level learning processes in the 
wake of disaster.
Studies on knowledge transformation between epistemic communities have argued 
that dominant epistemic community are likely to become self-referential, refining 
established knowledge and reinforcing assumptions and values (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2002; 
Roberts, 2006). This study showed that in absence of new knowledge inputs by marginal 
communities, learning from disaster focused primarily on learning technical lessons, 
like more technical training and improved competence management procedures. The 
literature on learning from incidents in high hazard industries has indicated that learning 
from disaster tends to be dominated by principles of technical rationality, represented by 
technical experts like engineers (Carroll, 1995; 1998; Carroll et al., 2002; Dekker, 2014; Elliott 
& Smith, 1993; 2006; Perin, 1995). From this technical paradigm, people are perceived as 
sources of problems that have to be constrained, often through increased technical training 
or creating more detailed procedures (Carroll, 1995; 1998). Hence, our findings confirmed 
the dominance of a technical paradigm in learning from disaster in the offshore oil and 
gas industry. In line with other studies of learning from disaster, our study confirms that 
learning from disaster frequently does not go beyond the ‘paradigmatic’ level (Deschamps 
3
92
Chapter 3
et al., 1997), hence reinforcing the technical paradigm in the wake of a disaster (Elliott & 
Smith, 2006; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011).
Our investigation of the attempts by HF specialists to manifest themselves as a distinct 
safety discipline has several similarities with Giroux and Taylor’s (2002) investigation of 
the attempts of quality engineers to put quality management (QM) on the map as a 
distinct profession. For instance, Giroux and Taylor also identified how the attempt to 
create a distinct field of expertise involved a struggle for management recognition and 
budget. In the first phase of justification, quality specialists were advised to “speak the 
language of money” (p. 506) and to frame QM as an opportunity to attain economic 
objectives. We found that some HF specialist made similar remarks in our interviews. 
However, Giroux and Taylor found that “translating specialists’ knowledge into a language 
that top management can understand is not sufficient to transform it into an accepted 
truth” (p. 509). Only in the context of economic and political crises that challenged the 
competitive position of US companies versus Japanese companies, was the QM community 
able to successfully justify QM as an American solution and competitive obligation that 
companies had implement to survive. The subsequent explosion of popularity allowed the 
QM community to solidify their position by framing the effectiveness of QM as undeniable 
truth. Relating these insights to our case, it seems that the HF community is only in the 
first phase of justification, and may need to capitalize on future crises to further the HF 
discipline.
Knowledge transformation in an organizational field in the wake of disaster
Our study also contributes to the literature on knowledge sharing and transformation. 
We studied attempts for knowledge transformation in an organizational field following 
disaster; a setting characterized by the absence of formal hierarchy (Knight, 2002; 
Moynihan, 2009) and destabilized informal authority relations (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; 
Hoffman, 1999). Most studies focus on formal hierarchical settings, such as organizations 
(e.g. Bechky, 2003) or joint ventures (e.g. Tsang, 2002), where managers have a mandate to 
establish dependencies between communities to organize cross-community projects. Our 
case emphasized a situation where collaboration is not presupposed, as in joint projects, 
and where strong converging pressures for mutual engagements may be absent. Our 
study therefore provided new insights into the dynamics of knowledge transformation. 
In particular, our emphasis on a marginal community following a disruptive event shifted 
focus to the importance of political strategies of justification as a means to establish 
dependencies with dominant communities and transform their knowledge (Fligstein, 
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1997; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Giroux & Taylor, 2002). Still, this is a challenging process, 
as established communities may flat out resist marginal community’s efforts for knowledge 
transformation (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). They may exercise 
episodic power to impose their perspective on other actors, shaping learning processes 
according to their interests (Lawrence et al., 2005; Macpherson & Jones, 2008).
However, our emphasis on the organizational field also provided insights on the influence 
of more subtle, systematic power (Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Lawrence et al., 
2005) on knowledge transformation, emanating from field-level institutions. The notion 
of systemic power highlights that behavior is constrained by the unconscious acceptance 
of assumptions about normality and appropriateness that are embedded in taken-for-
granted discourses and institutions (Hardy, 1996; Hardy & Clegg, 1996). In this sence, 
institutional structures privilege certain actors over others, creating inequality in access 
to power and resources (Hardy, 1996; Giddens, 1979). Hence, systemic power is vested in 
institutionalized practices, rather than possessed by individual actors (Lawrence, 2008). In 
this way, power relations become pervasive and form the backdrop against which learning 
and change may or may not occur (Hardy, 1996). In high hazard industries, practices of risk 
management and learning are constrained by the established dominance of the technical 
paradigm. Technical expert knowledge, in our case concerning drilling, is sedimented in 
societal institutions and dominates policy and debates about risk and learning (Beck, 1992; 
Carroll, 1995; Perin, 1995).
As previous studies on knowledge sharing and transformation focused mainly on (inter)
organizational collaborations, the influence of the external institutional context on 
processes of knowledge transformation tends to be ignored (Mork et al., 2010). Yet, in 
high-risk industries the institutionalized risk regime plays an important role in shaping 
learning in an organizational field (Elliott, 2009; Elliott & Smith, 1993; 2006). We showed in 
our findings that the institutionalized risk regime in the North Sea region embeds taken-
for-granted learning mechanisms and responsibilities. For instance, the actors that create 
the risks – i.e. oil companies and drilling contractors – are responsible for managing and 
continuously reducing the risks (Baram & Lindøe, 2014). Therefore, important constituencies 
from oil companies and drilling contractors – the drilling community and senior managers 
– are designated as learning authorities. Hence, the risk regime embeds systemic power 
relations, privileging particular actors over others and maintaining pragmatic boundaries 
between them. This limited the ability of the HF community to participate in and shape 
field-level learning. These insights confirm Fischer’s (1990) emphasis on “the tensions 
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between expertise and participation” (p. 7) and Blackler and McDonald’s (2000) insight 
that power, expertise, and collective learning are fundamentally related. Institutionalized 
expertise and associated power relations may limit participation of marginal communities 
in learning, fostering increasingly elitist and undemocratic decision-making processes, 
which limit the potential for radical learning (Coopey, 1995; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; 
Fischer, 1990). The literature on CoPs indicates that for peripheral actors to become 
legitimate participants in a learning community, established actors have to grant them 
recognition (Brown & Duguid, 2001; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Osterlund & Carlile, 2005; 
Wenger, 1998). Yet, in our study, it seems that the HF community was not perceived as a 
legitimate community.
Boundary conditions
The focus of this study on knowledge sharing processes in one organizational field in the 
wake of one disaster affects the generalizability of our findings. Still, we believe that our 
findings to some degree generalizable, in particular to other technologically intensive, 
hazardous industries. Other studies about learning in such environments have indicated 
that the predominance of the technical paradigm in other industries, such as nuclear power 
(e.g. Carroll, 1998). Hence, similar knowledge sharing mechanisms and complexities may 
occur in these settings. To learn more about these mechanisms and complexities, it would 
be worthwhile to study how HF knowledge is shared in other hazardous industries, such 
as aviation or maritime transport, or following another serious incident in the North Sea 
drilling industry. Furthermore, our study particularly focuses on the struggles between 
a technical community consisting of engineers and a non-technical community of 
occupational psychologists. It seems that legitimacy issues are especially challenging for 
a non-technical community that aims to participate in a technically dominated industry. 
Hence, our findings could be generalizable to other settings where non-technical 
communities, trained in the social sciences, struggle to receive recognition in a technical 
industry.
Second, our study focuses on field-level learning processes in the North Sea region as 
opposed to the US Gulf of Mexico where the Macondo blowout occurred. Such spillover 
of a legitimacy crisis in the wake of a disaster is likely to affect how actors in different 
fields learn lessons. Organizational fields are characterized by different field actors and 
institutional arrangements (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), hence, processes of learning 
and contestation in the organizational field in which the disaster occurred will likely differ 
from such processes in another organizational field are likely to differ. We have shown that 
95
Justifying superior knowledge from the periphery 
spillover will trigger particular contestation practices, so our findings are generalizable to 
other crisis settings.
Third, we investigated attempts for knowledge sharing in a particular institutional setting, 
namely a co-regulatory regime. In a co-regulatory regime, risk governance responsibilities 
are shared between industry actors and regulators (e.g. Baram & Lindøe, 2014). Learning 
is affected by institutions in an organizational field. For instance, learning is more likely to 
occur in participatory regimes than antagonistic regimes (Elliott & Smith, 2006). However, 
we also illustrated that in a co-regulatory regime where industry actors have important 
risk governance and learning responsibilities, it is unlikely that a regulator will impose 
new knowledge on the industry. As such, in co-regulatory regimes, it may be the case that 
radical learning initiatives, as proposed by marginal communities, are less likely to occur. 
Co-regulation is a trend in many Western societies (Power, 2007; Short & Toffel, 2008). 
Therefore, our findings are relevant to other industries with such regulatory regimes.
Furthermore, while we studied processes of knowledge creation within and sharing 
by three different epistemic communities, we were not able to observe to what extent 
organizations adopted and implemented HF knowledge. The literature on learning from 
disaster has indicated that learning goes beyond the identification of lessons learned, 
hence, it has been argued that studies should also focus on how lessons are implemented 
in organizations (Elliott, 2009; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). Yet, because of our field-level focus 
– focusing especially on knowledge creation within and sharing between communities in 
a field, as well as zooming in on industry associations and regulators as drivers of field-
level learning – and the collection of secondary data sources, interviews, and observations 
at a conference and training center, we focused particularly on mechanisms knowledge 
creation and sharing, which shifts focus to different mechanisms of field-level learning 
than adoption and implementation.
Finally, we presented the three communities as uniform groups. In contrast, several studies 
on knowledge creation in and across communities have suggested that communities are 
not necessarily peaceful groups that operate along the same line towards a common goal 
(e.g. Wenger, 1998). Our data also provided indications that contestation also occurred, for 
example, within the HF community. A stronger focus on the internal community practices 
of contestation could provide a better understanding why the community engaged 
in struggles of discipline recognition, and therefore why field-level learning about HF 
knowledge was limited.
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CONCLUSION
Our research question was: how does a marginal community attempt to influence learning 
from disaster processes that are driven by established communities? We found that 
the marginal HF community developed a different call for more radical action than the 
established drilling and senior management constituencies in the wake of the Macondo 
disaster. Being convinced of having superior knowledge about human behavior and incident 
causation, the HF community aimed to justify their call for radical action to the drilling 
and senior management communities, and share their specialist knowledge with them. To 
achieve this, the HF community engaged in a struggle for discipline recognition by using 
self-referential strategies, like ‘using a generalized sales pitch’, ‘using decontextualized, 
non-technical HF knowledge in a technically dominated environment’, and ‘using specialist 
HF language in a management environment’. However, we found that the HF community 
did not contextualize its specialist knowledge and language to the dominant discourse and 
values of the drilling and management communities. As such, their justification strategies 
reinforced knowledge boundaries between the communities, limiting the HF community’s 
ability to transform established knowledge in the field. Furthermore, their attempts to share 
knowledge were constrained by institutionalized learning mechanisms and responsibilities 
in the North Sea risk regime, which kept boundaries between the established and marginal 
communities in place. Our study indicates the need for marginal communities to engage 
in strategic political actions to influence learning from disaster, while also maintaining 
awareness of potential institutional constraints such as institutionalized values, discourses, 
and learning mechanisms and responsibilities.
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ABSTRACT
Never waste a good crisis: When disaster strikes, it presents an opportunity to learn for 
those directly involved, and for collective vicarious learning at the level of an organizational 
field. Such field-level learning becomes imperative when a disaster has triggered a 
legitimacy crisis that spills over to other organizations. However, research has indicated 
that learning from disaster takes place in an extremely politicized environment, which 
may undermine attempts to improve disaster prevention. This study explores the politics 
of learning from disaster in a situation where a resulting legitimacy crisis spilled over to 
an organizational field in a distant geographic region. This is an important research topic, 
because spillover affects how political processes of learning take place in the wake of 
disaster. We interpret field-level learning following crisis spillover as a dynamic, contested 
process and investigate how and why actors continuously enact their competing interests 
in response to opposing actors’ actions. Our empirical setting is the organizational field 
of offshore oil and gas exploration and production in the North Sea in the wake of the 
Macondo disaster, which occurred in 2010 in the US Gulf of Mexico. Using a longitudinal 
research design we illustrate how two actor groups – a coalition of industry actors from 
the North Sea region versus the EU Commission – organized different field-level initiatives 
following the Macondo disaster and how they contested each other’s initiatives over time. 
This study illustrates how contestation involved a narrative conflict that was rooted in 
opposing institutional discourses about risk governance, and maintained over time through 
the dynamic interaction of discursive strategies. Actors aimed to resist crisis spillover 
by emphasizing differences between institutional arrangements in organizational fields. 
Furthermore, contestation involved politics of responsibility and expertise, with which 
actors aimed to assume a position of authority in the learning process.
INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, the global offshore oil industry was confronted with a disastrous 
accident of a scale rarely experienced before. The oil company BP, together with its main 
contractors Transocean and Halliburton, had lost the control over the deepwater Macondo 
well1, causing a violent blowout that resulted in a series of explosions on the drilling rig 
Deepwater Horizon (Read, 2011). Eleven people on board were killed in the explosions, and 
1 The Macondo well was a high pressure-high temperature well drilled at an ocean depth of 
about 1.500 meter (5000 feet), and approximately 4000 meter (13.000 feet) under the seafloor, 
at a total depth of approximately 5.500 meters (18000 feet) (Hopkins, 2012).
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the Macondo blowout caused the largest accidental oil spill in the history of the global 
offshore industry. While the disaster occurred in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, it also triggered 
discussions in Europe about its implications for risk governance in European offshore 
operations (European Commission, 2011). Different European stakeholders proposed 
learning initiatives to implement lessons from Macondo and ensure that a similar accident 
would not happen in the EU. For instance, the European Commission initiated several 
policy interventions to reorganize risk governance of offshore oil operations. However, 
these initiatives were heavily contested by stakeholders from the oil industry, who were 
already in the process of initiating their own learning initiatives. In this paper we seek to 
understand how this contestation occurred between these different stakeholders and why 
it occurred in this fashion.
Research has indicated that learning from disaster takes places in an extremely politicized 
environment (Brown, 2000; 2004; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Gephart, 1984; 1992; Hoffman 1999; 
Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009; 
Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013; Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993; 1994; Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
In this paper we are primarily interested in politics of learning from disaster following crisis 
spillover, i.e. the transfer of a legitimacy crisis from organizations involved in causing a crisis 
to organizations that were not involved, but appear to be similar (Desai, 2011; Jonnson, 
Greve, & Fujiwara-Greve, 2009; Yu, Sengul & Lester, 2008). Disasters may undermine trust 
in the ability of corporations and regulators to control risks (Beck, 1992). A common 
response following the occurrence of disasters is for societal stakeholders to wonder ‘can 
it happen here?’ (Shrivastava, 1987). Hence, disasters may create political urgency for 
involved organizations, uninvolved organizations, and governmental stakeholders alike 
to reassure the public that adequate lessons are drawn (Barnett & King, 2008; Brown, 
2000; 2004; Lampel et al., 2009; Sagan, 1994). As such, the implications of a disaster may 
transcend beyond the involved organization(s) to affect an industry as a whole (Desai, 
2011; Yu et al., 2008). As our case suggests, the European response to the Macondo 
disaster is a manifestation of crisis spillover, triggering learning and contestation between 
actors beyond the US context. Different actors are likely to have different interests and 
different perspectives on the causes and consequences of a disaster, creating contestation 
between opposing positions on the need and means for learning (Hoffman & Jennings, 
2011; Shrivastava, 1987; Smith & Elliott, 2007). In order to highlight the political struggles 
between political, public, and industry actors involved in learning following crisis spillover, 
we conceptualize an industry as part of an organizational field, which is defined as a 
community of organizations with disparate interests that interact frequently with each 
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other on a central issue, including competitors, suppliers, consumers, regulatory agencies, 
special interest groups, and associations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999).
We argue that the learning from disaster literature needs to better account for political 
struggles between diverse actors in a field after crisis spillover. In general, research on 
learning from disasters and crises still focuses on organizational effectiveness at the 
expense of politics, as well as on learning processes by the organizations involved in the 
causation of the disaster (Lampel et al., 2009). As such, it tends to pay less attention to 
the possibility for politics and crisis spillover. The literature on crisis sensemaking is an 
exception in the broader learning from disaster literature, as it presumes crisis spillover to 
an organizational field and subsequent contestation to occur following a disaster. These 
studies emphasize that disasters trigger contestation between actors in a field that have 
opposing interests, perspectives, and positions in the social hierarchy (Brown, 2000; 2004; 
Deschamps, Lalonde, Pauchant, & Waaub, 1997; Gephart, 1984; 1992; 1993; Hoffman & 
Jennings, 2011; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013). Yet, we argue that these studies provide 
an incomplete picture of the political processes of learning following crisis spillover.
First, we argue that the actual practices of contestation need additional focus. While 
studies tend to emphasize the presence of opposing narratives in a field, they do not 
always investigate in-depth the discursive practices that opposing actors employ to contest 
each other’s narrative (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; cf. Deschamps et al., 1997; Gephart, 
1984; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013). For instance, Hoffman 
and Jennings (2011) identified that “seven competing institutional logics form the core of 
the tensions that lie within the debate over the BP Oil Spill […] They create positions and 
thereby solutions and alternatives that are then further refined, debated, and eventually 
sorted and selected.” (p. 7). Yet, they did not provide further insights in how this dynamic 
process of debating, sorting, and selecting of narrative positions occurred. Instead, studies 
of politically sensitive events as drivers of institutional change have highlighted that 
contestation is, in fact, a dynamic process in which opposing actors respond to each other’s 
strategies by adapting their own (Hardy & Maguire, 2010; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). Studies 
on crisis sensemaking in public inquiries and hearings have provided more insight into the 
dynamics of contested learning. These studies show that inquiries provide actors with the 
opportunity to challenge opposing viewpoints, but that inquiries also impose restrictions 
on the search for causes and tend to impose a monological account that serves to restore 
trust in social institutions (Brown, 2000; 2004; Gephart, 1992; 1993; Topal, 2009). However, 
because public inquiry boards are able to constrain contestation by imposing restrictions, 
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these studies do not provide insight into the dynamic processes of contestation outside 
these quasi-legal, hierarchical arenas, something our study is focused on.
Second, while studies of crisis sensemaking imply spillover from organizations involved 
in a crisis to the organizational field as a whole, these studies rarely take into account 
that a legitimacy crisis may even cross boundaries of an organizational field to affect 
organizations in other geographical locations (Yu et al., 2008). Spillover to other regions is 
rare, as most crises and disasters do not have such far-reaching effects (Elliott, 2014), but 
our case of politics of learning in the North Sea after the Macondo disaster clearly shows 
spillover effects. In this study, we perceive the North Sea and US offshore oil sectors as 
different organizational fields, as they are characterized by different risk regimes (Lindøe, 
Baram, & Renn, 2014). We argue that spillover to another organizational field will have 
important implications for dynamics of contestation in the wake of a disaster. For instance, 
while public inquiries normally are an important platform for contestation and politics 
following crises (e.g. Gephart, 1992), in the case of spillover to a different field it is unlikely 
that such hierarchical, quasi-legal mechanisms for learning are initiated. Inquiries are 
organized by national governments of the country in which a disaster occurred to formally 
investigate into the causes of disasters, as well as to assign blame (Brown, 2000; Gephart, 
1993; Turner, 1976). In contrast, we argue that when spillover to a different field occurs, 
the question of relevance to actors in that field shifts from “what happened” and “who is 
responsible” to “what do the lessons learned mean for us?” Questions of who is to blame 
for a disaster become less relevant for government bodies, because the accountable actors 
are under the jurisdiction of a different government. Another implication of spillover for 
contested learning from disaster concerns the situated nature of learning and contestation. 
For instance, research on learning in the wake of the Bhopal disaster has indicated that 
learning is culturally and institutionally situated, leading to the implementation of different 
changes in India, Europe, and the US (Jasanoff, 1994; Shrivastava, 1987). Furthermore, 
because fields are characterized by different institutions, such as safety regulations, we 
expect that actors in a different field may more easily distance themselves from the need 
to learn, arguing that that ‘it could not happen here’ (Smith & Elliott, 2007, p. 532; see also 
Elliott & Smith 1993; 2006). As such, we contribute to the political perspective on learning 
from disaster by investigating the dynamics of contestation in a different organizational 
field than where the disaster occurred. Our research question is: How do field actors contest 
each other’s learning initiatives over time following spillover of disaster implications to a 
different organizational field?
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Spillover of legitimacy crises following organizational disasters
Industrial disasters are low-probability, high-consequence organizational accidents, 
frequently triggered by the failure of complex technology, that impact people, the 
environment, organizational assets, and potentially broader society (Beck, 1992; Perrow, 
1999; Shrivastava, 1987; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). They differ from other organizational 
accidents in that they are unusually visible and constitute emotional events that attract 
public attention (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Vaughan, 1999). As such, industrial disasters 
inherently carry with them a legitimacy crisis that undermines stakeholders’ support of 
involved organizations, technologies, and potentially industries (Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, 
& Miglani, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughan, 1999). We therefore argue that disasters 
are a particular kind of organizational crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998).
The legitimacy crisis of a disaster may also trigger spill over to other organizations that 
were not involved in the disaster itself (Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 2011; Jonsson et al., 
2009; Yu et al., 2008). The occurrence of a disaster indicates that involved organizations 
failed to manage operational risks (Reason, 1997). As a consequence, stakeholders may 
presume that similar organizations may also be unable to manage comparable risks 
and may challenge the legitimacy of an industry as a whole (Desai, 2011), calling for 
collective sanctions (Barnett & King, 2008). For instance, governmental stakeholders may 
investigate a disaster, reexamine established public policy and engage in policy learning, 
i.e. developing new policy instruments, or changing policy problems, the scope of a policy, 
or the objectives of a policy (Birkland, 2004; May, 1992). For instance, the Santa Barbara oil 
spill in the US in 1969 became a national crisis that triggered the Nixon administration to 
impose restrictions on drilling for oil and gas in sensitive environmental areas (Molotch, 
1970, cited in Hoffman, 1999).
Spillover of a crisis may occur when societal stakeholders “generalize from deviance by 
one organization to others that are similar” (Jonsson et al., 2009, p. 195). Consequently, 
stakeholders undertake actions to minimize association with these other organizations to 
limit their exposure to presumed risks (Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008). For example, 
customers may boycott particular products. In this way a legitimacy crisis spreads to 
other organizations. This suggests that crisis spillover occurs when the following enabling 
conditions are satisfied: First, a non-routine events, such as an organizational accident, 
has to receive substantial attention from stakeholders (Desai, 2011; Hoffman & Ocasio, 
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2001; Jonsson et al., 2009). Studies on the socially constructed nature of disruptive events 
have highlighted that events like organizational accidents are not inherently disruptive, 
but that they are enacted as such by stakeholders (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Munir, 2005). 
For instance, Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) studied why some non-routine events become 
disruptive for an industry while others do not. They found that such events become crises 
for an industry as a whole when public stakeholders attributed accountability to the 
industry as a whole, and when industry stakeholders where worried about the image 
of the industry, for instance with respect to their ability to manage risks. According 
to our definition crisis is inherent in disasters, hence we argue that this conditions will 
per definition be met in the wake of a disaster. Second, stakeholders have to perceive 
similar characteristics between organizations involved in the disaster and uninvolved 
organizations (Desai, 2011; Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008). Desai (2011) hypothesizes 
that organizations that share “relatively central, enduring, and salient attributes with 
stricken firms, such as major product lines […] are heavily penalized by association” (p. 
267), because stakeholders link negative assessments of legitimacy to aspects central to 
organizations’ identity (Barnett & King, 2008; Jonsson et al., 2009). While individuals always 
make sense of the world by generalizing based on mental categorization heuristics, crises 
may alter stakeholders’ mental categorizations of organizations (Yu et al., 2008). These 
categorizations are simplistic, reducing the complexity that stems from organizational 
differences by focusing on easily available characteristics (Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 
2008). This overgeneralization enables broad and indiscriminate responses in the wake 
of a disaster.
Politics of learning from disaster following of spillover
Since spillover also threatens the viability of organizations that were not involved in a 
disaster, these organizations have strong incentives to deal with the resulting field-level 
legitimacy problem (Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 2011; Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008). 
Research shows that organizations may respond to a disaster by organizing collective 
learning initiatives to improve safety in a high hazard industry (Barnett & King, 2008; 
Hoffman, 1999; Nathan & Kovoor-Misra, 2002; Rees, 1994; 1997). By learning collectively 
from the hazardous experiences of organizations in an industry, other organizations are 
provided opportunities to improve their practices without being directly exposed to 
the catastrophic costs that are associated with a disaster (Sagan, 1994). Studies into the 
causation of disasters have shown that such collective vicarious learning is important. 
Disasters may point to lessons that are relevant to actors that were not involved in a 
disaster (Toft & Reynolds, 2005), especially when harmful practices, objectives, and beliefs 
4
106
Chapter 4
that contributed to a particular disaster in an organization may in fact be institutionalized 
in the field as a whole (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Wicks, 2001). As such, organizations may 
cooperate to create new industry collectives, such as associations or research consortia, or 
new industry standards to avoid the recurrence of a major failure (Miner, Kim, Holzinger, 
& Haunschild, 1999). In the wake of the Bhopal disaster, the US chemical industry formed 
a self-regulatory institution – the Responsible Care Program – leading to changes in risk 
governance practices across the chemical industry (Barnett & King, 2008; King & Lenox, 
2000; Nathan & Kovoor-Misra, 2002; Rees, 1997). Hence, learning from disaster has a 
clear ‘substantive’ function (Westphal & Zajac, 1998), aiming to address the causes of the 
failure (Lampel et al., 2009).
Yet, political perspectives on learning from crises have emphasized that learning does not 
just revolve around improving practices to prevent recurrences; it also has a ‘symbolic’ 
function (Westphal & Zajac, 1998) aimed at protecting narrow organizational interests 
(Lampel et al., 2009; Perrow, 1999; Sagan, 1993; 1994). For example, while studies on 
self-regulatory institutions have shown that their establishment has not improved safety 
levels in hazardous industries (e.g. King & Lenox, 2000), Barnett and King (2008) have 
argued that they serve primarily to reassure public stakeholders and reduce the probability 
for stakeholder sanctions in the wake of a disaster. Hence, learning initiatives serve to 
attenuate stakeholder pressures on organizations by signaling compliance with stakeholder 
expectations for action (Oliver, 1991). Alternatively, learning from disaster may involve 
active contestation between actors with opposing viewpoints and interests (Deschamps 
et al., 1997; Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013). 
Organizational fields are characterized by the existence of opposing beliefs and world-
views (Brint & Karabel, 1991; Hoffman, 1999). Especially in the wake of a disaster, field-
level discourses may resemble a war of meaning on the appropriate definition of causes, 
consequences, and solutions (Hoffman, 1999; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013). The 
literature on crisis sensemaking has shown that actors, driven by divergent interests, 
knowledge, and social position, develop diverging disaster accounts (Brown, 2000; 
2004; Gephart, 1984; 1992; Müller-Seitz & Macpherson, 2013; Shrivastava, 1987). These 
interpretations become highly contested as actors attempt to implicitly or explicitly impose 
these views on others to shape learning. An essential element of contestation in the wake of 
a disaster is the process of allocating and avoiding responsibility and blame (Douglas, 1992; 
Gephart, 1993; Sagan, 1994). Activist stakeholders may challenge the identity and image of 
established technologies, products, and industries, striving for institutional transformation, 
while established industry organizations may aim to preserve legitimacy by countering 
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negative evaluations and communicate reassuring information (Desai, 2011; Hoffman, 
1999; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). For instance, stakeholders may 
argue for more stringent regulations on industries (Birkland, 2004; Jasanoff, 1994), while 
organizations commonly attempt to avoid spillover following disaster by claiming that ‘it 
could not happen here’ (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Maguire and Hardy 
(2009) argued that established organizations may engage in ‘defensive institutional work’, 
i.e. “the authoring of texts that contest problematizations of practices by (a) countering 
assertions of negative impacts of practices; (b) countering categorizations of practices as 
unethical, undesirable, or inappropriate; and (c) countering calls for regulatory change” 
(p. 169).
While disasters provide opportunities for contestation for diverse actors, the political 
perspective on learning explains that not all actors are equally able to shape the learning 
process. Powerful actors, with a higher position in the social hierarchy, are able to impose 
their viewpoints on others thereby dominating the learning process and reinforcing 
their dominance (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011; Coopey, 1995; Sagan, 1994). For instance, 
disasters and crises are commonly blamed on the most proximate cause, i.e. human error 
by the operators of hazardous technology, rather than more latent causes such managerial 
or design deficiencies (Dekker, 2014; Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994). Furthermore, studies of 
crisis sensemaking in public inquiries have shown that these are hegemonic, hierarchical 
mechanisms in which an authority – the inquiry board or principal investigator – imposes 
a monological account of the causes of a disaster to influence other’s interpretations of 
the event (Brown, 2000; 2004; Gephart, 1992). As such, public inquiries depoliticize a crisis 
by creating an impression of control, thereby restoring credibility in social institutions that 
were undermined by the crisis and reinforcing the dominance of powerful actors like the 
government and corporations.
The previous discussion shows that political processes play an important role following 
spillover of crises, constraining learning from disaster. However, we expect differences after 
spillover to a different region. Jasanoff (1994) has emphasized that learning from disaster 
is embedded in local cultures and institutional frameworks. Investigating learning from 
the Bhopal disaster, she identified differences in learning from Bhopal in India, Europe, 
and US. Hence, we expect that politics of learning from disaster are partly determined 
by the institutional frameworks in different regions. Furthermore, while public inquiries 
are an important political mechanisms for developing a disaster account and allocate 
responsibility and blame (Turner, 1976; Brown, 2000), it is unlikely that such learning 
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mechanisms are set up in in other nation states, because the responsible organizations 
are under jurisdiction of a different government. In the absence of the hegemonic 
functioning of public inquiries, other political processes may play a more central role in 
shaping learning from disaster. For instance, Reinecke and Donaghey (2015) studied how 
production organizations and social movement organizations collaborated after the Rana 
Plaza disaster in Bangladesh – a building collapse that killed 1129 garment workers and 
injured 2500 more – to create coalition power to establish the legally binding ‘Accord for 
Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh’.
METHODS
Research setting and design
We focus on the North Sea offshore industry in the wake of the Macondo disaster as 
the research setting of this study. This is a relevant setting for our research objective for 
several reasons. First, the Macondo disaster had clear spillover effects in Europe (European 
Commission, 2011). Second, in Europe offshore operations revolve largely around the 
North Sea region (Lindoe et al., 2014), a mature field with a long history of offshore drilling 
and production (McGinty, 2008). Multiple actors in the field engaged in the organization 
of learning initiatives in the wake of Macondo and contestation of other initiatives. In 
particular, these processes occurred over a time span of several years, during which actors 
published many publicly available texts in the process of learning that we could analyze.
We use a longitudinal research design to capture how processes of contestation unfolded 
over time. This is important, as it creates a better understanding of learning from disaster 
as a process, taking place from the occurrence of a disaster until implementation of lessons 
learned and potentially cultural readjustment over time (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013; Elliott 
& Smith, 2006; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Our inquiry focuses on the period from April 2010, 
when the Macondo blowout occurred in 2010, until June 2013 when a European directive 
on offshore safety was established, which appeared to have settled the process of field-
level contestation. While focusing on this three-year timeframe, we also remain sensitive 
to important historical developments in risk governance arrangements in the North Sea 
offshore sector, because learning is embedded in an institutional and historical context 
that shapes the learning process (Elliott & Smith, 2006; Handley, Sturdy, Fincham, & 
Clark, 2006). For instance, we are sensitive to the role of the Piper Alpha disaster, which 
occurred in the North Sea in 1988 and in which killed 167 people in explosions on an 
offshore platform (McGinty, 2008). This disaster triggered a major transformation in the 
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risk governance frameworks in the North Sea offshore sector, thereby fundamentally 
shaping the institutional context of offshore drilling and production (Lindoe, et al., 2014).
We use a qualitative-process research strategy to understand in depth the complex 
learning process in the wake of a disaster and explain how it evolved and why (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000; Langley, 1999). Due to the unique combination of casualties, environmental, 
economic, and socio-political impacts (Read, 2011) and widespread spillover (Elliott, 
2014), we argue that the Macondo disaster represents an ‘extreme case’ for investigation 
contestation at the field level. Furthermore, a qualitative approach recognizes to the role 
of context of social phenomena (Yin, 2008), enabling us to contextualize contestation of 
learning in the wider institutional setting.
Data collection
We collected a variety of data sources from diverse actors playing a key role in the field-
level learning dynamics in the North Sea following Macondo. We focused particularly 
on nationally operating actors from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well 
as actors operating on the transnational level. We employed the following strategy for 
the identification of key actors: first, we studied the websites of (trans)national industry 
associations. Associations generally play a central organizing role in mature organizational 
fields (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002), such as the North Sea offshore industry, and 
may play an important role in field-level learning from accidents (Barnett & King, 2008; 
Nathan & Kovoor-Misra, 2002) so we expected these actors to be involved in learning and 
distributing lessons from Macondo. We collected documents about Macondo from their 
websites. Criteria for selection were: 1) The data sources had to address the Macondo 
blowout, focusing for instance on change initiatives that were proposed as a consequence 
of Macondo; 2) the data sources focused on risk and safety management in the North 
Sea offshore industry in general. We scanned these documents for references to other 
relevant documents and actors, either ones that they collaborated with in the aftermath 
of Macondo, or ones whose opinions and actions they contested. We then visited the 
websites of these actors and repeated this strategy until no new key actors and relevant 
documents emerged. This way, we collected a body of interconnected documents, all 
produced as a response to other documents (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). We identified 
two central actor groups: on one hand there was a tri-partite coalition of industry actors 
(national and transnational industry associations, oil companies), national regulators, and 
trade unions, on the other side was the European Commission.
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Our main body of data consisted of secondary data sources that were publicly available. 
Secondary data is useful for this study for two reasons. First, secondary data is produced 
“naturally” instead of “at the request of a social researcher” (Bryman, 2015, p. 543). This 
limits the potential reactive effect of data collection, increasing the validity of the data. 
Second, because secondary data is produced during the process, potential problems with 
retrospective bias – a well-known shortcoming in research on unexpected events (Lampel 
et al., 2009) - are limited. Importantly, we do not perceive secondary documents as a neutral 
window to an underlying reality (Bryman, 2015). Instead, secondary data are produced with 
a particular purpose and aimed at a particular public (Atkinson & Coffey, 2004). Since we 
aim to uncovering and explaining contestation of learning, we consider secondary data to 
be relevant data source for our research objective. The second body of data consisted of 
keynote speeches and presentations from representatives of the aforementioned actors 
at industry conferences in which actors contested the European Commission’s initiative for 
implementing a new offshore safety regulation. Field configuring events such as industry 
conferences play an important role in collective sensemaking (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). 
Again, speeches were not interpreted as neutral, but as a purposeful effort to convey an 
impression (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011). Finally, 21 semi-structured interviews were done 
with professionals in the offshore industry that were either recorded and transcribed 
verbatim, or notes were taken. The interviewees included individuals working for the 
European Commission, national regulators, the government, oil companies, consultancies, 
associations, and unions. In these interviews we focused on what the Macondo blowout 
meant to them, what their organizations were doing in response to the crisis, and how they 
perceived learning initiatives organized by other actors. Hence, our interviews provided 
more insight in the why and how of actors’ sensemaking of Macondo, the subsequent 
learning initiatives, and contestation. We used a snowball strategy to identify new potential 
interviewees, asking interviewees whom they believed we should approach. Furthermore, 
we approached potential interviewees whose name was mentioned in the documents that 
we collected. On average, an interview lasted 75 minutes. Because of the variety of data 
sources, we were able to triangulate sources, which increased the validity of our findings. 
Our body of data is shown in table 4.
Finally, since we perceive learning as embedded in a social and historical context, we 
studied sources that provided background information on risk governance in the North 
Sea region. We studied a book and the official investigation report of the Piper Alpha 
disaster, an explosion, which occurred on the Piper Alpha platform in the North Sea in 
1988 and killed 167 people on board. As our data sources indicate, this disaster was an 
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essential trigger for reshaping the offshore risk governance regimes in the North Sea. 
We also studied a book focused specifically on risk governance in offshore oil and gas 
operations, as well as a general book on risk governance in hazardous industries. These 
sources provided information on dominant risk discourses and practices, which enabled 
us to better explain processes of contestation.
Table 4. Empirical data
Actor Data sources Number of documents
European Commission - Archival data: Press releases, 
regulatory review, legal 
proposals, communication 
document, written speeches; 
memo’s
- Interviews
17 documents, 458 pages
3 speeches: 3 pages transcript
4 interviews: +/- 4,5 hours
National regulators
- Two regulators from the UK
- One regulator from the 
Netherlands
- Archival data: Press releases, 
recommendation reports, 
powerpoint presentations, 
regulatory reviews, public 
consultations
- Interviews
- Speeches
9 documents, 315 pages
15 powerpoint presentations
3 interview: +/- 4 hours
4 speeches: 27 pages 
transcript
Industry Associations
- One national industry 
association from the UK
- One national industry 
association and one from the 
Netherlands
- One national contractor 
association from the 
Netherlands
- One international industry 
association
- One international contractor 
association
- Archival data: Position 
papers, press releases, 
recommendation reports, 
letters, annual reports, 
powerpoint presentations
- Interviews
- Speeches
69 documents, 420 pages
6 powerpoint presentations
6 interviews: +/- 8,5 hours
5 speeches: 33 pages 
transcript
International Oil and gas 
companies
- Archival data: public 
consultations
- Interviews
7 documents, 39 pages
4 interviews: +/- 4,5 hours
Trade unions
- Two trade unions from the UK
- One trade unions from the 
Netherlands
- Interviews
- Speeches
- position paper
1 document: 4 pages
3 interviews: +/- 4 hours
1 speech: 1,5 page transcript
National government
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(the Netherlands)
House of Commons (UK)
- Archival data: Regulatory 
review; parliamentary 
questions and answers from 
Minister of Economic Affairs
- Interviews
- Speeches
2 documents, 198 pages
1 interview: +/- 1 hour
1 speeches: 8 pages
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Data analysis
The first step in our analysis was to identify important events of field level learning and 
contestation related to the Macondo disaster and to develop a chronology of events. 
The concept ‘event’ may indicate different occurrences at different levels of analysis, but 
in this paper we are specifically interested in field-level events – i.e. learning initiatives 
–defined as events that occur outside the control of individual organizations, and impact 
the broader organizational field (Müller-Seitz & Schüssler, 2013). While the European 
Commission and industry associations may be perceived as individual organizations, we 
perceive them as collective actors because, first, these entities are dependent on their 
members for their existence, respectively member states and oil and gas companies, 
and second, learning initiatives of the Commission, as a transnational regulator, and 
associations, as (trans)national industry representative, per definition have a field-level 
impact. In this paper we distinguish between, but include both organized events, like the 
publication of formal reports or conferences; and unexpected, disruptive events, disasters 
and other crises (Christianson, Farkas, Sutcliffe, & Weick., 2009; Müller-Seitz & Schüssler, 
2013). For the identification of critical events in the North Sea sector we were sensitive 
to what our interviewees mentioned as important events. The interviewees referred to 
several events in the wake of Macondo that played an important role in the collective 
learning and contestation process. Furthermore, they mentioned historical events that 
shaped the development of the risk governance framework in the North Sea sector, which 
in turn played an important role in how actors in the North Sea sector made sense of the 
Macondo disaster. We also used secondary data to identify the events that were referred 
to in the text. Table 5 shows the chronology of events starting with the Macondo disaster.
Subsequently to the development of the event chronology, we collected texts that were 
produced as a response to the Macondo disaster and subsequent events that we identified 
in the previous phase (Gephart, 1993; Phillips, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). We analyzed 
actors’ discursive contestation practices, disaster accounts, and learning initiatives related 
to the Macondo disaster. We used MAXQDA to code the data inductively and create 
first order concepts that were close to the empirical data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). After 
reorganizing the first order concepts into conceptually distinct labels, we grouped together 
similar concepts to create second order categories, resulting in increased abstraction of 
data. From this step, several strategies of contestation emerged from the data. By going 
back and forth between our empirical strategies and theory, we were able to refine our 
empirical categories and identify three overarching abstract concepts. The codebook is 
shown in Appendix A.
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During our first round of analysis, we identified two conflicting narratives of risk 
governance emerging in the contestation, each one supported by a different actor group, 
that affected how actors perceived and approached the learning process. Hence, we 
engaged in a second round of analysis to develop a narrative account (Hardy & Maguire, 
2010; Nigam & Ocasio, 2010) of the learning and contestation practices through which 
the two actor groups responded to the Macondo disaster. The first narrative, which we 
label the ‘responsible self-regulation’ narrative, was predominantly supported by industry 
actors - associations and oil companies; unions; and national regulators, and revolved 
around. The other narrative, which we label the ‘harmonized regulation and centralized 
control’ narrative, was supported by the European Commission. Finally, we analyzed data 
on risk governance in the offshore industry and hazardous industries in general and linked 
Table 5. Chronology of Key Events in Europe Following the Macondo Disaster
Date Event
April 20, 2010 The Macondo disaster occurs
May 2010 EU Commission organizes first offshore safety meeting with industry to 
discuss the implications of the Macondo disaster (starting point 1st phase of 
contestation)
May 2010 National industry association mobilizes national regulators and trade unions 
the create UK task force
July 2010 European Commissioners call for moratorium
July 2010 EU Commission organizes second offshore safety meeting with industry to 
discuss the implications of the Macondo disaster
July 2010 International industry association creates international task force Y
October 2010 EU Commission publishes a communication in which they hint at EU legislation 
January 2011 UK government officially rejects call for moratorium 
May 2011 EU Commission organizes stakeholder consultation on the issue of a potential 
EU regulation
October 2011 EU Commission publishes proposal for EU offshore safety regulation 
November 2011 Publication of position report from UK industry association against proposal 
for EU regulation
January 2012 EU Commission organized stakeholder meeting concerning the proposed EU 
regulation
February 2012 Publication of position report from international industry association against 
proposal for EU regulation
February 2012 Publication of joint Dutch industry and trade union position paper against EU 
regulation
April 2012 Publication of joint UK industry and trade union position paper against EU 
regulation
June 2012 Trade association organized a seminar on proposed regulation
October 2012 EU Commission proposes a directive instead of regulation
June 2013 EU adopts offshore safety directive 
4
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the narrative accounts to broader institutional discourses on risk governance (Hardy & 
Maguire, 2016).
FINDINGS
We show how the attempts to learn from the Macondo disaster in Europe involved a 
struggle between the European Commission and a tripartite coalition from the North 
Sea region. We identified how these opposing actor groups advanced conflicting risk 
governance narratives in the wake of the Macondo disaster. These narratives were enacted 
in different learning initiatives and discursive strategies of contestation. We identify a 
dynamic process of contestation, in which the actor groups responded to each other’s 
strategies by altering their own strategies. We first present an overview of the conflicting 
narratives, describing how they vary in their interpretation of particular risk governance 
principles. Then, we present the dynamic process of contestation, in which the actor groups 
adapted their strategies of contestation over time in response to each other’s actions.
Conflicting risk governance narratives
We identified that the conflict between the two actor groups was driven by two opposing 
narratives of risk governance, which had different implications for how learning from the 
Macondo disaster was deemed to occur. The tripartite coalition enacted the narrative of 
‘responsible self-regulation’, while the Commission enacted the narrative of ‘harmonized 
regulation and central control’. These narratives represent different interpretations of 
fundamental principles about risk governance: ‘Who should be responsible for risk 
governance?’, ‘at what level should risk governance be organized?’, ‘What is the appropriate 
improvement philosophy’, and ‘Who should have control over risk governance and natural 
resource extraction?’. A summary of the risk governance narratives is shown in Table 6.
These findings shows how the learning conflict that ensued in the wake of the Macondo 
disaster between the EU Commission and the tripartite coalition emerged from their 
fundamentally different interpretations of what good risk governance entailed. This in 
turn affected their perspective on what comprised constituted appropriate approaches 
to learn from the Macondo disaster. We furthermore identified how these narratives were 
enacted by the opposing actors in discursive strategies of contestation, which aimed at 
undermining each other’s position. In particular, they adapted their contestation strategies 
in response to their opponent’s actions.
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Dynamic strategies of contestation
We identified how the EU Commission attempted to learn from Macondo by implementing 
two policy interventions – a drilling moratorium and an EU-wide offshore safety legislation 
– to improve risk governance in the EU offshore industry and increase their influence in the 
European offshore industry. The tripartite coalition resisted these proposals using three 
recurring strategies – discrediting the EU Commission, self-idealization, and proclaiming 
unity. Eventually, this led the EU commission to develop a legislative vehicle that both the 
EU Commission and the tripartite coalition approved, namely an offshore safety Directive, 
as opposed to an EU Regulation, which the EU Commission initially proposed.
EC strategy: Enacting Precautionary Principle by recommending moratorium 
on drilling
The Macondo disaster was a shock for oil industry actors, governments and the public 
alike. It was widely perceived as a uniquely severe accident. An expert advisor for the 
European Commission called it “the worst ever incident in the history of the offshore oil and 
gas industry: the combination of 11 men dead and the massive pollution” (Interview). Given 
the severity and visibility of the impact, Macondo attracted the attention of high-ranked 
individuals in the European Commission, the regulative body of the European Union. In 
particular, the European Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger, soon voiced his 
ambition to intervene in the offshore industry to prevent the occurrence of a Macondo-
like disaster in Europe. Hence, he proposed to temporarily suspend new drilling projects 
that resembled the Macondo project:
“until the exact causes [of the Macondo disaster] are known, the Precautionary Principle 
should prevail. Utmost caution must be exercised for the moment with respect to new drillings. 
Given the current circumstances, any responsible Government would at present practically 
freeze new permits for drilling with extreme parameters and conditions. This can mean 
de facto a moratorium on new drills until the causes of the accident are known.” (Speech 
Oettinger, 7 July 2010).
As this quote shows, the Commissioner based his proposal for a drilling moratorium on a 
claim of comparability, arguing that similar “extreme parameters and conditions”, like deep 
water, also exist in the EU waters. Hence, his underlying assumption was that “if it could 
happen in the Gulf of Mexico then it could happen in Europe” (Interview expert advisor). A 
temporary moratorium would provide the Commission with time to review the status of 
existing risk governance arrangements while being sure that no potentially Macondo-like 
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projects were initiated in the meantime. The statement of Commissioner Oettinger also 
indicates that the proposal for a moratorium is rooted in the Precautionary Principle. The 
Precautionary Principle is a central risk governance principle for the EU Commission, which 
prescribes to suspend risk-taking activities in situations of uncertainty to “reduce the risk of 
adverse effects to the environment, human, animal or plant health” (Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle). The adherence of the Commission to this precautionary discourse 
also explains why it responded to the Macondo disaster by proposing a moratorium. For 
the EU Commission, the Macondo disaster introduced new uncertainty about the safety 
of deepwater drilling and the appropriateness of the risk governance regime for dealing 
with such risks, perceiving a precautionary approach to be necessary. However, since 
implementing moratoria is a matter for national governments, the Commission had to 
persuade national governments to do so.
We argue that this strategy is radical. The EU Commission had not played a large role 
in offshore risk governance prior to the Macondo disaster, but it used its legitimacy as 
a regulator to attempts to implement a significant restriction on offshore operations. 
Unsurprisingly, the call for a moratorium immediately caught the attention of oil industry 
actors and regulators in the North Sea region, who viewed a moratorium as a threat 
to business opportunities and economic development, as well as to their position as 
established risk governance authorities. The calls for a moratorium particularly triggered 
the UK industry association and an international association to take a lead role in 
responding to the Macondo disaster, as well as this threatening situation to avert its 
implementation. Other actors from the North Sea region followed.
Tripartite counter strategies: challenging the need for radical precaution
Discrediting policy initiative by contesting problem framing and solution. 
Industry actors attempted to limit spillover of a risk governance crisis from the U.S. to 
Europe by contesting the EU Commission’s claim that Macondo could also happen in the 
EU because of the presence of similar deepwater conditions in the EU. Instead, they aimed 
to invoke an alternative problem framing:
“most of these calls for drilling moratoriums tend to focus on deepwater areas. In truth, the 
depth of water is not the critical element here. Rather, what is critical are the practices and 
procedures employed to drill the well and to regulate those who are doing that drilling. In 
this regard, policy and practice in the UK are substantially different to those employed in the 
US Gulf of Mexico.” (Press release UK Task Force, 7 September 2010).
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Industry actors, led by the industry associations, aimed to shift the focus from deepwater 
as the “critical” risk factor to the risk governance regime in place, effectively saying that if 
the regime is effective, water depth doesn’t matter. Furthermore, they framed the approach 
to risk governance between the US and the North Sea as being “substantially different” – 
the US regime being inferior. This allowed the North Sea constituents to discredit the US 
regime and distance themselves from it. This strategy aimed to limit generalizability on 
the basis of shared characteristics between the US and North Sea risk regimes, thereby 
limiting spillover. In turn, this enabled them to frame the moratorium as irrational; a “wholly 
unjustifiable, knee-jerk reaction (UK Task Force press release, 14 July 2010). Hence, by 
invoking an alternative problem framing, the tripartite actors could discredit the US risk 
regime, as well as the rationale behind the EC’s proposal for a moratorium.
Self-idealization by demonstrating effectiveness of risk regime. 
The alternative problem framing enabled the tripartite actors to promote and justify the 
risk governance regime in the North Sea region. For instance, the UK industry association: 
“refuted that there should be a moratorium on deep-sea drilling in UK coastal waters […] 
Our dynamic [regulatory] regime has served us well over twenty years of operations during 
which time a blowout has not been experienced.” (Press release UK Task Force, 13 August 
2010). This quote shows how the tripartite actors highlighted the positive safety record 
in the North Sea and presented the risk governance regime as the primary reason for it. 
In particular, industry actors and regulators attributed the robustness of their regime to 
changes that they implemented in the wake of a different offshore disaster that occurred 
in the North Sea in the past:
“We had our own sort of Macondo moment nearly 25 years ago, Piper Alpha, in which 167 
people died. So this whole topic is sort of deep within the psyche. We did a hell of a lot of 
moving, changing and shaping following Piper Alpha leading to our legislative regime for 
offshore safety.” (Speech UK Regulator).
By discursively reenacting the Piper Alpha disaster and the lessons that were learned then, 
the tripartite actors contested the EU Commission’s position that a radical intervention 
was required following the Macondo disaster. This shows how the coalition discursively 
construed similarities between the Piper Alpha and Macondo disasters, despite the fact 
that these had different causes and consequences. Furthermore, they contested the 
similarity that the Commission established between the US and Europe in the wake of 
Macondo. By discursively creating resemblance between the disasters, they could appeal 
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to improvements implemented following the Piper Alpha disaster, thereby rejecting the 
need for radical intervention following Macondo: “there were no serious shortcomings [in 
the regime], but there were possibilities for recommendations for continuous improvement” 
(Interview Dutch regulator). This quote shows the coalition’s approach to learning from 
Macondo. In contrast to the EU Commission’s proposal for radical intervention, the tripartite 
group aimed for “continuous improvement” of the established regime. We found that the 
notion of continuous improvement has been a central principle in the risk governance 
discourse in the North Sea risk region since the Piper Alpha disaster (Patterson, 2014), 
which suggests that learning should occur by upgrading established practices. This creates 
an image of continuous upgrading towards ever-higher levels of safety. A moratorium 
conflicts with this image, as it indicates doubt in the established risk governance practices 
and industry’s ability to manage offshore risks.
Despite arguments that the risk regime was already robust, industry actors demonstrated 
that they took the Macondo disaster seriously. Our data shows that the tripartite actors 
anticipated that the Macondo disaster would trigger political consequences because it was 
such a shock. For instance, the director of the UK association reflected in an interview: “we 
realized that we had to mobilize and do something about it, because if we didn’t then there 
would be a serious push for ramifications.” As such, two industry associations in the North 
Sea – one transnational and one from the UK – organized separate multi-stakeholder task 
forces. In particular, the director of the UK association explained how UK task force was 
created to reassure public and political stakeholders that offshore risks were properly 
managed in the North Sea: “[UK task force]] was driven by a need to demonstrate to the 
public that they didn’t need to worry that Macondo would happen in the UK. And also to 
persuade the regulators not to take wrong actions.” As such, they were keen to emphasize 
that “Our industry is not complacent on [safety] and [UK Task Force] is already carrying out 
a thorough review of UK procedures and practices and will institute any changes seen to be 
necessary” (Press release UK Task Force, 13 August 2010) By indicating that the task force 
was supported by different stakeholders groups, it was presented as a broadly supported, 
legitimate initiative. Furthermore, by portraying their initiative as comprehensive and 
proactive (“already carrying out a thorough review”). This shows that by showcasing the 
depth and the proactiveness of their response, the associations aimed create an image of 
responsibility and ability concerning the need learn from the Macondo disaster, as well 
as manage risks in general. As such, the tripartite coalition presented itself as being in 
charge of learning and risk governance.
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Proclaiming united stance to legitimate task force initiative. 
While the industry associations quickly initiated Task Forces as a response to the Macondo 
disaster, the director of the UK association explained that it was important to exhibit that 
they were “not moving ahead on our own” (Interview), but that “industry, the regulators, and 
the trade unions are all engaged [in UK Task Force]” (Press release UK Task Force, 13 August 
2010). As such, they invoked an image of universal buy-in by industry actors, regulators, 
and unions. Our data analysis shows that this proclamation of their united stance was an 
important strategy of the associations in their response to Macondo. This strategy aimed 
to legitimize the industry’s learning initiatives by portraying the task force as broadly 
supported by other stakeholders, in particular those with higher levels of public trust 
than the oil industry2. For instance, the director of the UK association argued: “what was 
incredibly important was that the trade unions came out and support the industry position” 
(Interview). Similarly, a trade unionist reflected on their role in an interview:
“[The Commission] was quite happy to stand against the industry. If you want good press 
in this country just slag of BP and Shell, so standing up against oil companies is not an 
unpopular thing to do. Standing up against the workforce representatives is.”
Hence, proclaiming that the initiatives were widely supported by industry actors, as well 
as other stakeholders provided legitimacy to the initiative. Particularly the involvement of 
trade unions and national regulators provided the initiatives with credibility that industry 
actors lack given their poor reputation in society.
Furthermore, proclaiming to be united in their response to the Macondo disaster also 
provided another source of legitimacy. Given the involvement of a multitude of actors, 
the associations could showcase the collective expertise and experience that underpinned 
the task forces. For instance, the international association reported how it “pooled its 
knowledge and experience to create three dedicated teams drawn from some 20 companies 
and comprising more than 100 technical experts and senior managers” (International Task 
Force, report). Hence, by emphasizing the involvement of a multitude of actors from 
2 While national regulators and industry actors cooperated regularly the North Sea co-regulatory 
regime, the relation between trade unions and oil industry actors is in the UK offshore industry 
is more antagonistic (Hale, 2014). We found that cooperation between these actors in the 
Macondo task forces was enabled by the success of another multi-stakeholder task force, which 
was set up following a helicopter crash in the UK in 2009 in which 16 offshore workers died.
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various stakeholder groups and their collective expertise, the associations were able to 
present the task forces as unparalleled learning initiative.
EC strategy: shifting policy learning objective to harmonizing risk governance
The Commissioner’s call for a Moratorium eventually failed to materialize as the coalition 
was able to persuade national governments to not implement a temporary moratorium. 
For instance, the UK government concluded:
“A moratorium on deepwater drilling would decrease the UK’s security of supply and increase 
the UK’s reliance upon imports of oil and gas. A moratorium could also harm the wider British 
economy. There is insufficient evidence of danger to support such a moratorium.” (UK Energy 
and Climate Change Committee).
But that did not mean that the Commission was convinced by the coalitions arguments 
to leave the disaster response to them. In fact, the Commission perceived an important 
role for themselves in the response to Macondo, arguing that, “improving the safety 
of citizens and the protection of the environment cannot rely on industry’s discretionary 
initiative and self-regulation alone.” This quote indicates that the Commission did not 
perceive the tripartite coalition’s arguments for self-regulation and demonstration of 
learning initiatives in the wake of the Macondo disaster to be sufficiently convincing. 
Instead, the Commission argued that the protection of citizens and the environment 
required their involvement in offshore risk governance. Already in July 2010 did the EU 
Commissioner for Energy state that he would “not hesitate to propose a European framework 
for ‘controlling the controllers’ if need be” (Speech Oettinger). As such, in October 2010 the 
Commission published the communication document, which formulated their ambition 
to set up a new EU wide offshore safety legislation. As reported in the communication 
document, the Commission had conducted a review of regulatory regimes in the EU 
and identified an alarming “fragmentation of legal frameworks in the EU”, arguing that, 
“this heterogeneity complicates the understanding and management of health, safety and 
environmental risks in Europe and increases costs for companies. Importantly, it risks slowing 
down coordinated response to accidents affecting several Member States”. Therefore, the 
Commission identified the need for “further harmonization in this sector” by means of 
“a single new piece of specific legislation for offshore oil and gas activities”. Together, the 
previous quotes illustrate how the Commission disputed the “industry’s discretionary 
initiative and self-regulation” by framing the resulting heterogeneity in risk governance 
arrangements as problematic. Instead, it perceived the need for more “harmonization” by 
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developing a new legislation that would embrace the whole of the EU. Following this line of 
argumentation, the Commission appears to position itself, being a transnational regulator, 
as best equipped to coordinate the transnational harmonization of regulations. Hence, 
motivated by its perceived responsibilities towards citizens and the environment, and 
constructing a problem and solution framing focused on the variation in risk governance 
and need for harmonization, the Commission formally positioned itself as responsible for 
risk governance and learning from the Macondo disaster. Despite attempts by the coalition 
to emphasize their positive track record and emphasize the improvements since Macondo, 
the Commission maintained that “the good historical record of the sector was highlighted; 
nevertheless, even industry stakeholders admit that there is a need to challenge the industry 
to do better” (Impact assessment).
Tripartite counter strategies: challenging the need for radical policy learning
Discrediting policy learning initiative by contesting need for uniformity. 
Our data shows that Commission’s learning initiative to harmonize legislation triggered 
substantial contestation by the tripartite coalition. They particularly challenged the 
proposal for an EU-wide uniform legislation as an appropriate means to improve offshore 
safety. For instance, the UK industry association argued:
“a mandatory ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach […] would be counter-productive to both socio-
economic and health, safety and environmental risk management objectives as they would 
not take into account the fundamental differences and risks present for different operations 
under different geological and reservoir conditions.” (UK association public consultation).
The coalition partners framed the proposal for EU-wide legislative harmonization as 
“counter-productive” to risk governance and socio-economic objectives, because it would 
ignore “fundamental differences” between individual operations and Member states. 
Instead, coalition partners argued, risk governance practices had to be “tailored to the 
assessed risks of particular operations in specific locations” (E.On public consultation). These 
quotes show how the proposal for harmonized legislation is rejected because it promotes 
uniformity of risk governance, whereas actors from the North Sea region upheld that risk 
governance should be tailored to local conditions. As such, the Commission’s proposal 
conflicts with an core organizing principle of risk governance in the North Sea. Part of 
the contestation of the tripartite coalition can be understood as resistance against a 
radical learning initiative that conflicted with an institutionalized norm of risk governance. 
Besides the conflict with institutional norms, the tripartite coalition also questioned the 
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Commission’s capacity to govern offshore risk by challenging their expertise. They argued 
that the Commission had “absolutely no experience or competence in the regulation of safety 
in the offshore oil and gas industry” (Press release Oil & Gas UK). Several interviewees 
referred to the Commission as inexperienced bureaucrats whose positive intentions would 
do more harm than good: “They believe you can improve safety by creating more rules. But it 
does not work like that; you will end up with more bureaucracy than safety […] those dangers 
you only recognize if you have experienced it in practice” (Dutch association interview). It is 
therefore framed as a step backwards that would counteract the Commission’s ambition 
to improve offshore safety.
While the preceding discussion shows how contestation between the Commission’s 
and tripartite coalition’s focused on the issue of improving safety in the EU, we argue 
that contestation also revolved around the deeper issue of power. In particular, the EU 
Commission’s proposal for an EU-wide offshore safety legislation can be interpreted as 
an attempt to increase influence in the industry by occupying a more central position in 
offshore risk governance. In contrast, the tripartite coalition – which had been responsible 
for risk governance so far – aimed to resist the Commission’s attempt and maintain their 
dominant position. For instance, arguing for a tailored approach to risk governance also 
implies that established co-regulatory arrangements – and therefore decision-making 
authority – between industry actors and national regulators would be maintained. The 
control struggle was also indicated by the tripartite coalition appeal to a fundamental 
argument about national versus supranational control over natural resources:
“Any action taken at the EU level should respect the general principle of subsidiarity regarding 
regulation of individual Member States’ offshore oil and gas activities and, therefore, the 
right of individual Member States to control their respective energy resources.” (Oil & Gas 
UK public consultation).
We showed that contestation to a large part revolved around the issue of safety. Yet, the 
last quote indicates a parallel, and less explicit, legal discussion about national versus 
supranational authority about risk governance and natural resources. This discussion 
hinged on the question ‘who should be in control of risk governance and natural 
resources?’.
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Self-idealization by presenting regime as exemplary. 
While the coalition opposed the notion of a European legislation, they did endorse the 
idea of promoting ‘state of the art practices’ across the EU. But, while the EU Commission 
perceived to achieve this through a new uniform legislation, the tripartite coalition 
equated ‘state of the art practices’ to their own risk governance arrangements. As such, 
they presented their own risk regulations as a format to be copied by the Commission 
and other Member states
“In addition to the lessons from the Deepwater Horizon incident, this is an ideal opportunity 
for the European Commission, and Member States, to learn from the offshore oil and 
regulatory practice adopted by experienced national regulators.” (UK regulator consultation).
As this quote shows, the coalition framed the occurrence of Macondo as an “opportunity” 
for other actors to learn from the “experienced” North Sea regulators. It seems that the 
Commission’s preference for a legislative solution enabled the coalition to frame themselves 
as expert role models that were willing to educate supposedly less knowledgeable actors 
on offshore risk governance. They promoted their co-regulatory “goal-setting” regime as 
a format for good risk governance, while opposing to the Commission’s proposed uniform 
“prescriptive” legislation, which would not allow the tailoring of risk governance practices 
to local circumstances. For instance, the UK regulator stated:
“The UK’s offshore safety regime places the responsibility on those who create risks to 
demonstrate that they have adequately assessed the risks associated with their work activities 
and put in place appropriate control measures. It has the flexibility to require operators to 
consider new standards or best practice as they emerge and to drive them to continually 
improve […] The UK feels that these goal-setting regimes, rather than prescriptive ones, are 
best suited to the continuous adoption of state of the art practices. The Commission should 
consider the benefits of such approaches when developing its proposals.” (UK Regulator 
consultation).
This quote again indicates the radically different stance of the tripartite coalition as 
compared to the Commission regarding core risk governance principles: ‘responsibility 
for risk governance’ – i.e. both industry actors and regulators versus solely to an ‘outside’ 
regulator; ‘level at which risk governance is organized’ – i.e. allow for tailoring risk 
governance practices to local circumstances versus uniformly prescribed practices; and 
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‘improvement philosophy’ – i.e. aiming for gradual continuous improvement versus radical 
changes of the risk regime.
To promote the effectiveness of the co-regulatory regime, the coalition partners continued 
to showcase their learning initiatives in the wake of the Macondo disaster, both rhetorically 
and physically. While they, at first, aimed to reassure other stakeholders by emphasizing 
their preoccupation with and depth of their response efforts, now they were able to 
showcase tangible achievements of the Macondo task forces. One of the core objectives 
of the task forces was to improve the industry’s capacity to respond to and solve oil spills 
by developing well capping and oil spill containment equipment.
“The new cap demonstrates the industry’s determination to learn from experience and 
continuously improve the safety of operations so that risks to people and the environment 
are reduced. The capping device was designed and manufactured over a period of only 
seven months – an extraordinary feat given the complexity and uniqueness of the required 
functionality and design requirements.” (Press release UK Task Force, 14 March 2011).
As the previous quote shows, the coalition backed up their earlier claims of responsibility, 
indicated by their preoccupation with learning the lessons of Macondo, with “extraordinary” 
achievements that are presented proof of “the industry’s determination to learn and 
continuously improve the safety of operations”
Proclaiming united stance - supporting national regulators as risk governance authority. 
It seems that the Commission’s focus on a legislative solution triggered the tripartite 
coalition to foreground the national regulators as the primary role models for the EU 
Commission:
“The [North Sea] Member States in which we operate all have highly competent, technically 
knowledgeable and professional national regulators. These expert inspectors are clearly best 
placed to supervise, inspect and verify industry compliance and we support the assertion that 
this should be carried out in their capacity as national regulatory bodies as they are close to 
the operational interface.” (Chevron public consultation).
This quote shows that industry actors supported national regulators in the North Sea 
countries by defending their mandate, supporting their credibility as risk governance 
agents given their “high level of technical competence and knowledge” and their experience 
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at “the operational interface”. As such, industry actors defended the national regulators’ 
position as risk governance authority. In particular, as this quote also seems to indicate, 
industry actors presented themselves as preferring to be scrutinized by the regulator. In 
fact, industry argued that having expert regulators was in their own benefit: “the industry 
actively seeks sound and appropriate regulation, delivered by strong and professional 
regulators.” (Press release UK Task Force). Hence, the industry actors’ support of the 
national regulators helps to reiterate their united stance in opposing the Commission’s 
aim for an EU-wide offshore safety legislation. We argue that this strategy aimed to protect 
not just the regulators’ interests in the overarching debate about ‘who should have control 
over risk governance’, but also of the industry actors themselves. By arguing that risk 
governance should maintain with the national Member States, and portraying national 
regulators as highly qualified, industry actors basically argued to maintain the established 
co-regulatory regime, in which they also had risk governance responsibilities. Hence, this 
strategy of supporting the national regulators and proclaiming unity served both these 
actors’ interests.
EU Commission strategy: rejecting contestation to continue pursuit of 
uniform legislation
The coalition partners rejected the ambition for an uniform safety legislation across the EU 
and argued for the importance of tailored risk governance through a goal-setting regime. 
However, despite these efforts, the Commission published in October 2012 a formal 
notification to introduce uniform, EU wide offshore safety Regulation. The Commission 
argued for “a comprehensive offshore reform raising throughout Union, through new law, the 
level of risk management and emergency preparedness in the offshore industry.” In particular, 
they argued for a Regulation as legislative instrument as opposed to a Directive, because it 
“has advantages over a Directive due to its clarity, consistency and speed of implementation 
through direct application [and] would also provide for a more level playing field.” (Proposal 
for a Regulation). A Regulation requires Member states to implement the legislation directly 
into national legislation, while a Directive allows Member states to adapt the legislation to 
match pre-existing national legislation. This indicates that a Regulation will best achieve 
to the Commission’s objective of uniform legislation across the EU, thus comprising the 
preferred legislative vehicle. While the Commission did recognize the tripartite coalition’s 
learning initiatives, referring for instance to “the capping device currently being developed by 
[UK Task Force]” (consultation summary document), it appears that it ignored the coalition’s 
strategies to contest its pursuit for uniform legislation throughout the EU.
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Tripartite counter strategies: engaging in dramatic resistance
Discrediting Regulation to achieve alternative policy initiative. 
Our data shows that the tripartite coalition’s contestation strategies became more dramatic 
in response to the Commission’s decision to pursue a Regulation. The coalition engaged 
in new means of contestation, such as formulating multi-stakeholder position papers to 
formally voice their objections to the Commission, as well as organizing a conference 
to collectively discuss and contest the proposal for a Regulation. They framed the 
Commission’s proposal as “a red line issue” (Speech UK Regulator). The coalition partners 
again appealed to an image of regression of offshore safety in the North Sea, but it was 
more dramatic than in the previous phases. They invoked the metaphor of collapse and 
destruction. For instance, two members of the Dutch industry association argued
“it is like this: you have constructed a building with LEGO, but the Commission denies that 
it is any good and wants to destroy it and” [his colleague jumps in] “and gives you a stack of 
cards and says: build a new house of cards instead.” (Dutch association interview).
This quote shows how the Regulation was framed as destroying established risk governance 
arrangements, replacing it with an unstable alternative, and thereby permanently cripple 
the industry. The use of the ‘collapsing building’ metaphor as a discursive strategy of 
contestation makes sense from the perspective of the tripartite coalition; it represents 
the exact opposite of their advocated notion of ‘continuous improvement’, which instead 
invokes an image of progressively building upon an established foundation. For instance, 
a UK trade unionist argued “It took us 20 years to get to this stage, let’s not undo it, let’s 
maintain what we have got and built on it” (interview), and the regulator argued “We want to 
add things on top which will improve [safety].” (UK regulator speech). This image of building 
as progressive improvement was also invoked in the coalition’s attempt to persuade the 
Commission to consider and alternative policy learning initiative. While the coalition had 
previously rejected the proposal for an EU legislation, now that it became clear that the 
Commission would push through, the coalition changed its contestation strategies towards 
trying to influence the type of legislative vehicle. Instead of an uniform and inflexible 
Regulation, the coalition proposed a Directive as a more appropriate alternative:
“We strongly believe that a properly worded Directive would more effectively align with 
the Commission’s objectives for the EU, allowing the Member States to use their discretion 
to adjust to local circumstances and to align with existing regulatory frameworks. This will 
avoid inconsistencies and contradictions with current national legislation and with industry 
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best practices, which ultimately could be detrimental to offshore safety.” (Dutch industry 
association).
This shows that, now it became clear that the Commission would continue to pursue policy 
learning, the coalition aimed to persuade the Commission to make the policy as favorable 
to their interests as possible. From the perspective of the coalition, a Directive would be 
an appropriate alternative, as it matched the coalition’s interests for a tailored approach 
to risk governance and continuous improvement.
Self-idealization by showcasing commitment to safety and learning as motivation to 
fight.
Now that the coalition aimed to convince the Commission to change the Regulation into 
a Directive, they changed their contestation strategy. On one hand, they increasingly 
presented themselves as a partner to the Commission, willing to collaborate with them 
on their shared objective to improve offshore safety. However, they portrayed themselves 
as being willing to clash with the Commission if they ignored them.
“we will work with the EC, bring us in to the discussion, let us participate, let us bring our 
expertise and our knowledge to you. Let us improve safety; that is what we are committed 
to. Do not shut us out. But if you do that, then we will work, and we will shout and we will 
spread the word that what you do will put peoples’ life at risk and we will not support that. 
We cannot.” (UK unionist speech).
It seems that the coalition, whose opposition against an EU legislation was already ignored 
by the Commission before, now made an ultimate attempt to influence the Commission’s 
proposal. The coalition presented itself as determined to defend their risk governance 
regimes and commanded cooperation from the Commission. It seems that they give the 
Commission a choice between smooth co-operation versus them digging their heels in 
and going to the trenches, hence using a more forceful frame of contestation than before. 
But, as one of our interviewees reflected, this image of fighting was primarily a rhetorical 
strategy, as their actual ambition was to collaborate with the Commission to influence the 
outcome of the policy change, which they apparently expected to come through regardless 
of their resistance:
“We took the tactical decision that although we were fundamentally opposed to the 
regulation, and we were going to argue against it all the way through, we would continue to 
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work constructively with the Commission so that whatever instrument they were developing, 
it was as good as it could be.” (UK regulator).
Hence, while it seems the coalition invoked a frame of being willing to fight, it seems that 
their primary objective was to get more involved in shaping the legislative instrument. 
By claiming voice and warnings, the coalition aimed to increase their sphere of influence.
Proclaiming united stance. 
To contribute to their strategy to influence the final shape of the legislative vehicle, the 
coalition partners now aimed to persuade each other to put in all their effort. In particular, 
they appealed to the shared objective that brought all coalition partners together, namely 
safety.
“we are all very united in a common cause in opposition to these proposals […] we are 
actually more united under this safety banner than we probably have been for many years 
and probably since Piper Alpha. I see this very much as we few, we happy few, we band 
of brothers gathered together before the European Union fortress.” (Speech HSE director 
industry association).
Hence, the frame of being a “band of brothers”, “united under this safety banner” invokes 
an image a united coalition with a single purpose, as well as ‘us’ versus ‘them’. While 
regulators, unions, and industry actors are frequently not on the same page concerning 
issues of safety, due to their varying interests, these differences were strategically ignored. 
Reiterating their united stance also seems to reaffirm each actor’s sense of purpose and 
motivating them to continue to contest the Commission as a learning agent. For instance, 
it was argued “we have to keep our pressure on the commission […] We must remain united in 
our efforts and move the EU away from regulation and to a directive” (Speech HSE director 
industry association), and “we are beginning to get traction […] so don’t give up hope.” (UK 
regulator speech).
EC strategy: adapting policy learning to accommodate opposing perspective
Eventually, the Commission did succumb to the coalition’s pressure to drop the proposal 
for a regulation, and instead promulgated a proposal for a Directive, an alternative 
legislative vehicle that leaves more opportunity for customizing legislation to Member 
states’ pre-existing legislation. This allowed the North Sea countries to adapt the legislative 
requirements of the Directive to their existing goal-setting regimes. Hence, the proposal for 
4
132
Chapter 4
a Directive respected both the Commission’s ambition to assume responsibility of offshore 
risk governance, and the North Sea countries’ ambition to maintain their existing regimes. 
The coalition approved this new proposal, which signaled the end of the contestation.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to better understand the politics of learning from disaster in 
the wake of crisis spillover to a different organizational field. We found that contestation 
between two actor groups was represented by a conflict between two opposing risk 
governance narratives. In particular, the contestation revolved around core issues of risk 
governance, such as: 1) ‘Who should be responsible for risk governance?’; 2) ‘At what 
level should risk governance be organized’; 3) ‘What is the appropriate improvement 
philosophy?’; and 4) ‘Who should be in control of risk governance and natural resource 
extraction?’ We demonstrated how the two actor groups responded to each actions, 
adapting their own practices of learning and contestation to influence each other’s 
initiatives. Hence, we found that the process of contestation was dynamic. We furthermore 
showed how the differences between the narratives were rooted in different institutional 
discourses of risk governance. Research has indicated that learning from disaster tends 
to be embedded in a ‘dominant discourse about risk’ (Hardy & Maguire, 2016, p. 81; see 
also Brown, 2000; 2004; Gephart, 1992), which shapes how learning takes place. However, 
our findings indicated that learning was inherently coloured by a conflict between two 
powerful discourses. As such, while previous research on learning from disaster has 
emphasized the ability of established actors in an organizational field to impose their 
interests on other actors (e.g. Brown, 2000), our study confirms statements in the literature 
on institutional change that a ‘challenger’ – i.e. an actor that aims to disrupt established 
institutions and authority relations – may drive field-level learning (Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein 
& McAdam, 2012; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). We visualize the process of contestation in a 
process model in Figure 1.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the political 
perspective on learning from disasters and crises (e.g. Sagan, 1994). The crisis literature has 
indicated that different stakeholders may produce their own event narratives (Buchanan 
& Denyer, 2013; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Smith & Elliot, 2007). Our investigation goes 
beyond the identification of a narrative conflict to show how this conflict is sustained over 
time through dynamic practices of contestation following spillover of the legitimacy crisis 
to a different organizational field. In particular, this study identified three core practices of 
133
Field-level learning from disaster - a dynamic process of contestation following crisis spillover 
contestation that served to limit the intervention of a powerful actor: discrediting others, 
self-idealization, and proclaiming a united stance. The strategies of ‘discrediting others’ 
and ‘self-idealization’ served to claim sole learning authority at the expense of other 
Figure 1. Process model of contestation following spillover in the wake of a disaster
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potential learning agents. These findings confirm evidence from studies on institutional 
maintenance that established actors in an organizational field may defend their position 
in the wake of disruptive events (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Micelotta & Washington, 2013). 
The strategy of ‘discrediting others’ aimed at undermining learning initiatives by other 
actors, in particular the EU Commission, by challenging interpretations of disaster causes, 
formulations of solutions, as well as risk governance expertise. This confirms studies on 
disruptive events in organizational field that identified that a central aspect of contestation 
in the wake of a field-level crisis involves challenging problem- and solution framings 
(Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). On the other hand, the strategy 
of ‘self-idealization’ aimed to bolster the image of established actors and practices, for 
instance by asserting the appropriateness of the established institutional arrangements 
– e.g. the risk governance regimes in the North Sea – or demonstrating preoccupation 
with responding to a disaster. This strategy confirms studies on organizational impression 
management, which showed that such strategies serve to create favorable images and 
induce goodwill in stakeholders (Elsbach et al., 1998; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). We also 
found that the coalition supplemented their ‘self-idealization’ strategy by ‘proclaiming a 
united stance’; a strategy that legitimated the learning response by showing that it was 
broadly supported and built upon diverse expertise.
It seems that the strategies of ‘discrediting others’ and ‘self-idealization’ have much 
in common with practices identified in the literature on organizational re-legitimation 
in response to crisis events (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Elsbach, Sutton, & 
Principe, 1998; Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Pfarrer, DeCelles, 
Smith, & Taylor, 2008). This literature distinguishes between technical arguments – i.e. 
signaling efficiency and effectiveness in organizational performance - and institutional 
arguments – i.e. referring to compliance with institutionalized practices – for protecting or 
restoring legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994). The strategy ‘discrediting others’ had clear technical 
elements. For instance, learning initiatives by the EU Commission were framed as having 
a the negative impact on safety, and the US risk regime was framed as inferior in terms of 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the strategy of ‘discrediting others’ invoked institutional 
elements. For instance, because the Commission went down the path of new legislation, 
the coalition was able to invoke institutionalized beliefs and practices of risk governance 
from the North Sea risk regime (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), such as the 
principle of continuous improvement. The strategy of ‘self-idealization’ also featured 
technical arguments. For instance, the coalition discursively reenacted regime changes 
that were implemented following the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988, arguing that they had 
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already experienced ‘their’ Macondo and that the current regime in the North Sea region 
had never experienced a blowout since then. As such, they were able to use normative 
arguments (Elsbach, 1994; Maguire & Hardy, 2009), presenting the North Sea regime as 
highly legitimate and an example for other regulators. Finally, the strategy ‘proclaiming 
united stance’ also had technical features. The involvement of three different constituencies 
demonstrated that the coalition had organized a well-resourced and effective learning 
initiative that built upon deep and broad expertise. Earlier research confirms that multi-
stakeholder collaboration enables more effective responses to disasters (Reinecke & 
Donaghey, 2015; Van der Vegt, Essens, Wahlstrom, and George, 2015). However, it also 
had an important symbolic function. It was important to demonstrate that the task force 
initiatives did not just involve industry actors, but also trade unions and national regulators, 
which provided credibility and legitimacy to the initiative that oil industry actors were 
lacking.
Our study also contributes to the political perspective on learning from disaster by 
identifying specific politics of learning. First, our discursive strategies of contestation 
resemble political strategies found in the literature on identity politics and ‘othering’ in 
discourses about issues like race (Alcadipani, Westwood, & Rosa, 2015; Jack & Westwood, 
2009). These discourses are often characterized by othering practices in which an ‘Other’ 
is defined in negative and inferior terms while the Self is defined in positive and superior 
terms. Furthermore, our findings show that these identity politics revolved primarily 
around a politics of responsibility, and a politics of expertise. Research on crises has 
shown that responsibility is a contested issue following crises (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; 
Douglas, 1992; Gephart, 1984; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Organizations may attempt to dispute 
responsibility for a disaster by denying involvement and shifting blame in order to avoid 
the burden of accountability on the organization (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Bundy and 
Pfarrer, 2015; Elsbach, 1994), or by arguing that ‘it won’t happen here’ (Smith & Elliott, 
2007). Our findings show that crises can also trigger negotiations about other aspects 
of responsibility, in particular about who is responsible for the learning response. Our 
findings show that established actors may want to claim learning authority and take on 
the burden of responsibility for learning. This struggle for responsibility can be understood 
as an attempt to gain or maintain an authority position in the field, as other actors are 
denied responsibility for and influence in the learning process. As such, the politics of 
responsibility aim to avert interventions from challengers in the organizational field, while 
challengers may want to take responsibility for learning to impose radical change (Maguire 
& Hardy, 2009). As we have shown, actors aimed to invoke legitimate categories – such as 
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expertise, stakeholder support (Elsbach et al., 1998) – in their narrative strategies to claim 
responsibility. This shows that the politics of responsibility are closely related to politics 
of expertise. Resistance against alternative learning proposals may involve contestation 
of expertise of challenging actors in the field, while established actors may presented 
themselves as experts in risk governance. Our findings confirm earlier studies on risk 
and learning from crisis, which states that denial of expertise and disregard for outsiders 
may play a central role in contestation about risk and learning (Beck, 1992; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2013; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Research on (technological) risk has argued that risk 
is heavily contested; risk is open to social definition and construction (Beck, 1992), and 
thus mediated through interpretation and argumentation (Gephart, 1984; Maguire & 
Hardy, 2013). Different actors have different interests and perspectives on the nature and 
desirability of risk, which fosters competing knowledge claims and risk discourses (Beck, 
1992; Giddens, 1990; 1991; Maguire & Hardy, 2013; 2016; Power, 2007; Rosa, Renn, & 
McCright, 2014). Hence, in the context of risk, expertise becomes highly politicized (Beck, 
1992; Fisher, 1990). However, despite the presence of competing perspectives, learning 
from disaster tends to be dominated by principles of technical rationality, represented by 
technical experts like engineers (Carroll, 1995; 1998; Carroll et al., 2002; Dekker, 2014; Elliott 
& Smith, 1993; 2006; Perin, 1995). Such ‘legitimized’ expertise may be used to prevent some 
outside groups from entering into debates (Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
Our findings confirm these insights, as the tripartite coalition used appeals to technical 
expertise to resist the Commission’s involvement in learning.
This study also indicated how strategies of contestation change as a narrative conflict 
progresses. In early phases, ‘discrediting others’ primarily involved contestation of 
alternative problem- and solution definitions. When the EU Commission proposed new 
EU legislation of offshore safety, implying that they aspired a more central role in risk 
governance in Europe, the coalition more specifically challenged the EU Commission’s 
supposed lack of expertise. Similarly, the strategy of ‘self-idealization’ changed over time. 
Initial self-idealization practices were anticipatory forms of impression management 
(Elsbach et al., 1998). Even before the Commission proposed a moratorium, the coalition 
was aware of the need to organize learning initiatives to avert expected political responses. 
As such, they organized multi-stakeholder task forces in order to demonstrate a proactive 
and resourceful response. This confirms Barnett and King’s (2008) observation that 
proactive learning through self-regulation helps to avert regulatory interventions in 
hazardous industries. When the Commission explicated their intention to develop a EU 
Regulation as opposed to a Directive, self-idealization strategies changed into intimidation 
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(Elsbach et al., 1998), presenting themselves as motivated to fight the EU Commission 
if their rational demands were ignored. The focus of the ‘proclaiming a united stance’ 
strategy shifted when the EU Commission communicated its intention to develop EU-wide 
safety legislation. Given the emphasis on new legislation, the coalition’s arguments became 
more focused on showcasing the involvement of national regulators in the initiative and 
supporting their expertise and position in the risk governance regime. When the EU 
Commission indicated their motivation for an EU Regulation, the coalition engaged in an 
ultimate attempt to strengthen the ties between the coalition partners, motivating each 
other to maintain their pressure on the Commission and portraying themselves as a “band 
of brothers”. These findings confirm the broad range of organizational responses that may 
be enacted to deal with a legitimacy crisis, varying from mere acceptance of stakeholder 
pressures for change to outright rejection (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Pfarrer et al., 2008).
Our study has investigated the politics of learning after to spillover of a crisis that originated 
in a different organizational field. Some elements of our findings appear similar to findings 
of studies on politics of learning that did not focus specifically on the context of spillover. 
For instance, the strategy of ‘discrediting others’ has similarities with strategies of avoiding 
blame that are well-known in crisis management literature (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Smith & 
Elliott, 2007). However, we show that the context of spillover to another field introduced 
new opportunities for avoiding blame. For instance, we found that the tripartite coalition 
aimed to exploit the fact that both regions are characterized by different institutional 
arrangements – the risk governance regime. For instance, the coalition’s challenged the EU 
Commission’s problem framing by arguing that it was not water depth that played a critical 
role in causing the disaster, but the US risk regime. By redirecting attention to differences 
between the risk regimes in both regions, they could more easily distance themselves 
from the Macondo disaster and the US regime. They had similar opportunities with the 
strategy of ‘self-idealization’. Coalition partners appealed in their discursive strategies 
to institutionalized risk governance principles – continuous improvement, tailoring 
risk governance to local conditions, and decentralized control – that are central to the 
North Sea risk regime. Because of the differences in risk regimes between the US and 
the North Sea, the coalition was able to portray the North Sea regime as an example for 
other regulators to adopt. Finally, we also argue that spillover to a different region had 
implications for the strategy of ‘proclaiming a united stance’. While collaboration between 
stakeholders in the North Sea regime is still not the norm, their relation is less adverse than 
in the US (Lindoe et al., 2014). Hence, we argue that there were better conditions to form a 
multi-stakeholder coalition in the North Sea region in the wake of the Macondo disaster.
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Boundary conditions
As for any single qualitative case study, this study has methodological limitations. We 
focus on a crisis as a result of a disaster spilled over to a different geographical region 
and how the spillover led to contestation of learning in this different region. Elliott (2014) 
has argued that events with such far-reaching effects are rare. Yet, there have been other 
disasters that had similar effects, like Bhopal (Nathan & Kovoor-Misra, 2002; Bowman & 
Kunreuther, 1988; Shrivastava, 1987; Jasanoff 1994) and Fukushima (Wittneben, 2012). We 
argue that our findings are generalizable to settings of major disasters, as well as other 
types of crises, such as the failure of banks (Kim & Miner, 2007). Furthermore, scholars 
have observed an increase in major crises (Perrow, 1999), or at least an increase in the 
perception thereof (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013). Hence, we argue that our findings may 
become increasingly relevant in the future. This research approach allowed us to unpack 
the complexity of contestation in the wake of a disaster.
Furthermore, we argue that the scope of spillover is an important boundary condition of 
our study: we investigated spillover from the US field of offshore drilling and production 
to a different organizational field. We argued that field-level learning and contestation 
would take different forms in the original context. For example, in the original context in 
which a disaster occurred politics focus to a large extend on the issue of culpability (e.g. 
Sagan, 1994), whereas spillover mostly initiates political struggles about the implications 
of a disaster for Furthermore, because organizational fields are characterized by particular 
institutional arrangements – institutions, authority relations – (e.g. Yu et al., 2008) there 
will be a larger ‘institutional distance’ between the organizations involved in the disaster 
and other actors in the field, likely affecting opportunities and strategies of contestation.
Literature on learning from disaster states that, in the wake of a disaster, the social 
construction of reality is often portrayed through the ‘lens of the powerful’ (Smith, 2001) 
– as those in positions of authority and power aim to serve their own interests and utilize 
their position to write their history according to their terms. Our case is particularly 
interesting because both central actors in our case, the coalition and the Commission, were 
almost equally powerful. The financial power and technical expertise of the oil industry, 
augmented by the national regulators’ and unions’ social legitimacy and expertise of the 
national regulators and trade unions, created a strong coalition in terms of resources and 
credibility. The Commission, on the other hand, can be regarded as a powerful regulatory 
body. The presence of two powerful actors likely fostered prolonged contestation. Without 
these opposing centers of power, contestation would likely have subsided earlier. Finally, 
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our main body of data sources consisted of publicly available secondary sources, such 
as documents and video recordings of speeches. While the choice for these naturally 
occurring data makes sense given the fact that a large part of contestation occurred 
through production of publicly available texts, this also means that our findings depended 
on what actors decided to showcase in their bodies of text. While we have anecdotal 
evidence that substantial lobbying activities took place by the coalition in Brussels, we 
were not able to engage in observations of contestation that occurred hidden from the 
public eye.
CONCLUSIONS
Our research question was: How do field actors contest each other’s learning initiatives 
over time following spillover of disaster implications to a different organizational field?’ We 
conclude that actor groups engaged in recurring discursive practices of contestation, in 
particular ‘self-idealization’ – aimed at reassuring other stakeholders and overcoming 
potential ‘outside’ intervention – ‘proclaiming united stance – to support self-idealization 
by demonstrating broad stakeholder support and deep expertise – and ‘discrediting 
others’ – aimed at undermining other learning initiatives. Together, these practices aimed 
to capture learning authority and responsibility and withhold it from other actors. The 
practices were continuously updated to match changes in the opposing actor’s learning 
initiatives. We also showed how the different learning initiatives and discursive practices 
of contestation constituted two conflicting narratives of risk governance – the narratives 
of ‘responsible self-regulation’ and ‘harmonized regulation and centralized control’. These 
narratives differed in their interpretation of four core risk governance principles: ‘who 
should be responsible for risk governance?’; ‘at what level should risk governance be 
organized’; ‘what is the appropriate improvement philosophy’; and ‘who should be in 
control of risk governance and national resource extraction. These interpretations were 
rooted in different institutional discourses and responsibilities of risk governance.
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The objective of this dissertation was to better understand how actors in an organizational 
field collectively attempt to learn from disaster. Focusing specifically on field-level learning 
as a contested process, the main research question was: How and why do actors in an 
organizational field initiate and maintain the contested process of field-level learning from 
disaster? The main research question was approached through three sub-questions, which I 
investigated in three separate studies. The first research study theoretically and empirically 
demonstrated why field-level learning is relevant in the wake of a disaster. The second 
and third research studies focused on politics of field-level learning from disaster, which 
was conceptualized as a process of contestation of interpretations of disaster causes and 
solutions between actors with different interests, perspectives, and social positions.
In this section I will first discuss the main findings of the three research studies and 
answer the research questions of each chapter. Then, the three studies are brought 
together to formulate the theoretical contributions of my dissertation to the literatures on 
disaster causation, learning from disaster, and institutional theory. Third, the implications 
for practice will be discussed. Finally, the boundary conditions of this dissertation, and 
directions for future research are elaborated.
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
Chapter Two: How many blowouts does it take to learn the lessons? An 
institutional perspective on disaster development
In Chapter two, the objective was to better understand how disasters develop and why 
similar disaster development trajectories recur by introducing the organizational sociology 
of new institutional theory. This study was initiated as a consequence of an increasing 
awareness – through informal conversations with experts, and reading industry- and 
accident investigation reports about the Macondo and Montara blowout disasters – that 
institutional rules, norms, and beliefs seemed to contribute to the occurrence of similar 
disaster development patterns in the offshore industry. Based on this initial insight it was 
decided to investigate further. Using various data sources, such as accident investigation 
reports of multiple offshore accidents and serious near-misses, industry reports, semi-
structured interviews, and non-participant observations, this study provided an empirical 
illustration of institutionalized beliefs of risk and practices of risk management and 
occupational training in the offshore drilling industry. A mismatch was identified between 
the complexity of offshore drilling operations and risk management and training, which 
increases the risk for accidents. First, this study showed that accidents and near-misses in 
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the offshore industry demonstrated that risk was conceptualized as a static, fragmented, 
and technical phenomenon. I argued that this conceptualization is inadequate for a 
hazardous, complex, and dynamic setting as offshore drilling. Furthermore, this study 
traced back these harmful conceptualizations of risk to persistent institutionalized training 
practices in the industry, which have not co-evolved with the increasing complexity of 
offshore operations. For instance, it was shown that worker competence was generally 
perceived as an issue to be addressed by ‘fixing the individual’ through more technical 
training. Yet, I argue that taking such an individualized approach to occupational risk is be 
insufficient, because this does not recognize the influence of the institutional environment. 
Furthermore, the study indicated that occupational training practices varied across the 
offshore industry, and that this variability was widely accepted.
Based on these findings, I argue that risk management needs to be professionalized in 
the offshore industry, involving standardized training in non-technical skills and system 
risk management. To address the risk arising from the mismatch of complex operations 
and risk management and training, I argue for the need for a broader conceptualization 
of competence and claim that the nature of training in the offshore drilling industry needs 
to change to better equip the offshore workforce for these new circumstances. While it 
takes effort and perseverance to change institutionalized practices, I argue that it can be 
achieved through professionalizing these practices by means of standardization of worker 
training and career progression, and through balancing technical and non-technical skills 
training. Furthermore, while contributing causes may appear to be unique for the involved 
organizations, they may actually be institutionalized in an industry. Hence, this study 
proposes that to learn effectively from disasters and prevent their recurrence, one should 
look outside organizations for the potential existence of institutionalized dysfunctional 
practices and beliefs. Looking for similarities between disaster development patterns is one 
way to identify the influence of taken-for-granted beliefs and practices. All together, the 
findings of Chapter Two indicate the need for field-level learning in the wake of a disaster 
to resolve harmful institutional factors.
Chapter Three: Justifying ‘superior’ knowledge from the periphery – 
struggles of a marginal community to influence learning in the wake of a 
disaster
Building upon our argument that field-level learning from disaster is important, the aim 
of chapter three was to better understand how field-level learning from disaster takes 
place. This study blended the learning from disaster literature with insights from the 
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transformation perspective on knowledge sharing and communities-of-practice literature, 
and conceptualized field-level learning from disaster as a struggle between established 
and marginal community for participation in learning. The research question was: how 
does a marginal community attempt to influence learning from disaster processes that are 
driven by established communities?
The starting point of the analysis of this study was the Macondo blowout and oil spill. 
While this disaster occurred in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, it triggered a risk governance crisis 
in the global offshore oil and gas industry. Hence, the Macondo disaster became a field-
level crisis. Also in the North Sea region, actors responded to the disaster by initiating 
field-level learning. This study investigated the efforts of a relatively marginal community 
in the industry – the Human Factors (HF) community – to contribute to field-level learning 
and make sure that a similar disaster would never happen in the North Sea region. The HF 
community called for radical change and attempted to share its specialist knowledge about 
human error and incident causation with two established communities that were leading 
the learning response – the drilling community and senior managers from oil companies 
and drilling contractors. This study showed, however, that the HF community struggled to 
persuade the established communities to adopt their call for radical change and specialist 
knowledge. Based on the analysis of interviews with HF specialists, industry reports, and 
participant observations This chapter demonstrated that the HF communities’ attempts to 
share HF knowledge was complicated by the presence knowledge- and political boundaries 
that limited mutual engagement with the established communities in the wake of Macondo. 
It showed that a semantic boundary – rooted in different assumptions about human error 
– contributed to the creation of divergent disaster accounts and calls for action. Second, It 
showed how political boundaries emerged as the HF community aimed to become more 
established in the drilling industry. They engage in strategies of discipline recognition 
to justify the importance of their discipline, such as ‘using a generalized sales pitch to 
justify the relevance of HF for drilling’, ‘using decontextualized, non-technical knowledge 
in a technically dominated environment’, and ‘justifying HF as a distinct safety discipline 
in a efficiency-focused management environment’. However, I demonstrated how these 
strategies were largely ‘self-referential’ – i.e. focused on strengthening the status of the 
HF discipline by showcasing it as a distinct safety discipline worthy of attention, rather 
than translating HF knowledge to the drilling context to demonstrate specifically how it 
could positively impact drilling practices. This self-referential approach created political 
boundaries that limited sharing of HF knowledge. In particular, it undermined the HF 
community’s legitimacy, as they were unable to connect to the dominant drilling and senior 
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management discourses and values. Finally, the study demonstrated how the separation 
between the HF and drilling and senior management community practices was reinforced 
by the risk regime in the North Sea. The risk regime embeds institutionalized mechanisms 
of learning and responsibilities for risk governance that favor established communities are 
learning authorities and maintain community boundaries in place. Due to their justification 
strategies and the institutional constraints, the HF community was unable to overcome 
the knowledge and political boundaries and significantly influence field-level learning in 
the North Sea region. As such, established communities dominated field-level learning, 
resulting in the adaptation of established knowledge rather than radical change.
Chapter three indicated that field-level learning from disaster is a contested process in 
which marginal communities in a field struggle to overcome knowledge- and political 
boundaries to transform established knowledge and influence the learning trajectory. 
The study demonstrated that marginal communities need to maintain awareness of 
potential institutional constraints such as institutionalized values, discourses, and learning 
mechanisms and responsibilities. The failure of a marginal community to overcome 
knowledge- and political boundaries and effectively justify alternative bodies of knowledge 
will contribute to a learning process that revolves around refining established knowledge, 
practices, and goals, rather than changing deeper assumptions, values, and beliefs.
Chapter four: Field-level learning from disaster – a dynamic process of 
contestation following crisis spillover
The aim of this chapter was to better understand the politics of learning from disaster 
following spillover of a legitimacy crisis to a different organizational field. I conceptualized 
politics of learning as a dynamic, contested process and investigate how and why actors 
continuously enact their competing interests in response to opposing actors’ actions. 
We proposed that spillover to a different region would introduce particular dynamics of 
contestation to the process of field-level learning from disaster. The research question 
was: How do field actors contest each other’s learning initiatives over time following spillover 
of disaster implications to a different organizational field?
Similar to chapter three, the starting point is the risk governance crisis in the global offshore 
oil and gas industry that was triggered by the Macondo disaster. This study empirically 
examined how the risk governance crisis spilled over to Europe and triggered a political 
struggle between two actor groups - the European Commission versus a tripartite coalition 
from the North Sea region consisting of oil industry actors, national regulators, and trade 
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unions. Contestation between these actor groups was represented by two opposing risk 
governance narratives: ‘responsible self-regulations’ versus ‘harmonized regulation and 
centralized control’. These narratives had competing interpretations of fundamental risk 
governance principles: ‘who should be responsible for risk governance?’ – i.e. industry actors 
and national regulators as co-regulators versus a more distanced central regulator; ‘at 
what level should risk governance be organized?’ – i.e. allow for tailoring risk governance 
practices to local circumstances versus uniformly prescribed practices; and ‘what is the 
appropriate improvement philosophy?’ – i.e. aiming for gradual continuous improvement 
versus radical changes of the risk regime, and ‘who should have control over risk governance 
and natural resource extraction?’ – i.e. control should be left to Member states versus the EU 
Commission. Furthermore, the study demonstrated how the two actor groups responded 
to each other’s learning initiatives and strategies of contestation, adapting their own 
practices of learning and contestation to influence each other’s initiatives. Hence, I found 
that the process of contestation was dynamic. The EU Commission first aimed to implement 
a moratorium, but when they did not succeed in persuading national governments to 
implement a ban of new drilling projects, they continued by formulating a proposal for new 
legislation. And despite contestation of the tripartite coalition, the Commission continued 
with its pursuit of a Regulation. Only after intense contestation did the Commission adapt 
their proposal to a Directive to accommodate the objections of the tripartite coalition. On 
the part of the tripartite coalition, I identified three core practices of contestation emerge 
from conflicting narratives: ‘discrediting others’, ‘self-idealization’, and ‘proclaiming united 
stance’.
Chapter four has indicated that contestation in the wake of a disaster can involve a narrative 
conflict that is rooted in opposing institutional discourses about risk governance. The study 
demonstrated how contestation is maintained over time through the dynamic interaction 
of discursive strategies of contestation. The study also showed that crisis spillover to a 
different organizational field triggers particular strategies of contestation. Actors that aim 
to resist crisis spillover focus on differences between institutional arrangements – e.g. the 
risk governance regime – in an organizational field, arguing that particular regimes are 
better able to avert disasters. Furthermore, the findings showed that contestation involved 
politics of responsibility and expertise, with which actors aimed to assume a position of 
authority in the learning process.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
This dissertation provides a study into the subjects of disaster causation and learning 
from disaster. By blending the literatures on learning from disaster, politics of learning, 
institutional change, and disaster causation, this dissertation makes several contributions 
to these respective bodies of literature.
Learning from disaster as a process of contestation following crisis spillover
I contribute to the literature on learning from disaster by conceptualizing it as a political 
process in which different actors in an organizational field negotiate and contest varying 
interpretations and suggested solutions, and strive to protect their interests. Most studies 
perceive learning from the perspective of effectiveness, i.e. a process aimed at improving 
safety performance (Lampel et al., 2009). However, this ignores the inherent political nature 
of learning (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000) and learning from disaster specifically (Sagan, 1993; 
1994; Smith & Elliott, 2007). The majority of studies that addressed politics of learning in 
the wake of a disaster or crisis have primarily investigated politics in quasi-legal settings like 
public hearings and public inquiries (Hardy & Maguire, 2016; see for examples Brown, 2000; 
2004; Gephart 1992; Topal, 2009). Instead, this dissertation focused on dynamic processes 
of contestation between actors outside formally organized arenas like public inquiries 
following spillover to another organizational field. Previous research has largely ignored 
how politics of learning from disaster takes place following spillover of the legitimacy 
crisis from involved organizations to a different organizational field. However, as chapter 
four proposed, crisis spillover to a different field will affect how contestation of learning 
will take place. For instance, processes of contestation will not revolve around questions 
of culpability, but will focus on the implications of a disaster for that organizational field. 
As such, public inquiries – learning mechanisms that serve to assign blame (e.g. Turner, 
1976) – will not play an important role in the wake of spillover. This dissertation contributes 
to the political perspective on learning from disasters and crises by identifying how actors 
in an organizational field engage in contestation following spillover. In particular, it makes 
the following specific contributions to the literature on politics of learning from disaster:
Learning from disaster as a process of contestation between marginal and 
established actors
Previous studies tend to portray politics of learning from disaster as a process dominated 
by powerful actors, such as corporations and government bodies, who constrain the search 
for causes and aim to maintain established institutions, meaning systems, and authority 
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relations in place (Brown, 2000; 2004; Deschamps et al., 1997; Elliott & Smith, 2006; 
Gephart, 1992; 1993; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011; Topal, 2009). Yet, research on disruptive 
events as triggers for institutional change (e.g. Hoffman, 1999; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) 
has indicated that marginal communities may successfully initiate radical changes to 
institutional practices and beliefs. This dissertation contributes to the literature on learning 
from disasters, as well as the political perspective on learning from disaster and crises 
by highlighting how learning involves marginal actors and communities that struggle to 
overcome defensiveness by established powerful actors. Chapter three highlighted how a 
relatively powerless marginal community struggled to influence learning from disaster. This 
study introduced the transformation perspective on knowledge sharing (e.g. Carlile, 2004) 
and the communities-of-practice literature (e.g. Brown & Duguid, 2001), to conceptualize 
learning from disaster as a process of contestation in which marginal communities aim to 
overcome knowledge- and political boundaries to shape the learning process. Chapter 
three provided new insights in how a marginal community may simultaneously aim to 
contribute to field-level learning from disaster, and alter established power relations in a 
field to occupy a more central social position. In particular, the study identified particular 
strategies of justification that a marginal community used to become more recognized 
and established in an organizational field. It showed that these strategies were largely self-
referential, serving to demonstrate the relevance of the marginal community’s knowledge. 
However, chapter three also indicated that a marginal community’s political strategies 
for justifying new knowledge need to align with established values and institutional 
discourses. Self-referential strategies may be ignored by established communities and 
thus fail to overcome knowledge- and political boundaries with established communities 
in the wake of disaster.
While chapter three investigated the struggles of a relatively powerless marginal 
community to influence learning from disaster, chapter four zoomed in on the situation 
when a marginal community actually is potentially powerful enough to alter institutions 
and authority relations in an organizational field. In this situation, established actors 
cannot ignore the marginal challenger and merely pursue to their own agenda. Instead, 
this study confirms that if marginal actors are, in fact, powerful challenges, established 
actors are likely to engage in practices of contestation to avert intervention (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009; Micelotta & Washington, 2013). In particular, it contributes to the political 
perspective on learning from disaster by teasing out established actors’ practices of 
contestation. It demonstrated that established actors defend their authority position by 
engaging in identity politics, presenting themselves as superior and others as inferior 
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(Alcadipani, Westwood, & Rosa, 2015; Jack & Westwood, 2009). In particular, established 
actors engaged in politics of expertise – challenging the expertise of challengers while 
presenting themselves as technical experts to reassure other actors of the effectiveness 
of established practices (Beck, 1992; Fischer, 1990); politics of responsibility for learning– 
presenting themselves as preoccupied with learning; and invoking dominant institutional 
discourses.
Together, chapters three and four provide new insights in why learning from disaster 
often does not lead to deep ‘cultural readjustment’ (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), but instead 
reinforce established beliefs and assumptions in an organizational field (Deschamps et al., 
1997; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). If weak marginal communities are 
unable to convince established actors to adopt new knowledge, or if powerful marginal 
actors are effectively resisted by established actors, learning from disaster will remain 
‘paradigmatic’ (Deschamps, Lalonde, Pauchant, & Waaub, 1997) – i.e. focused on refining 
established knowledge, practices, and goals, while leaving deeper assumptions, values, and 
beliefs unchanged. As such, this study provides new insights in the mechanisms that drive 
paradigmatic learning in an organizational field following disaster, as opposed to radical 
‘cultural readjustment’ (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). As such, this study shows that even when 
a disaster has disrupted established practices and social positions in an organizational 
field, learning may eventually even reinforce the dominance of established communities 
and practices.
Power dynamics in learning from disaster
Furthermore, this dissertation also provides insights into the role of different types of 
power dynamics involved in learning from disaster. As the previous paragraph already 
indicated, this dissertation confirmed that actors do not have equal opportunities to 
influence learning. (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011; Contu, 2014; Contu & Willmott, 2003; 
Coopey, 1995; Lawrence et al., 2005). In particular, by investigating the dynamics between 
established actors and marginal communities this dissertation provides new insights in 
the workings of two different forms of power in learning from disaster: episodic power 
and systemic power (Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2005). Episodic power refers 
to deliberate political strategies initiated by self-interested actors. I showed that marginal 
actors invoke in episodic power in order to disrupt established authority relations in 
an organizational field. While chapters three and four showed that weak- and powerful 
marginal communities invoked different political strategies – respectively through 
justifications of alternative knowledge and organizing a political intervention – both 
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types of episodic power aimed to induce an institutional change. This confirms Lawrence 
et al.’s (2005) argument that episodic forms of power will facilitate the interpretation 
and integration of new ideas. However, chapter four also showed that established actors 
have to engage in episodic forms of power to resist powerful challengers. This confirms 
studies of defensive institutional work (Desai, 2011; Maguire & Hardy, 2009) that show that 
established actors engage in defensive practices to resist institutional change driven by 
challenging actors. This dissertation also provides examples of systematic forms of power, 
which involves unconscious domination through routine, ongoing organizing practices 
(Brint & Karabel, 1991; Hardy, 1996; Lawrence, Malhotra, & Morris, 2012; Lawrence et al. 
2005). From a systemic power perspective, institutional beliefs, practices and positions 
in an organizational field are manifestations of power relations (Brint & Karabel, 1991; 
Suddaby & Greenwood, 2010). Privileged actors are better able to impose practices and 
beliefs, which become institutionalized over time. As such, hegemonic forms of domination 
and inequalities become taken-for-granted. Institutionalized assumptions, beliefs and 
practices exercise systemic power over actors in an organizational field, subtly but strongly 
influencing learning processes (Lawrence et al., 2005). Especially when marginal challengers 
are relatively weak and are not particularly noticed by established actors, it is more likely 
that systematic power shapes learning processes than episodic power. As Chapters Two 
and Three demonstrated, the technical paradigm and the associated dominant position 
of technical experts and communities are deeply taken-for-granted in the offshore oil 
sector. In Chapter Two showed that dominant technical conceptualizations of risk were 
reinforced through institutionalized training practices, at the expense on non-technical 
decision-making skills. Chapter Three showed how the technical paradigm shaped the 
learning process in a subtle fashion by implicitly assigning technical experts as learning 
authority. Instead, non-technical communities were not seriously taken into account in the 
learning process. This confirms that technical expertise, represented by technical experts 
like engineers and scientists, tends to dominate decision-making in high-hazard industries 
(Beck, 1992; Carroll, 1995; Dekker, 2014; Elliott & Smith, 2006; Fisher, 1990; Perin, 1995).
Blending learning from disaster literature with institutional theory
Introducing the notion field-level learning and studying its processes
By building on insights from institutional theory I make contributions to the learning 
from disaster literature, as well as the organizational learning literature in general. The 
learning from disaster literature (Lampel et al., 2009) and the organizational learning 
literature (Chandler & Hwong, 2015; Haunschild & Chandler, 2008; Miner & Mezias, 1996) 
have tended to focus at the organizational level of analysis. Yet, some scholars have 
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conceptualized learning as a process that also takes place at higher levels of analysis 
(Shrivastava, 1983; Wenger, 2000). Also, quantitative studies on vicarious learning from 
disasters and accidents have shown that other organizations in an industry can improve 
their safety performance following accident experience of their peers (Baum & Dahlin, 
2007; Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002; Madsen, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). However, these 
quantitative studies were not able to ascertain whether any higher-level learning did take 
place, or whether each organization learned individually (Kim & Miner, 2007). Building on 
the concept of organizational field (e.g. Hoffman, 1999) – a central concept in institutional 
theory – and the concepts of population-level learning (Miner & Haunschild, 1995; Miner 
& Anderson, 1999; Miner, Kim, Holzinger, & Haunschild, 1999), network learning (Knight, 
2002; Knight & Pye, 2004), and institutional learning (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008) I 
introduced the notion of field-level learning from disaster, which I defined as a collective 
process of ongoing interactions between field actors with different interests, knowledge, 
and positions in the social hierarchy, in the wake of a disaster, aimed at improving disaster 
prevention and response by working towards a sustained change in the nature and mix 
of institutionalized risk management practices enacted in an organizational field. Field-
level learning from disaster therefore represents a macro-perspective on learning, and 
conceptualizes learning as punctuated, non-routine change triggered by rare events 
(Haunschild & Chandler, 2008; Lampel et al., 2009; Miner & Mezias, 1996). It differs from 
dominant conceptualizations of organizational learning in terms of the level of analysis 
(organizational field vs. organization) and the process of change (radical vs. incremental). By 
addressing collective learning in an organizational field following a disaster as a contested 
process, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on vicarious learning from 
disaster and crisis (Kim & Miner, 2007; Lampel et al., 2009).
Understanding how institutions in an organizational field affect learning from disaster
Research has indicated that effective learning will lead to the institutionalization of 
new practices (e.g. Crossan, White, & Lane, 1999). However, learning is also constrained 
by institutions (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000). The concepts of organizational field and 
institutions inform the literature of learning from disaster as it they point to how learning 
is shaped or even initiated by institutional pressures from the organizational field (Lampel 
et al., 2009; Perrow 1999b). Yet, few studies of learning from disasters and crises have 
empirically investigated how institutions affect learning in an organizational field (for two 
exceptions see Elliott, 2009; Elliott & Smith, 2006). This dissertation addressed this gap. 
It was demonstrated how marginal actors’ attempts for knowledge transformation and 
sharing in the wake of a disaster are constrained by institutionalized responsibilities and 
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learning mechanisms in a risk governance regime. In particular, institutional arrangements 
of social relations and practices privilege established communities, leaving little learning 
agency to marginal communities. Furthermore, this dissertation showed how the contested 
process of learning from disaster involves conflicting narratives that have their origins in 
different institutional discourses about risk governance. Based on these insights, I argued 
that the concepts of ‘organizational field’ and ‘institutions’ help to understand how learning 
from disaster is constrained by institutionalized practices, discourses, and social relations.
Developing a holistic understanding of why institutionalized practices change
By blending the literature of learning from disaster and institutional theory, this dissertation 
creates a more complete understanding of the reasons for inducing change processes in 
an organizational field. Traditionally, learning (from disaster) theories emphasize ‘technical’ 
reasons for change, such as concerns for operational efficiency and the need to prevent 
disaster recurrence, whereas institutional theory emphasizes “institutional” reasons, such 
as concerns for legitimacy (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008; Suddaby, 2010). I argue that 
the separation of legitimacy and effectiveness as motivations for institutional change 
and learning may be understandable for academic purposes, but for professionals these 
notions are fundamentally intertwined. Professionals that were interviewed for this 
dissertation were genuinely concerned about improving offshore safety, but at the same 
time aimed to defend the credibility of the profession. In line with other authors, I therefore 
argue a blend of learning- and institutional theory creates a more complete perspective on 
how institutionalized practices change (see also Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Greenwood et 
al., 2008; Haunschild & Chandler, 2008; Suddaby, 2010; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2010). This 
dissertation confirms other studies that indicated that learning initiatives in the wake of 
disasters perform a double function of restoring legitimacy of established actors involved 
in risk governance, while also improving the prevention, containment, and response to 
disasters (See also Brown, 2004; Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, and Coombs, 2016; Gephart, 1984). 
Still, few studies on organizational disasters and crises have investigated how processes 
of learning and restoring legitimacy are related (Bundy et al., 2016; Lampel et al., 2009). 
This dissertation has contributed to this gap by showning that industry actors may 
engage in coalition building with other stakeholders to create broadly supported learning 
initiatives to improve practices of disaster prevention and response following disasters. 
By strategically demonstrating engagement in learning, established actors in the field 
may aim to reassure public stakeholders and avert policy interventions. It also showed 
another link between learning and legitimacy, namely that marginal communities in a field 
need to be granted legitimacy by established actors in order to participate in field-level 
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learning efforts. Hence this dissertation shows that learning in the wake of a disaster is 
not an objective process in which the most effective solution is chosen among alternative 
initiatives on the basis of a rational evaluation of merit. Instead, only those solutions that 
are effectively legitimized will feature in field-level learning initiatives. Hence, learning 
from disaster involves struggles for legitimacy and authority over the learning process.
Contribution to institutional change literature
I argue that insights from the learning from disaster literature also contribute to 
institutional theory. The literature on institutional change has emphasized how disruptive 
events act as triggers for change as they destabilize established institutional arrangements 
(e.g. Hoffman, 1999). Different types of disruptions – such as technological innovations 
(Munir, 2005), new regulations (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010), book publications (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2009), conferences (Hardy & Maguire, 2010), and disasters (Turner, 1976) have 
been shown to shatter institutionalized beliefs, and trigger changes in practices and the 
social hierarchy in an organizational field. While each of these events has the potential to 
disrupt established institutional arrangements and beliefs, there is substantial variation 
in event characteristics – e.g. deliberately organized vs accidental; type of impact (social, 
competitive, physical, emotional); type of actor responsible for the event (corporations, 
government body, scientists) – as well as characteristics of the learning process – e.g. 
which actors are involved (industry insiders, governmental bodies, social movements); 
type of learning (policy change, technological change). We argue that the literature on 
institutional change may benefit from the learning from disaster and crisis literature, which 
has addressed the variety within the category disruptive crisis events, both in terms of 
their different characteristics and responses to the different events (Buchanan & Denyer, 
2013). For instance, Marcus and Goodman (1991) distinguished between different types 
of crises – accidents, scandals, and product safety and health incidents – on the basis of 
the effect on victims, and whether its causation was accidental or the result of misdeeds 
and faults. Similarly, the concept ‘extreme event’ (Buchanan, 2011; Hallgren et al., 2018, 
p. 112; Hannah et al., 2009) was coined to differentiate between catastrophic events with 
could threaten “life and limb” and other types of organizational crises, such as hostile 
take-overs. I argue that disasters are a unique type of institutional disruption, which may 
trigger particular institutional change processes in organizational fields. First, disasters 
have specific immediate and long-term consequences that distinguish it from other 
disruptive events, such as technological innovations or book publications. For example, 
disasters are particularly harmful and emotional events that may inflict physical damage on 
people, the natural environment, organizational assets, and communities and create social 
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and political turmoil in society (Hallgren et al., 2018; Perrow, 1999; Vaughan, 1999). As this 
dissertation has shown, the catastrophic impact of a disaster may shock industry actors 
and government bodies alike. This shock may drive long term contestation, spreading from 
the initial phase of identifying the causes of a disaster and lessons to learn, to drafting 
and implementing solutions. Second, learning from disaster is triggered by a single, high 
profile extreme event and is particularly directed towards preventing recurrence of that 
incident (Buchanan, 2011; Hardy & Maguire, 2016). In contrast, change following other 
types of disruptions may be progressive rather than defensive, i.e. focused on “making 
things happen”, such as business development (Buchanan, 2011, p. 282). As such, disaster 
trigger specific learning processes as compared to other disruptive events. While all sorts 
of disruptive events will trigger actors to reflect on the implications of the event for 
themselves – i.e. vicarious inferential learning to answer the question ‘what does this mean 
for us?’ – disasters will also trigger investigations into the causation of the disaster – to 
answer the question ‘what happened?’ and ‘why did it happen?’ (Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, 
& Taylor, 2008) – to deduce lessons and decide on preventive measures to implement to 
avoid recurrence. This may be done by the organizations involved in the event (e.g. Carroll, 
1995) or other actors in the organizational field – particularly regulators and government 
bodies (e.g. Gephart, 1984). This dissertation has shown that the varying inferences in a 
field about the causes of a disaster and necessary solutions are an important source for 
contestation.
Contribution to disaster causation literature
This dissertation contributes to the literature on disaster causation by developing an 
institutional perspective on disaster development (Chapter Two). An institutional 
perspective on disaster development sensitizes disaster researchers to the influence of the 
institutional environment on disaster development. The vast majority of studies on disaster 
causation study how internal organizational factors – technical, human, and organizational 
– contribute to the occurrence of organizational disasters (e.g. Reason, 1997). The role of 
an organization’s external environment on disaster development in organizations receives 
far less scholarly attention (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004). When an organization’s external 
environment is taken into account, it is mostly conceptualized as a competitive or regulatory 
environment (e.g. Dekker, 2011; Reason, 1997). Only few studies that investigated disaster 
causation in organizations have conceptualized the organizations’ external environment 
as an institutional environment, which shapes organizational practices by imposing norms, 
values, and taken-for-granted beliefs (Dyhrberg & Jensen, 2004; see Elliott & Smith, 2006 
and Wicks, 2001 as two exceptions in the management literature). I contribute to the 
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institutional perspective on disaster development by studying how taken-for-granted 
beliefs and institutionalized practices may become dysfunctional when they remain stable 
while the task environment becomes increasingly complex, thereby contributing to the 
development of disasters and near-miss events.
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE
Besides contributing to theory, this dissertation has practical implications. Disasters 
have a catastrophic impact on people, the natural environment, local communities, and 
organizational assets, as well as indirect negative consequences – economic, psychological 
- on people, households, communities, organizations, industries. This dissertation 
contributes to a better understanding of how disasters are caused and how learning occurs 
following a disaster. Hence, it provides new knowledge on how disasters may be prevented.
Chapter two indicated that risk management and occupational training in the offshore 
industry need to be professionalized to co-evolve with the increasing complexity of 
offshore operations. I argued that a broader conceptualization of worker competence – 
including technical and non-technical skills – will better equip the offshore workforce for 
dealing with this complexity, while some degree of standardization will resolve harmful 
variability in training and career progression across organizations. I argued standardized 
training should address non-technical skills and system risk management. While it takes 
effort and perseverance to change institutionalized practices, I argue that it can be achieved 
through professionalizing these practices by means of standardization of worker training 
and career progression, and through balancing technical and non-technical skills training.
Chapter two also indicated that an institutional perspective on disaster causations has 
important implications for learning. Most disaster investigations focus on technical, human, 
and organizational contributing causes of the organizations involved in the disaster, as 
well as the influence of regulatory factors (e.g. National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). Chapter two demonstrated, however, that 
organizational disasters partly have institutional origins that are not specific to the involved 
organizations, but may be more widespread in an industry. These institutional factors go 
beyond explicit regulatory factors to include tacit, taken-for-granted beliefs and practices. 
These may drive the recurrence of similar disaster development patterns within and across 
organizations in an industry. These findings have implications for learning from incidents 
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and disasters, particularly regarding the search scope of investigations. Investigations 
teams – either in the organization(s) involved in a disaster or organized by the regulator - 
should aim to identify institutional contributing causes beyond the organizational setting 
in which a disaster, accident, or incident occurred. This could be achieved by comparing 
the causation pattern with other investigated incidents and disasters, either within or 
outside the organization. For regulators this could mean to contact other regulators for 
information on other investigations, while organizational investigation teams may reach 
out to other organizations or industry associations. Naturally, an extended search scope 
has implications for managers. While extending the search scope of investigations may 
take more time and resources in the short term, identifying harmful taken-for-granted 
beliefs and practices will strengthen organizational resilience and help to prevent costly 
incidents in the future. Furthermore, I hope these insights will motivate managers and 
safety professionals to perceive disasters in other organizations as opportunities for 
improving safety practices in their own organization, even if the incident happened in a 
distant part of their own organization, or in a different organization in another geographic 
region. A common response in the wake of a disaster is ‘it could not happen here’. Chapter 
two shows that such remarks ignore the role of the institutional environment in disaster 
development. Recent incidents in the North Sea region have indicated that disasters 
similar to the Macondo blowout could definitely happen here as well. In 2009, Transocean 
and Shell experienced an incident with similar beginnings as the Macondo blowout in 
the Bardolino oil field in the North Sea, which fortunately could be averted last-minute. 
The analysis in chapter two indicated that both this incident and the Macondo disaster 
were characterized by similar institutional factors. Similarly, in 2011 Total experienced a 
significant gas blowout in the Elgin-Franklin field, which, according to anectodal evidence, 
bore great similarities with the beginnings of the Piper Alpha disaster that occurred in 
1988, but fortunately the gas did not find an ignition source. While in both cases a large-
scale disaster was prevented, these were serious near-misses that could have triggered 
an organizational disaster. This contrasts sharply with the statements made by many 
professionals and executives in the North Sea offshore industry that the North Sea had 
not experienced a blowout since the Piper Alpha disaster, and that a Macondo-like disaster 
could not happen here. I argue that these claims are clear illustrations of dangerous “myths 
of infallibility” (Sagan, 1994).
This dissertation also has implications for how actors learn from disaster. It posits 
that learning from disaster per definition is characterized by competing interests and 
perspectives. Consequently, this implies that actors should acknowledge that learning is 
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inherently a political activity (Coopey, 1995; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000). By conceptualizing 
field-level learning as a contested process in which actors strive to protect their interests, 
this dissertation demonstrated that learning is not a neutral and objective process, but 
shaped by particular – especially privileged – actor groups. This has important implications 
for what is being learned, and what is not. This dissertation showed that the technically 
oriented drilling community had a strong influence on field-level learning from the 
Macondo disaster. As such, the majority of lessons learned in the North Sea region focused 
primarily on technical improvements: of preventive, containment, and response equipment; 
improved technical procedures; and strengthened technical training. Instead, marginal 
actors had less opportunity to influence the field-level learning process, even though their 
knowledge may be very useful (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000). 
For instance, the Human Factors community was not able to make HF a central issue for 
learning and risk management. As a consequence, few changes were implement to address 
human and organizational factors, despite convincing evidence in accident research that 
these factors play a fundamental role in creating safe and resilient organizations (e.g. 
Reason, 1997). The European Commission was resisted in its efforts to set up policy 
learning initiatives to improve standardization in risk governance regimes across Member 
states, even though arguments for standardization make sense in an high hazard setting 
where disasters may affect other Member states. While the technical lessons learned by 
the drilling community are definitely important improvements, learning was predominantly 
‘paradigmatic’ (Deschamps et al., 1997) – refining existing knowledge, practices, and goals, 
while leaving deeper assumptions, values, and beliefs intact. Hence learning in the wake 
of the Macondo disaster primarily reinforced the technical paradigm (e.g. Carroll, 1995). 
In doing so they missed out on the opportunity to enrich their own perspective with new 
insights from other communities and actors- i.e. more radical learning.
This dissertation makes a case for more participative learning processes and risk 
governance in general (Beck, 1992; Coopey, 1995; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; Renn, 2008; 
Rosa, Renn, & McCright, 2014). A more participative perspective on learning as opposed 
by a technocratic ‘expert’ notion of learning may provide voice to alternative perspectives 
and knowledge, which may create more robust learning New knowledge may ‘stress test’ 
established knowledge when it challenges dominant, taken-for-granted assumptions, 
thereby contributing to more robust learning in the wake of incidents. Disasters are 
complex phenomena (e.g. Perrow, 1999), hence, diverse bodies of knowledge from diverse 
epistemic disciplines – engineering, psychology, sociology, economics, political sciences etc 
– are necessary for understanding how disasters develop and may be prevented. I propose 
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that established communities – in our case oil industry actors - should stimulate an open 
discussion with other field members, providing marginal communities with the opportunity 
to voice their perspective, and actively seek out new insights and knowledge (Coopey, 
1995; Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000). A core objective of risk governance in the offshore oil and 
gas industry is to develop increasingly robust risk regime, i.e. a regime that is increasingly 
effective at drawing on industrial expertise and improving the safety of offshore operations 
(Baram, Lindoe, & Renn, 2014). This dissertation has shown that dominant expertise may be 
invoked to exclude other actors from learning processes. Hence, I argue that established 
actors, like managers, technical experts, and regulations, should foster a more pluralistic 
learning process, resulting in more diverse lessons learned and potentially more robust 
improvements to disaster prevention, containment, and response.
The previous argument for pluralistic learning in the wake of disaster was rooted in appeals 
for greater efficiency. However, there are also normative arguments for stimulating the 
involvement of a more diverse group of actors in learning processes. A technocratic 
perspective on risk proposes that technical experts should be decision-makers on risk 
assessment and management given their rational understanding of risk (Beck, 1992; Renn, 
2008). However, this ignores that risk management also has an important normative 
foundation, which addresses the question: ‘what level of risk is deemed acceptable’ (Renn, 
2008). These questions cannot be answered through rational calculations, but should 
be the subject of democratic learning and risk governance processes (Beck, 1992; Renn, 
2008). Coopey and Burgoyne (2000, p. 878) promote multiple advocacy as a means to 
achieve democratic learning discussions: “norms of multiple advocacy require that parties 
to decision-making have every facility to put forward positions that oppose those of a 
dominant group”. The EU Commission promotes multiple advocacy in learning through 
mechanisms like public consultation, however, I argue that from a democratic perspective 
on risk, industry actors should also adopt the principle of multiple advocacy. This may 
become increasingly important if the oil industry wants to prolong their viability in a 
society that is increasingly focused on sustainable energy and hostile towards fossil fuels 
like oil and gas.
This dissertation also provided practical insights for overcoming opposition and conflict 
in learning from disaster. Chapter four of this dissertation showed that narrative conflicts 
between actors with opposing perspectives and interests are rooted in different 
institutional discourses, values, and responsibilities. As such, I argue that a core aspect of 
learning from disaster should revolve not just around identifying causes and solutions, 
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but also identifying the interests and institutional roots of opposing viewpoints. From 
the interviews conducted for this dissertation it emerged that all actors were motivated 
to learn lessons from disasters. Furthermore, if the call for more pluralistic participation 
in learning seems to be too ambitious at this point in time, this dissertation provides 
practical insights for marginal communities to overcome potential resistance or neglect 
by established communities. Chapter three indicated that marginal communities might 
have difficulties with participating in learning from disaster because of the presence 
of knowledge- and political boundaries. Established actors are privileged as learning 
authorities and may not perceive marginal communities as legitimate learning agents. 
For marginal communities to transform established knowledge in an organizational field, 
they have to become aware of the discourses and values that are enacted by established 
communities. As such, they have to strategically translate their knowledge and learning 
proposals to explicitly link them to dominant discourses and values.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS
Due to methodological- and conceptual choices made during the research process, 
the generalizability of findings from this dissertation to other contexts is limited. Most 
obviously, this dissertation is based on qualitative data and case studies. This approach 
was relevant for this dissertation, because the objective was to better understand how 
and why actors in and organizational field initiate and maintain contested processes of 
field-level learning from disaster. As such, I was particularly interested in the examining 
in-depth the processes and practices of contestation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Yin, 2008). 
Extreme events and contexts are useful for this purpose as they “may provide particularly 
rich insights into organizational processes” (Hallgren et al., 2018, p. 112; Hannah et al., 
2009). While we acknowledge that the use of qualitative case studies into extreme events 
brings about limitations in generalizability, I argue that the findings in this dissertation 
are nevertheless relevant for other research settings. Below, I discuss the most important 
boundary conditions of this dissertation that affect generalizability of the findings.
First, I focused on a particular type of learning experience: an organizational disaster 
that inflicted damage on people, assets, the natural environment, and local communities 
(Hallgren, Rouleau, & De Rond, 2018; Perrow, 1999; Turner, 1974). Disasters are non-routine 
trigger events that confront organizations with a unique and dramatic experience, and 
which presents complications for organizational learning (Lampel et al., 2009; March et al, 
1991; Vaughan, 1999). For instance, disasters are likely to capture the attention of societal 
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stakeholders like the public, the media, or government bodies and trigger a legitimacy 
crisis (Smith & Elliott, 2007). This is in contrast to other forms of organizational learning, 
especially incremental learning, in which actors continuously accrue experience through 
routine conduct (cf. Haunschild & Chandler, 2008; Lampel et al. 2009; Miner & Mezias, 
1996). As such, we first of all argue that our findings are generalizable to other high 
hazard- or extreme contexts (Beck, 1992; Hallgren et al., 2018; Hannah et al., 2009, p. 898), 
i.e. “environments where one or more extreme events are occurring or are likely to occur 
that may exceed the organization’s capacity to prevent and result in an extensive and 
intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to—or in close 
physical or psychosocial proximity to—organization members”. Examples of such extreme 
contexts in which organizational disasters may occur are the (petro-)chemical industry 
(Hopkins, 2008; Jasanoff, 1994; Shrivastava, 1987), the civil aviation industry (Weick, 1988), 
and the nuclear industry (Perrow, 1999).
Furthermore, while disasters “pose a direct risk to life and limb” (Hallgren et al., 2018, p. 
112), and therefore differ from other organizational crises, such as hostile take-overs, we 
argue that our findings are also generalizable to other organizational crisis situations. 
In particular, I argue that the findings are generalizable to other organizational crisis 
situations when the following conditions are met: 1) the organizational crisis has to be 
initiated by a clear trigger event, 2) the crisis has to create socio-political turmoil in society, 
particularly about the causes, implications and solutions 3) field-level learning from crisis 
needs to be characterized by the presence of potentially conflicting learning initiatives 
aimed at preventing potential recurrences in the future, but also serving to protect or 
further interests.
Third, this dissertation has indicated that a ‘technical paradigm’ shaped learning processes 
in the wake of a disaster. The dominance of technical expertise played an important role in 
the contestation of alternative learning initiatives, trumping other types of non-technical 
expertise from more marginal communities like the HF community (Chapter three) and 
the EU Commission (Chapter four). According to Carroll’s (1998) study on learning from 
incidents, occupations with a technical background versus a social science background 
use different ‘logics’ for understanding reality. Technical occupations like design engineers 
and operators deal with concrete problems with physical objects, while occupations with 
a social science background, like human factors experts, are focused on more abstract 
problems, such as learning. This distinction in abstract- and concrete logics may have been 
an important boundary for mutual engagement between the drilling community and the 
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HF community, and oil industry actors in general and the EU Commission. Chapter three 
indicated that one of the main problems with knowledge sharing between the HF- and 
drilling communities was that human factors remained an abstract issue. Instead, Bechky’s 
(2003) study on knowledge sharing between design engineers and operators from the 
assembly line in a product innovation setting showed that successful knowledge sharing 
with technical communities requires concretizing a problem by using concrete boundary 
objects. I therefore argue that the findings of this dissertation are especially generalizable 
to other settings characterized by conflicts between dominant technical communities 
and marginal, non-technical communities that challenge this dominance. To learn more 
about these mechanisms and of contestation between dominant technical- and marginal 
non-technical communities in the wake of disaster, it would be worthwhile to study how 
HF knowledge is shared in other technically dominated hazardous industries, such as the 
nuclear industry (Carroll, 1995; 1998; Perin, 1995).
Fourth, this dissertation focuses on politics of learning from disaster that emerged 
when a legitimacy crisis, resulting from the disaster, spilled over from the organizations 
involved in the disaster to a different geographical region. Chapter four indicated that 
spillover triggers particular political dynamics, as discussions about culpability will shift to 
negotiations about disaster implications and appropriate solutions. However, Elliott (2014) 
has argued that events with such far-reaching effects are rare. Hence, the Macondo case 
may be understood as a particularly extreme case with little comparison. Yet, there have 
been other disasters that had similar effects, like the Bhopal chemical gas leak (Nathan & 
Kovoor-Misra, 2002; Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988; Shrivastava, 1987; Jasanoff 1994) and 
Fukushima nuclear incident (Wittneben, 2012). Furthermore, scholars have observed an 
increase in major crises (Perrow, 1999), or at least an increase in the perception thereof 
(Buchanan & Denyer, 2013). Hence, I argue that the findings are generalizable to other 
high-hazard may become increasingly relevant in the future.
Furthermore, I investigated attempts for learning from disaster in a particular institutional 
setting, namely a co-regulatory risk governance regime. In a co-regulatory regime, risk 
governance responsibilities are shared between industry actors and regulators (e.g. Baram 
& Lindøe, 2014). However, organizational fields are characterized by different institutional 
arrangements (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), hence, processes of learning and contestation 
are likely to differ in organizational fields with different risk regimes. For instance, learning 
is more likely to occur in participatory co-regulatory regimes than antagonistic regimes 
(Elliott & Smith, 2006). Furthermore, we illustrated that in a co-regulatory regime, it is 
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unlikely that a regulator will impose new knowledge on the industry. While the setting 
of a co-regulatory regime is an important boundary condition for generalizability of the 
findings, co-regulation becomes increasingly prevalent in Western societies (Power, 2007; 
Short & Toffel, 2008). Therefore, he findings are relevant to other industries with such 
regulatory regimes.
Finally, while I showed that processes of contestation between field actors, such as industry 
associations and (trans)national regulators, shaped field-level learning from disaster, we 
were not able to observe to what extent individual organizations actually adopted and 
implemented the lessons learned. The literature on learning from disaster has indicated 
that learning goes beyond the identification of lessons learned, hence, it has been argued 
that studies should also focus on how lessons are implemented in organizations (Elliott, 
2009; Toft & Reynolds, 2005). As such, I argue that future research could investigate the 
extent to which organizations implemented the field-level lessons that were learned in 
the wake of the Macondo disaster.
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do
 d
isa
ste
r a
s 
ca
us
ed
 b
y t
he
 la
ck
 
of
 co
m
pe
te
nc
e o
f 
pe
rso
nn
el.
 A
s s
uc
h, 
th
ey
 re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
to
 st
re
ng
th
en
 
pe
rso
nn
el 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e 
th
ro
ug
h i
m
pr
ov
ed
 
te
ch
nic
al 
tra
ini
ng
. 
O
n 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
ha
nd
, 
th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
em
p
ha
si
ze
d 
ho
w
 
dy
sfu
nc
tio
na
l 
te
am
 d
yn
am
ics
 
an
d 
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
al
 
in
flu
en
ce
s 
ca
us
ed
 t
he
 
dis
as
te
r.
Th
e 
di
sa
st
er
 a
cc
o
un
ts
 a
nd
 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
so
lut
ion
s a
re
 
ro
ot
ed
 in
 d
iff
er
en
t 
as
su
m
p
ti
on
s 
ab
o
ut
 h
um
an
 e
rr
or
 T
he
 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y’
s 
si
tu
at
ed
 
un
de
rst
an
din
g 
of
 h
um
an
 er
ro
r 
ca
us
ed
 th
em
 to
 d
ev
elo
p 
a 
di
ff
er
en
t 
di
sa
st
er
 a
cc
o
un
t 
an
d 
se
t o
f r
ec
om
m
en
de
d 
so
lut
ion
s 
th
an
 th
e d
ril
lin
g 
co
m
m
un
ity
, w
ho
 
un
de
rst
oo
d 
hu
m
an
 er
ro
r a
s a
 
ro
ot
 ca
us
e o
f a
cc
id
en
ts 
th
er
ef
or
e 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
m
or
e p
er
so
nn
el 
tra
ini
ng
.
“T
he
 M
ac
on
do
 r
ep
or
ts
 d
on
’t 
ov
er
tly
 ta
lk
 a
bo
ut
 
H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
. T
he
re
 a
re
 H
um
an
 F
ac
to
r 
el
em
en
ts
, i
f y
ou
 a
re
 fa
m
ili
ar
 w
ith
 t
ho
se
, w
he
n 
yo
u 
re
ad
 t
he
 r
ep
or
ts
. B
ut
 it
 is
 n
ot
 a
n 
ov
er
t 
re
ac
tio
n.
” 
(H
SE
 d
ir
ec
to
r 
in
 s
m
al
l c
om
p
an
y)
.
Po
rt
ra
yi
ng
 H
F 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
as
 su
pe
rio
r t
o 
‘e
ng
in
ee
ri
ng
 
pe
rsp
ec
tiv
e’ 
on
 
hu
m
an
 b
eh
av
ior
Th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
p
or
tr
ay
ed
 H
F 
kn
ow
led
ge
 as
 ev
id
en
t 
an
d 
str
aig
ht
fo
rw
ar
d, 
wh
ile
 ri
dic
uli
ng
 th
e 
dr
illi
ng
 co
m
m
un
ity
’s 
su
pp
os
ed
 at
te
m
pt
 to
 
p
ro
ce
d
ur
al
iz
e 
hu
m
an
 
be
ha
vio
r.
-
“F
or
 s
om
e 
pe
op
le
 , 
th
e 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 H
F 
co
nc
ep
t 
ca
n 
m
ak
e 
th
em
 u
nc
om
fo
rt
ab
le
. ‘
en
gi
ne
er
s 
lik
e 
to
 t
hi
nk
 t
ha
t y
ou
 p
ut
 t
hi
ng
s 
to
ge
th
er
 in
 a
 
sy
st
em
, a
nd
 t
ha
t t
he
 s
ys
te
m
 w
or
ks
, w
he
th
er
 
it 
is
 p
eo
pl
e 
or
 d
ri
ll 
bi
ts
” 
[H
SE
 d
ir
ec
to
r 
in
 s
m
al
l 
co
m
pa
ny
] s
ai
d.
 ‘U
nf
or
tu
na
te
ly
, h
um
an
 b
ei
ng
s 
op
er
at
e 
in
 a
 m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
co
m
pl
ex
 w
ay
.’”
 (H
si
eh
, 
20
14
).
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gr
eg
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co
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 o
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e 
tra
ns
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at
io
n
Ex
pl
an
at
io
n
Te
ns
io
n
Ill
us
tra
tiv
e q
uo
te
s
St
ru
gg
lin
g 
fo
r d
isc
ip
lin
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 b
y 
us
in
g 
se
lf-
re
fe
re
nt
ial
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
Us
ing
 
g
en
er
al
iz
ed
 s
al
es
 
pi
tch
 to
 ju
sti
fy 
re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 H
F 
fo
r d
ril
lin
g
Th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y’
s 
ju
st
ifi
ca
ti
on
s 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 m
ak
ing
 re
fe
re
nc
es
 
to
 th
e p
os
iti
ve
 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f H
F 
in
 o
th
er
 
ind
us
tri
es
, li
ke
 av
iat
ion
, 
an
d 
im
pli
cit
ly 
cla
im
ing
 
g
en
er
al
iz
ab
ili
ty
 t
o 
th
e 
dr
illi
ng
 in
du
str
y.
W
hi
le
 t
he
 H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
em
p
ha
si
ze
d 
g
en
er
al
iz
ab
ili
ty
, t
he
 
dr
illi
ng
 co
m
m
un
ity
 o
pe
ra
te
s f
ro
m
 
a d
ee
p 
be
lie
f t
ha
t d
ril
lin
g 
is 
a 
un
iq
ue
 in
du
str
y. 
Ev
en
 in
di
vid
ua
l 
dr
illi
ng
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 ar
e p
er
ce
ive
d 
to
 b
e u
niq
ue
.
“T
he
 is
su
e 
w
ith
 H
F 
is
 t
ha
t i
t i
s 
no
t 
op
er
at
io
na
liz
ed
 fo
r 
dr
ill
in
g.
 It
 is
 b
as
ic
al
ly
 c
op
ie
d 
fr
om
 a
vi
at
io
n 
an
d 
pa
st
ed
 o
n 
dr
ill
in
g.
” 
(D
ril
lin
g 
co
ns
ult
an
t).
“T
he
se
 r
ig
s 
ar
e 
lik
e 
fo
ot
ba
ll 
te
am
s.
 T
he
y 
ar
e 
lik
e 
A
rs
en
al
 a
nd
 T
ot
te
nh
am
. O
ne
 r
ig
 w
ill
 t
el
l y
ou
 
th
at
 e
ve
ry
th
in
g 
ab
ou
t t
he
m
 is
 d
iff
er
en
t t
o 
th
e 
ot
he
r 
on
e.
 [
Ye
t]
, a
s 
an
 o
ut
si
de
r 
yo
u 
w
ill
 k
no
w
 
th
at
 a
n 
A
rs
en
al
 a
nd
 T
ot
te
nh
am
 fa
n 
ha
ve
 9
9%
 o
f 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 t
he
y 
do
 in
 c
om
m
on
. E
xc
ep
t t
he
 t
ea
m
 
th
ey
 s
up
po
rt
.” 
(H
F 
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
 #
1)
.
Us
ing
 
de
co
nt
ex
tu
al
iz
ed
, 
no
n-
te
ch
ni
ca
l 
kn
ow
led
ge
 
in 
te
ch
nic
all
y 
do
m
ina
te
d 
en
vir
on
m
en
t
Th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
at
te
m
pt
ed
 to
 
sh
ar
e 
ab
st
ra
ct
 H
F 
kn
ow
led
ge
 w
ith
 th
e 
dr
illi
ng
 co
m
m
un
ity
, 
fo
r i
ns
ta
nc
e, 
us
ing
 a 
sp
ec
ial
ist
 vo
ca
bu
lar
y.
Th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
im
p
lic
it
ly
 
as
su
m
ed
 th
at
 ha
vin
g 
sp
ec
ial
ist
 
H
F 
kn
ow
le
d
g
e 
is
 s
uffi
ci
en
t 
fo
r 
m
ak
ing
 a 
po
sit
ive
 co
nt
rib
ut
ion
 in
 
th
e 
dr
ill
in
g 
in
d
us
tr
y.
 H
ow
ev
er
, a
 
lac
k o
f t
ec
hn
ica
l u
nd
er
sta
nd
ing
 o
f 
dr
illi
ng
 an
d 
kn
ow
led
ge
 o
f w
or
ks
ite
 
cu
ltu
re
 un
de
rm
ine
s t
he
 le
git
im
ac
y 
of
 H
F 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
.
“I
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
a 
lit
tle
 b
it 
di
si
llu
si
on
ed
, g
oi
ng
 
in
to
 a
 m
aj
or
 o
pe
ra
to
r, 
be
in
g 
ab
le
 t
o 
be
 t
he
 
hu
m
an
 fa
ct
or
s 
pe
rs
on
 t
he
re
, I
 t
ho
ug
h 
ve
ry
 n
aï
ve
 
th
at
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
ou
ld
 li
st
en
 t
o 
m
e.
 B
ut
 it
 is
 v
er
y 
fr
us
tr
at
in
g,
 it
 is
 r
ea
lly
 n
ot
 ta
ke
n 
se
ri
ou
sl
y”
 (H
F 
sp
ec
ia
lis
t 
in
 m
aj
or
 o
il 
co
m
p
an
y 
#3
).
“I
f y
ou
 u
se
 a
 b
un
ch
 o
f j
ar
go
n,
 y
ou
 d
on
’t 
im
pr
es
s 
an
yo
ne
 w
he
n 
yo
u 
ar
e 
in
 a
 g
ro
up
 o
f e
ng
in
ee
rs
 o
r 
op
er
at
io
ns
 p
er
so
nn
el
. [
H
F 
sp
ec
ia
lis
ts
] t
hi
nk
 t
ha
t 
m
ov
in
g 
in
 w
ith
 t
ha
t a
pp
ro
ac
h 
pu
ts
 t
he
m
 a
t a
 
po
si
tio
n 
of
 a
ut
ho
ri
ty
. I
t d
oe
sn
’t,
 it
 ju
st
 e
xc
lu
de
s 
th
em
 fr
om
 t
he
 d
is
cu
ss
io
n.
” 
(H
F 
sp
ec
ia
lis
t 
in
 
m
aj
or
 o
il 
co
m
p
an
y 
#1
).
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Ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 
co
ns
tru
ct
s
St
ra
te
gi
es
 o
f 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
tra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n
Ex
pl
an
at
io
n
Te
ns
io
n
Ill
us
tra
tiv
e q
uo
te
s
Ju
st
if
yi
ng
 H
F 
as
 
a d
ist
inc
t s
afe
ty
 
dis
cip
lin
e i
n 
an
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
-
fo
cu
se
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
en
vir
on
m
en
t
Th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
ju
st
ifi
ed
 t
he
 H
F 
dis
cip
lin
e t
o 
th
e 
se
nio
r m
an
ag
em
en
t 
co
ns
tit
ue
nc
y a
s 
a d
ist
inc
t s
afe
ty
 
dis
cip
lin
e t
ha
t i
s w
or
th
y 
of
 in
ve
stm
en
t.
Ju
st
if
yi
ng
 H
F 
as
 a
 d
is
ti
nc
t 
sa
fe 
dis
cip
lin
e e
xp
os
es
 it
 to
 
bu
dg
et
ing
 p
re
ss
ur
es
 fr
om
 se
nio
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 th
e n
ee
d 
to
 
d
em
on
st
ra
te
 t
he
 fi
na
nc
ia
l v
al
ue
 
of
 H
F.
 H
ow
ev
er
, i
t 
is
 d
iffi
cu
lt 
to
 p
lac
e a
 nu
m
er
ica
l v
alu
e o
n 
hu
m
an
 fa
cto
rs 
int
er
ve
nt
ion
s 
be
ca
us
e i
t i
s i
m
po
ss
ibl
e t
o 
sh
ow
 
th
e c
au
sa
l r
ela
tio
ns
hip
 b
et
we
en
 
an
 in
te
rv
en
ti
on
 a
nd
 t
he
 n
on
-
oc
cu
rre
nc
e o
f a
n i
nc
id
en
t.
“i
t c
om
es
 d
ow
n 
to
 c
os
t i
ss
ue
s.
 [H
F 
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
] 
ar
e 
ve
ry
 t
im
e 
co
ns
um
in
g 
an
d 
th
er
ef
or
e 
ex
pe
ns
iv
e.
 A
nd
 m
an
y 
of
 t
he
 m
an
ag
er
s 
in
 t
he
 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
 in
du
st
ry
 a
re
 n
ot
 t
ra
in
ed
 in
 H
F 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
. S
o,
 w
hy
 s
ho
ul
d 
th
ey
 in
ve
st
 t
he
 
m
on
ey
 in
 it
?”
 (H
F 
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
 #
3)
.
“T
he
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t a
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f H
F 
is
 
re
al
ly
 d
iffi
cu
lt
.” 
(H
F 
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
 #
3)
.
In
sti
tu
tio
na
liz
ed
 
lea
rn
in
g 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
an
d 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s 
m
ain
ta
in
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
bo
un
da
rie
s
In
sti
tu
tio
na
l r
es
po
ns
ibi
lit
ies
 
fo
r a
nd
 p
ra
cti
ce
s o
f le
ar
nin
g 
an
d 
ris
k m
an
ag
em
en
t p
riv
ile
ge
 
th
e d
ril
lin
g 
co
m
m
un
ity
 as
 th
e 
de
sig
na
te
d 
lea
rn
ing
 au
th
or
ity
. 
M
ar
gin
al 
co
m
m
un
iti
es
 lik
e 
th
e 
H
F 
co
m
m
un
it
y 
ha
ve
 le
ss
 
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
 an
d 
re
so
ur
ce
s t
o 
en
ga
ge
 in
 le
ar
nin
g 
ini
tia
tiv
es
 an
d 
th
er
eb
y 
sh
ap
e 
fie
ld
-l
ev
el
 le
ar
ni
ng
 
pr
oc
es
se
s.
“I
 t
hi
nk
 t
he
 p
ro
bl
em
 is
, i
f y
ou
 lo
ok
 a
t w
ha
t 
[in
du
st
ry
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n]
 O
G
P 
di
d,
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
a 
bu
nc
h 
of
 s
el
f-
ap
po
in
te
d 
pe
op
le
. B
ec
au
se
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 
re
m
em
be
r 
ho
w
 t
he
se
 c
om
m
it
te
es
 o
cc
ur
. O
G
P 
go
t m
em
be
r 
co
m
pa
ni
es
, s
o 
it 
is
 ‘w
ho
 h
as
 a
n 
id
le
 m
om
en
t a
nd
 w
ho
 is
 in
te
re
st
ed
?’
 It
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
m
ea
n 
th
at
 t
he
y 
ar
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
ea
bl
e.
” (
Dr
illi
ng
 
co
ns
ult
an
t).
“I
 w
as
 in
vi
te
d 
to
 a
 m
ee
ti
ng
 o
f t
he
 O
il 
&
 G
as
 U
K 
hu
m
an
 fa
ct
or
s 
an
d 
co
m
pe
te
nc
y 
w
or
kg
ro
up
. 
I b
as
ic
al
ly
 s
at
 a
ro
un
d 
th
e 
ta
bl
e 
w
ith
 t
he
se
 
en
gi
ne
er
s 
an
d 
th
e 
tw
en
ty
 m
em
be
rs
 c
ou
ld
n’
t 
ge
t t
he
ir
 h
ea
d 
ar
ou
nd
 w
ha
t n
on
-t
ec
hn
ic
al
 s
ki
lls
 
w
er
e 
[…
] I
 t
hi
nk
 I 
w
as
 t
he
 fi
rs
t p
er
so
n 
to
 g
o 
al
on
g 
an
d 
sp
ea
k 
to
 t
he
m
 w
ho
 h
ad
 a
ny
 t
yp
e 
of
 H
F 
ba
ck
gr
ou
nd
.” 
(H
F 
co
ns
ul
ta
nt
 #
2)
.
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tra
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at
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Te
ns
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n
Ill
us
tra
tiv
e q
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te
s
Th
e 
fie
ld
-w
id
e 
ad
op
ti
on
 o
f H
F 
gu
id
eli
ne
s i
s l
im
ite
d 
by
 th
e 
pr
inc
ipl
e o
f v
olu
nt
ar
y a
do
pt
ion
 
an
d 
th
e l
ac
k o
f r
eg
ula
to
ry
 
pr
es
su
re
 fo
r a
do
pt
ion
.
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
’re
 g
ui
de
lin
es
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 
st
an
da
rd
s,
 t
he
 [H
F]
 r
ep
or
ts
 w
ill
 n
ev
er
 r
ec
ei
ve
 
un
iv
er
sa
l b
uy
-i
n 
fr
om
 e
ve
ry
bo
dy
.” 
(D
ire
cto
r o
f 
tra
ini
ng
 ce
nt
er
).
I h
ad
 a
 m
ee
ti
ng
 w
ith
 t
he
 s
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
of
 [U
K 
re
gu
la
to
r]
 r
ec
en
tly
, l
oo
ki
ng
 a
t t
he
ir
 
on
go
in
g 
st
ra
te
gy
 a
nd
 I 
am
 p
re
tt
y 
su
re
 h
um
an
 
fa
ct
or
s 
w
as
n’
t a
ct
ua
lly
 m
en
tio
ne
d.
”(R
eg
ula
to
ry
 
in
sp
ec
to
r 
#2
).
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Un
de
rly
in
g 
co
nc
ep
ts
Se
co
nd
-o
rd
er
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
Fir
st-
or
de
r c
od
es
: 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 u
se
d
Ex
em
pl
ar
y q
uo
te
Se
lf-
id
ea
liz
at
io
n
Ju
sti
fy
ing
 re
gim
e
Pr
es
en
tin
g 
re
gim
e a
s 
ex
am
pl
e
“T
hi
s 
is
 a
n 
id
ea
l o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 fo
r 
th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
, a
nd
 M
em
be
r 
St
at
es
, t
o 
le
ar
n 
fr
om
 t
he
 o
ff
sh
or
e 
oi
l a
nd
 r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
pr
ac
tic
e 
ad
op
te
d 
by
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 n
at
io
na
l 
re
gu
la
to
rs
.” 
(U
K r
eg
ula
to
r c
on
su
lta
tio
n).
H
ig
hl
ig
ht
 p
os
it
iv
e 
tr
ac
k 
re
co
rd
“T
hi
s 
dy
na
m
ic
, g
oa
l s
et
ti
ng
 s
af
et
y 
re
gi
m
e 
ha
s 
se
rv
ed
 u
s 
w
el
l f
or
 o
ve
r 
tw
en
ty
 y
ea
rs
 o
f 
op
er
at
io
ns
 d
ur
in
g 
w
hi
ch
 t
im
e 
ne
ar
ly
 7
,0
00
 w
el
ls
 h
av
e 
be
en
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
lly
 d
ri
lle
d 
in
 t
he
 
U
K 
co
nt
in
en
ta
l s
he
lf.
” 
(C
he
vr
on
 p
ub
lic
 co
ns
ult
at
ion
).
Em
p
ha
si
ze
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts 
sin
ce
 
Pip
er
 A
lph
a
“T
he
 U
K 
off
sh
or
e 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
 in
du
st
ry
 h
as
 a
 p
ro
ac
tiv
e,
 fl
ex
ib
le
 a
nd
 r
es
po
ns
iv
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 t
o 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ri
sk
s,
 b
or
ne
 o
ut
 o
f t
he
 le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
nt
 fr
om
 P
ip
er
 A
lp
ha
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 t
he
 e
vo
lv
in
g 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 o
ff
sh
or
e 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
 b
us
in
es
s 
it
se
lf.
” 
(U
K a
ss
oc
iat
ion
 
po
sit
ion
 p
ap
er
).
Sh
ow
ca
sin
g 
re
sp
on
se
An
tic
ipa
to
ry
 
m
ob
ili
za
ti
on
“T
he
 U
K 
off
sh
or
e 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
 in
du
st
ry
 h
as
 a
 p
ro
ac
tiv
e,
 fl
ex
ib
le
 a
nd
 r
es
po
ns
iv
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 t
o 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ri
sk
s,
 b
or
ne
 o
ut
 o
f t
he
 le
ss
on
s 
le
ar
nt
 fr
om
 P
ip
er
 A
lp
ha
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 t
he
 e
vo
lv
in
g 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 o
ff
sh
or
e 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
 b
us
in
es
s 
it
se
lf.
”
Po
rtr
ay
ing
 le
ar
nin
g 
ini
tia
tiv
e a
s 
co
m
pr
eh
en
siv
e
“F
ol
lo
w
in
g 
th
e 
M
ac
on
do
 a
cc
id
en
t i
n 
th
e 
G
ul
f o
f M
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English summary
On April 20, 2010, offshore drilling rig Deepwater Horizon was engaged in deepwater 
drilling operations in the US Gulf of Mexico when it lost pressure control over the Macondo 
well (Read, 2011). Oil and gas violently blew out of the well, found an ignition source, and 
exploded. Eleven workers on the platform got killed in the explosion, which set off the 
largest accidental offshore oil spill in worldwide history. An estimated 4 million barrels 
(636 million liters) of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico during 87 days before the well 
got capped. The oil spill had devastating effects on ecosystems, local communities, and 
coastal industries.
The Macondo disaster illustrates that the very organizational processes that produce 
benefits for society – e.g. energy production and -security – may also trigger industrial 
disasters with serious consequences (Beck, 1992). When disasters occur, organizations have 
the responsibility to learn from the experience with the purpose to avoid similar disasters 
in the future (Lampel et al., 2009; Smith & Elliott, 2007). Given the apparent increase in 
amount and impact of disasters (Perrow, 1999), learning from disasters has become an 
increasingly important topic in organizational research (Lampel et al., 2009).
Still, more research is needed to better understand the phenomenon (e.g. Buchanan 
& Denyer, 2013). Most research on learning from disaster addresses learning by the 
organizations involved in the accident, but fails to investigate learning mechanisms in 
higher-level collectives, such as populations of organizations or industries (Lampel et al., 
2009). This is unfortunate, because higher-level learning is important for organizations in 
high-risk industries. Disasters have universally applicable lessons, which are relevant for 
organizations beyond those involved in the disaster (Elliott & Smith, 2006). This allows 
organizations to learn without being affected by a disaster’s catastrophic impact (Sagan, 
1994).
In this dissertation I address this gap by investigating learning from disaster at the level of 
an organizational field. An organizational field is defined as a community of organizations 
with disparate interests – including competitors, suppliers, consumers, regulatory agencies, 
special interest groups, and associations – that interact frequently with each other about 
a central issue of interest (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999). The concept of 
organizational field places organizations from an industry in a wider context of social 
relations and institutions (McAdam & Scott, 2005). The objective of this doctoral thesis is 
to better understand how actors in an organizational field collectively attempt to learn from 
disaster. I aim to shed light on the processes of field-level learning from disaster, to better 
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understand how it unfolds, and explain why it unfolds in a particular direction. I focus 
on the organizational field of offshore drilling following the Macondo disaster, in which 
organizations with different interests debated the issue of offshore safety.
My definition of organizational fields draws attention to political processes (Hoffman, 
1999). This is relevant for research on disasters. Different actors – because of their specific 
interests, knowledge, and identity – create different accounts of what happened, and 
propose different solutions to improve risk and safety management (Brown, 2004). Field-
level discourses about disasters may thus be characterized by contestation between 
opposing actors and interpretations (Hoffman, 1999). I specifically investigate the political 
processes in field-level learning from disaster. This is important, because struggles 
between conflicting interests are frequently overlooked in learning research (Lampel et 
al., 2009; Sagan, 1994). Learning tends to be perceived as a rational process to improve 
organizational effectiveness, rather than a political process to protect or further parochial 
interests. This dissertation thus provides an alternative perspective on how learning from 
disasters takes place. The main research question for this dissertation is: How and why do 
actors in an organizational field initiate and maintain the contested process of field-level 
learning from disaster?
RESEARCH CONTEXT, DESIGN, AND METHODS
The Macondo disaster did not just trigger a crisis for the involved companies – BP, 
Transocean, and Halliburton – it was a shock throughout the US and even the global 
offshore industry. Also in Europe did actors perceive the need to re-evaluate established 
risk management practices and regimes to assess their appropriateness (European 
Commisison, 2011). As such, it seemed that the crisis spilled over to the European offshore 
industry, causing European actors to establish learning initiatives. My inquiry focused on 
field-level learning processes and dynamics in the North Sea region following April 20, 
2010.
In this dissertation I take a qualitative research approach. Qualitative research is particularly 
useful for the research objective of this dissertation as it explains the how and why of 
complex social phenomena (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). A qualitative approach emphasizes 
actors’ interpretations of the Macondo disaster, why they develop particular accounts 
and learning solutions, and why different actors contested each other (Gephart, 1984). 
I collected a variety of data sources from diverse actors playing a key role in the field-
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level learning dynamics. I focused particularly on nationally operating actors from the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as actors operating on the transnational 
level.
The main data source in my dissertation is publicly available, secondary data sources, 
such as accident investigation reports, industry reports, and regulatory documents. 
Furthermore, I conducted 43 semi-structured interviews with safety professionals working 
for the European Commission, national regulators, national governments, oil companies, 
consultancies, associations, training providers, and unions. The third body of data consisted 
of notes taken during various industry conferences – in London, Aberdeen, Esbjerg, and 
Amsterdam - in which I focused on industry responses to the Macondo disaster, and 
observations at a well control training center in the Netherlands to experience how offshore 
crews are trained and learn how training practices changed in the wake of Macondo.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Chapter Two – How many blowouts does it take to learn the lessons? An 
institutional perspective on disaster development.
Chapter two presents evidence why field-level learning is important in high-hazard 
industries. The Macondo disaster showed many similarities with other accidents and 
near-misses in the offshore drilling industry (Read, 2011). The research objective was to 
better understand how disasters develop and why similar disasters keep recurring across 
organizations in high hazards industries. So far, explanations of disaster causation have 
primarily emphasized the role of intra-organizational causes (Reason, 1997). However, I 
argue that these perspectives do not adequately capture the influence of the external 
institutional environment that often affects an entire industry. This chapter proposes new 
institutional theory as a new perspective on disaster causation.
Institutions are socially accepted rules, norms, values, and beliefs, which define appropriate 
ways of behavior in a society or industry (Scott, 2008). When organizations integrate 
institutions in their practices, stakeholders - e.g. regulators, politicians, and customers - 
grant them a ‘public license to operate’. This improves an organizations ability to survive. 
In turn, this will drive similar behavior across organizations in an industry (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Scott, 2008). Institutions are relatively resistant to change (Jepperson, 1991). As 
such, when operational conditions change quickly, for instance through technological 
innovations, a mismatch may emerge between institutionalized practices and operational 
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requirements. In this situation, institutionalized practices become dysfunctional (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1991). In high-hazard industries, dysfunctional institutionalized practices can 
undermine organizational safety and contribute to the persistent recurrence of similar 
disasters in different organizations or plants, even after they have been identified and 
targeted in recommendations before (Elliott & Smith, 2006).
My qualitative institutional analysis of a multitude of offshore drilling accidents identified 
a mismatch between the complexity of offshore drilling operations and extant risk 
management and training practices. This study showed that risk management practices 
depict a static, fragmented, and solely technical conceptualization of risk. I argued that this 
conceptualization is inadequate for a hazardous, complex, and dynamic setting as offshore 
drilling and increases the risk for accidents. Furthermore, this study traced back these 
harmful conceptualizations of risk to persistent institutionalized training practices in the 
industry, which have not co-evolved with the increasing complexity of offshore operations. 
It was found that training practices reinforce these inappropriate conceptualizations of risk 
in the industry by focusing predominantly on technical-procedural competence. I argue 
that this has lead to systemic shortcomings in risk management in the entire offshore 
drilling sector. This points to the need for field-level learning to solve these industry-wide 
shortcomings. I recommend professionalizing occupational training by standardizing non-
technical skills- and systems risk management training. This way, workers will be better 
equipped for dealing with the complexities of offshore drilling.
Chapter Three: Justifying superior knowledge from the periphery – struggles 
of a marginal community to influence learning in the wake of disaster.
Building upon the insight that field-level learning from disaster is important, the following 
chapters shed more light on the political processes of field-level learning from disaster. 
Chapter three conceptualizes field-level learning as a struggle between powerful, 
established actors and less powerful, marginal actors in an organizational field. Previous 
research has found that established actors in an organizational field attempt to maintain 
the status quo following a disaster by imposing their own disaster account and proposed 
solutions on other actors (Brown, 2000). This seems to suggest that less powerful, marginal 
actors cannot influence the learning process. Yet, other research streams have indicated 
that marginal actors are not powerless. They may drive institutional change in a field by 
using political strategies (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). They have to 
overcome knowledge- and political boundaries to transform established practices (Carlile, 
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2002; 2004). The research question is: how does a marginal community attempt to influence 
learning from disaster processes that are driven by established communities?
I analysed the activities of the marginal Human Factors (HF) community to initiate in a 
radical change in the North Sea offshore oil and gas industry following the Macondo 
disaster. Being convinced of their superior knowledge, they attempted to persuade two 
established communities– the drilling community and senior managers from oil companies 
– to adopt their expertise about the psychology of decision-making. However, this study 
showed that persuasion of the established communities was complicated by the presence 
of knowledge sharing boundaries. First, I found that institutionalized mechanisms and 
responsibilities for learning favored the drilling- and senior management communities as 
principal learning agents. The HF community therefore had less opportunities to influence 
field-level learning. Finally, this study showed that a semantic boundary emerged between 
the communities that was rooted in different assumptions about human error and incident 
causation. This led to divergent disaster accounts and calls for action, complicating efforts 
to convince the established communities of the need for radical change. Also, I showed how 
political boundaries emerged as the HF community aimed to become more established 
in the drilling industry. They engaged in strategies of discipline recognition, but these 
persuasive strategies were largely ‘self-referential’, such as emphasizing the success of 
HF in other hazardous industries. They did not contextualize their specialist knowledge 
and language to the dominant discourse and values of the drilling and management 
communities. Hence, it undermined the HF community’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
established communities.
This study indicates the need for marginal communities to engage in strategic political 
actions to influence learning from disaster, while also maintaining awareness of potential 
institutional constraints such as institutionalized values, discourses, and learning 
mechanisms and responsibilities. The failure of marginal communities to overcome 
knowledge and political boundaries between themselves and established communities 
may contribute to field-level learning that reinforces established knowledge and practices, 
rather than change deeper assumption, values, and beliefs. Technical expertise seemed 
to dominate the learning proces, at the expense of the psychological expertise of HF 
specialists. Hence, I claim that learning was shaped by and reinforced the dominant 
technical paradigm in the drilling industry.
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Chapter four – Field-level learning from disaster - a dynamic process of 
contestation following crisis spillover
The aim of this chapter was to better understand the politics of learning from disaster 
following spillover of a legitimacy crisis to a different organizational field. I argue that field-
level learning becomes especially urgent and political when a disaster triggers a legitimacy 
crisis that spills over to an industry as a whole. In this chapter, I conceptualize field-level 
learning following crisis spillover as a dynamic, contested process in which opposing actors 
continuously enact their competing interests in response to opposing actors’ actions. 
When learning from disaster takes place in an extremely politicized environment, this 
affects how disaster prevention and response measures are changed. It was proposed 
that spillover to a different region introduces particular dynamics of contestation to the 
process of field-level learning from disaster. The research question is: How do field actors 
contest each other’s learning initiatives over time following spillover of disaster implications 
to a different organizational field?
Similar to chapter three, the starting point is the risk governance crisis in Europe that was 
triggered by the Macondo disaster. I investigate how a new actor in the field challenged 
established safety practices and called for radical change in safety legislation. While chapter 
three illustrated political processes between established communities and a less powerful 
marginal community, in chapter four I investigate political dynamics in the context when 
the challenging actor – in this case the European Commission – was particularly powerful 
and motivated to make a change in offshore safety legislation in the European Union. 
This study empirically examined the political struggle between two actor groups: the 
European Commission versus a tripartite coalition from the North Sea region consisting 
of oil industry actors, national regulators, and trade unions. Using a longitudinal research 
design I illustrate how two actor groups organized different field-level initiatives following 
the Macondo disaster and how they contested each other’s initiatives over time. This 
study indicates how contestation involved a narrative conflict that was rooted in opposing 
institutional discourses about risk governance. The contestation revolved around core 
issues of risk governance, like: ‘Who should be responsible for risk governance?’; ‘At what level 
should risk governance be organized?’; ‘What is the appropriate improvement philosophy?’; 
and ‘who should have control over risk governance and natural resource extraction?’
This conflict was sustained over time through the dynamic interaction of discursive 
strategies. In particular, this study identifies three core practices of contestation that the 
coalition used to limit the intervention of the European Commission: discrediting others, 
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self-idealization, and proclaiming a united stance. These discursive strategies served to claim 
sole learning authority at the expense of the European Commission. I found that after a 
period of intense contestation the Commission adapted their proposal for new offshore 
safety legislation to accommodate the objections of the tripartite coalition.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
Contributing to disaster causation literature
This dissertation contributes to the literature on disaster causation by developing an 
institutional perspective on disaster development (Chapter Two). An institutional perspective 
on disaster development sensitizes researchers to go beyond intra-organizational factors 
and investigate the influence of the institutional environment. I showed how taken-for-
granted beliefs about risk and institutionalized training practices in high hazard industries 
become harmful when they remain stable while the task environment becomes increasingly 
complex.
Contributing to learning from disaster research
This dissertation contributes to the literature on learning from disaster in multiple ways. The 
emphasis on concepts like ‘organizational field’ and ‘institutions’ helps to understand how 
learning from disaster is constrained by institutionalized practices, discourses, and power 
relations. I introduced the notion of ‘field-level learning from disaster’, which recognizes 
these factors and relates to a higher level of analysis than the common organizational 
perspective on disasters. Also, this dissertation contributes to the political perspective 
of learning from disaster by investigating how established and marginal actors in an 
organizational field contest each others’ interpretations and suggested solutions and 
strive to protect their interests. Previous studies tend to portray politics of learning from 
disaster as a process dominated by powerful actors, such as corporations and government 
bodies. These actors constrain the search for causes and aim to maintain established 
institutions and authority relations in place (e.g. Brown, 2000; Elliott & Smith, 2006). This 
dissertation highlights how learning involves marginal actors and communities struggling 
to initiate radical changes and overcome defensiveness by established powerful actors. 
However, if marginal communities are unable to convince established actors to adopt new 
knowledge, learning from disaster will likely be ‘paradigmatic’ (Deschamps et al., 1997) – 
i.e. focused on refining established knowledge, practices, and goals, while leaving deeper 
assumptions, values, and beliefs unchanged. As such, this study provides new insights in 
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the mechanisms that prevent deep ‘cultural readjustment’ in the wake of a disaster (Turner 
& Pidgeon, 1997).
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE
This dissertation also has practical implications. It contributes to a better understanding of 
how disasters are caused and how learning occurs following a disaster. Hence, it provides 
new knowledge on how disasters may be prevented.
As mentioned in Chapter two, I argue for the need for professionalization in occupational 
training in the offshore drilling industry to improve risk management. I claim that the 
nature of training needs to change to better equip the offshore workforce for increasingly 
complex operations. A broader conceptualization of worker competence is necessary, 
including both technical and non-technical skills, as well as an understanding of complex 
system dynamics. Also, some degree of standardization will resolve harmful variability in 
training across organizations. I argued standardized training should address at least non-
technical skills and system risk management.
Chapter two also indicated that an institutional perspective on disaster causations has 
important implications for learning in practice. Industrial disasters partly have institutional 
origins that are not specific to the involved organizations, but may be more widespread in 
an industry. These may drive the recurrence of similar disaster development patterns within 
and across organizations in an industry. These findings imply that investigations teams 
should aim to identify institutional contributing causes beyond the organizational setting 
in which a disaster occurred. This could be achieved by comparing the causation pattern 
with other investigated incidents and disasters, either within or outside the organization. 
Furthermore, I hope these insights will motivate managers and safety professionals to 
perceive disasters in other organizations as opportunities for improving safety practices 
in their own organization. A common response in the wake of a disaster is ‘it could not 
happen here’ (Smith & Elliott, 2007). Chapter two shows that such claims ignore the role 
of the institutional environment in disaster development, and are clear illustrations of a 
dangerous “myth of infallibility” (Sagan, 1994). Recent incidents in the North Sea region, 
like the Bardolino near-miss and Elgin gas blowout have indicated that disasters similar to 
the Macondo blowout could definitely happen in the North Sea as well.
197
English summary
This dissertation also has implications for how actors learn from disaster. It posits that 
learning from disaster per definition is not a neutral process but characterized by struggles 
between competing interests and perspectives (Coopey, 1995). Learning tends to be shaped 
privileged actor groups. This has important implications for what is being learned, and 
what is not. This dissertation showed that the technically oriented drilling community had 
a strong influence on field-level learning from the Macondo disaster. As such, the majority 
of lessons learned in the North Sea region focused primarily on technical improvements: 
of preventive, containment, and response equipment; technical procedures; and technical 
training. Instead, the non-technical HF community had less opportunity to influence the 
field-level learning process. As a consequence, few changes were implement to address 
human and organizational factors, despite convincing evidence in accident research that 
these factors play a fundamental role in creating safe and resilient organizations (e.g. 
Reason, 1997). Hence, the drilling industry missed out on the opportunity to ‘stress test’ 
established knowledge and enrich their techincal perspective with new insights from other 
communities and actors to drive more robust learning. I discovered that for marginal 
communities to contribute to field-level learning, they have to strategically translate their 
knowledge and learning proposals to explicitly link them to dominant discourses and 
values.
A more participative perspective on learning as opposed to a technocratic ‘expert’ 
notion of learning may provide voice to alternative insights and knowledge. Disasters are 
complex phenomena (e.g. Perrow, 1999), hence, diverse bodies of knowledge from diverse 
epistemic disciplines – engineering, psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, 
political sciences etc – are necessary for understanding how disasters develop and may 
be prevented. I propose that oil companies and associations should stimulate an open 
discussion with other field members, providing marginal communities with the opportunity 
to voice their perspective, and actively seek out new insights and knowledge. Pluralistic 
discussions are fundamentally important in the context of risk. The central question ‘what 
level of risk is deemed acceptable’ cannot be answered from a technocratic approach of 
rational calculations. Such ethical questions should be the subject of democratic learning 
and risk governance processes (Beck, 1992; Renn, 2008).
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Op 20 april 2010 boorde offshore boorinstallatie Deepwater Horizon de Macondo put in 
de diepe wateren van de Golf van Mexico toen het controle over de druk verloor (Read, 
2011). Olie en gas spuwde uit de put op de boorinstallatie, vond een ontstekingsbron, en 
ontplofte. Elf mensen op het platform werden gedood in de ontploffing, welke vervolgens 
de grootste onopzettelijke olieramp op zee veroorzaakte in de wereldwijde geschiedenis. 
Een geschatte hoeveelheid van 4 miljoen vaten (636 miljoen liter) olie lekte in de Golf 
van Mexico gedurende 87 dagen voordat de put gedicht werd. De olieramp had een 
verwoestend effect op ecosystemen, lokale gemeenschappen, en lokale industrieën.
De Macondo ramp illustreert dat de organisatieprocessen die voordelen creëren voor de 
maatschappij – zoals energieproductie en –zekerheid – ook industriële rampen kunnen 
veroorzaken met ernstige gevolgen (Beck, 1992). Als industriële rampen plaatsvinden 
hebben organisaties de verantwoordelijkheid om te leren van deze catastrofale ervaring, 
met als doel vergelijkbare rampen te voorkomen in de toekomst (Lampel et al., 2009; 
Smith & Elliott, 2007). Gegeven de schijnbare toename in de hoeveelheid en impact van 
industriële rampen (Perrow, 1999) is het onderwerp ‘leren van rampen’ van toenemend 
belang voor organisatieonderzoek (Lampel et al., 2009).
Er is echter meer onderzoek nodig om dit fenomeen beter te begrijpen (Buchanan & 
Denyer, 2013). De meeste onderzoeken over leren van industriële rampen bestuderen 
leerprocessen die in gang zijn gezet door de organisaties die betrokken waren bij het 
ongeluk, maar vergeten om leerprocessen in grotere collectieven te onderzoeken, 
zoals populaties van organisaties of industrieën (Lampel et al., 2009). Dit is zonde, want 
leerprocessen in grotere collectieven zijn belangrijk voor organisaties in risicovolle 
industrieën. Industriële rampen verschaffen universeel toepasbare lessen, welke ook 
relevant zijn voor organisaties die niet direct betrokken waren bij een ramp (Elliott & 
Smith, 2006). Dit geeft organisaties de mogelijkheid om de leren zonder dat ze de directe 
schadelijke effecten van een ramp ondervinden (Sagan, 1994).
In dit proefschrift adresseer ik dit hiaat door te onderzoeken hoe leren van rampen 
plaatsvindt in een organisatieveld. Ik definieer een organisatieveld als een gemeenschap 
van organisaties met verschillende belangen – zoals concurrerende bedrijven, 
toeleveranciers, consumenten, toezichthouders, belangengroepen, en associaties – die 
regelmatig interacteren met elkaar over kwesties die hen allemaal aangaan (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Hoffman, 1999). Het concept organisatieveld plaatst bedrijven uit een 
industrie in een bredere context van sociale relaties en instituties (McAdam & Scott, 2005). 
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Het doel van dit proefschrift is om beter te begrijpen hoe actoren in een organisatieveld 
collectief proberen te leren van een industriële ramp. Ik streef ernaar om nieuw licht 
te schijnen op de processen van leren van rampen op veld-niveau, teneinde beter te 
begrijpen hoe dit plaatsvindt, en te verklaren waarom dit op deze manier gebeurt. In dit 
proefschrift richt ik mij op het organisatieveld van offshore olieboringen na de Macondo 
ramp, waarin organisaties met verschillende belangen discussieerden over de kwestie 
industriële veiligheid.
Mijn definitie van organisatievelden vestigt de aandacht op politieke processen (Hoffman, 
1999). Dit is een relevante focus voor onderzoek naar industriële rampen. Verschillende 
actoren – vanwege hun specifieke belangen, kennis, en identiteiten – ontwikkelen 
verschillende verklaringen van wat er fout is gegaan, en stellen op basis daarvan 
verschillende oplossingen voor met betrekking tot risico- en veiligheidsmanagement 
(Brown, 2004). Discoursen over rampen op veld-niveau worden daarom gekenmerkt 
door strijd en betwisting tussen tegenpartijen en interpretaties. Ik onderzoek specifiek 
deze politieke processen. Dit is belangrijk, want de strijd tussen conflicterende belangen 
worden vaak over het hoofd gezien in onderzoek over leren (Lampel et al., 2009; Sagan, 
1994). Leren wordt vaak beschouwd als een rationeel proces om de effectiviteit van 
organisaties te verbeteren, in plaats van een politiek proces om belangen te beschermen 
of te bevorderen. Dit proefschrift biedt daarom een alternatief perspectief op hoe leren 
van ongelukken plaatsvindt. De hoofdonderzoeksvraag is: Hoe en waarom dragen actoren 
in een organisatieveld bij aan het conflictueuze proces van gemeenschappelijk leren van een 
industriële ramp?
ONDERZOEK CONTEXT, ONTWERP, EN METHODEN
De Macondo ramp veroorzaakte niet alleen een crisis voor de betrokken bedrijven – 
BP, Transocean, en Halliburton – het was een schok voor de Amerikaanse industrie en 
zelfs de wereldwijde offshore boorindustrie. Ook in Europa zagen belanghebbenden 
de noodzaak om gevestigde risicomanagement praktijken en –regimes opnieuw te 
evalueren op hun geschiktheid (Europese Commissie, 2011). Vandaar kun je stellen dat de 
risicomanagement crisis zich verspreidde naar de Europese offshore boorindustrie, waar 
Europese belanghebbenden verschillende leerinitiatieven opzetten. Mijn onderzoek richt 
zich op leerprocessen en dynamieken in het organisatieveld in de Noordzeeregio vanaf 
20 april 2010.
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In dit proefschrift hanteer ik een kwalitatieve onderzoekaanpak. Kwalitatief onderzoek is 
bijzonder nuttig voor mijn onderzoeksdoel, omdat het zich richt op het verklaren van het 
hoe en waarom van complexe sociale fenomenen (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). Kwalitatieve 
methoden benadrukken de interpretaties van actoren van de Macondo ramp, waarom 
ze bepaalde verklaringen en oplossingen ontwikkelen, en waarom verschillende actoren 
strijden met elkaar (Gephart, 1984). Ik verzamelde een variëteit aan databronnen van 
verschillende actoren die een centrale rol speelden in de leerdynamieken op veldniveau. 
Ik focuste voornamelijk op actoren uit Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk, en daarnaast 
op actoren die op transnationaal niveau actief zijn.
De voornaamste databron in mijn proefschrift in publiekelijk toegankelijk materiaal, zoals 
onderzoeksrapporten van incidenten, industrierapporten, en wetgevingsdocumenten. 
Daarnaast heb ik 43 semigestructureerd interviews gehoudenmet veiligheidsprofessionals 
die werkten voor de Europese Commissie, nationale toezichthouders, nationale overheden, 
oliebedrijven, adviesbureaus, associaties, training organisaties, en vakbonden. De derde 
groep data omvatte notities geschreven tijdens verschillende industriecongressen – 
in London, Aberdeen, Esbjerg, en Amsterdam – waar ik mij richtte op reacties uit de 
industrie op de Macondo ramp. Tevens heb ik non-participatieve observaties gedaan in 
een well control trainingcentrum in Nederland om te ervaren hoe bemanning van offshore 
installaties wordt getraind en om uit te zoeken hoe training praktijken zijn veranderd 
vanwege de Macondo ramp.
EMPIRISCHE STUDIES
Hoofdstuk twee – Hoeveel blow-outs zijn er nodig om lessen te leren? Een 
institutioneel perspectief op de veroorzaking van rampen.
Hoofdstuk twee presenteert empirisch bewijs waarom leren op veldniveau belangrijk is 
voor risicovolle industrieën. De Macondo ramp had veel overeenkomsten met andere 
ongelukken en near-misses in de offshore boorindustrie (Read, 2011). Het onderzoeksdoel 
was om beter te begrijpen hoe rampen veroorzaakt worden en waarom vergelijkbare 
rampen en incidenten blijven terugkomen over de hele linie van organisaties in risicovolle 
industrieën. Tot nu toe hebben verklaringen van de oorzaken van rampen hoofdzakelijk 
de intra-organisationele factoren benadrukt (Reason, 1997). Ik beargumenteer echter dat 
deze perspectieven niet voldoende de invloed van de externe institutionele omgeving 
adresseren, welke vaak invloed heeft op een hele industrie. Dit hoofdstuk stelt de 
institutionele theorie voor als nieuw perspectief op de veroorzaking van rampen.
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Instituties zijn algemeen geaccepteerde regels, normen, waarden, en overtuigingen, 
die voorschrijven wat passend gedrag is in een maatschappij of een industrie (Scott, 
2008). Als organisaties instituties integreren in hun praktijken zullen belanghebbenden 
– zoals toezichthouders, politici, en consumenten – hen een “publieke vergunning voor 
bestaansrecht” verlenen. Dit verbetert het vermogen van organisaties om te overleven. 
Tevens zal het vergelijkbaar gedrag stimuleren in een industrie (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 2008). Instituties zijn bestand tegen verandering (Jepperson, 1991). Als operationele 
omstandigheden snel veranderen, bijvoorbeeld door technologische innovaties, kan een 
mismatch ontstaan tussen geïnstitutionaliseerde praktijken en operationele vereisten. 
In een dergelijke situatie worden deze praktijken dysfunctioneel (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). In risicovolle industrieën kunnen dysfunctionele geïnstitutionaliseerde praktijken 
de veiligheid in organisaties ondermijnen. Door hun hardnekkige karakter kunnen deze 
praktijken vergelijkbare rampen en incidenten veroorzaken in verschillende organisaties 
of fabrieken, zelfs als ze al eerder zijn geïdentificeerd en geadresseerd in aanbevelingen 
(Elliott & Smith, 2006).
Mijn kwalitatieve institutionele analyse van meerdere offshore boorincidenten heeft een 
mismatch geïdentificeerd tussen de complexiteit van offshore booroperaties en bestaande 
risicomanagement- en trainingspraktijken. Ik ontdekte dat risicomanagementpraktijken 
de notie ‘risico’ voorstellen als een statisch, gefragmenteerd, en hoofdzakelijk technisch 
concept. Ik betoogde dat een dergelijke conceptualisering ontoereikend is voor een 
risicovolle, complexe, en dynamische setting zoals offshore booroperaties, omdat het risico 
op ongelukken op deze manier vergroot wordt. Deze studie herleidde dit ontoereikende 
geïnstitutionaliseerde concept naar hardnekkige geïnstitutionaliseerde trainingspraktijken 
in de industrie, welke niet voldoende mee ontwikkeld zijn met de toenemende complexiteit 
van offshore booractiviteiten. Ik ontdekte dat trainingspraktijken het ontoereikende 
concept van risico dieper verankerde in de industrie door hoofdzakelijk te focussen op 
technisch-procedurele competenties. Ik betoog dat dit heeft geleid tot systematische 
tekortkomingen in risicomanagement in de gehele offshore boorindustrie. Dit benadrukt 
de noodzaak voor leren op veldniveau om deze tekortkomingen op te lossen. Ik adviseer 
dat trainingspraktijken voor offshore bemanning worden geprofessionaliseerd door ‘non-
technical skills’ en systeem risicomanagement training te standaardiseren. Op deze manier 
wordt bemanning beter uitgerust om om te gaan met de complexiteiten van offshore 
booractiviteiten.
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Hoofdstuk drie: het rechtvaardigen van superieure kennis vanuit de periferie 
– de strijd van een marginale gemeenschap om leerprocessen in een veld te 
beïnvloeden in de nasleep van een ramp.
Voortbouwend op het inzicht dat het belangrijk is om op veldniveau te leren van een 
ramp zullen de volgende hoofdstukken meer licht schijnen op de politieke processen 
van leren in een veld. Hoofdstuk drie conceptualiseert ‘leren op veldniveau’ als een strijd 
tussen machtige, gevestigde actoren en minder machtige, marginale actoren in een veld. 
Eerder onderzoek heeft gevonden dat gevestigde actoren na een ramp zullen proberen 
om de status quo in een veld te behouden door hun eigen verklaring en voorstellen voor 
verbetering op te leggen aan andere actoren (Brown, 2004). Dit lijkt te suggereren dat 
marginale actoren geen invloed kunnen uitoefenen op het leerproces in een veld. Andere 
onderzoekstromingen hebben echter aangeduid dat marginale actoren niet machteloos 
zijn. Zij kunnen institutionele veranderingen aandrijven door politieke strategieën te 
hanteren (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Zij dienen kennis- en 
politieke barrières tussen henzelf en gevestigde actoren te overwinnen om gevestigde 
praktijken te kunnen transformeren (Carlile, 2000; 2004). De onderzoeksvraag is: hoe 
probeert een marginale professionele gemeenschap om leerprocessen in de nasleep van 
een ramp te beïnvloeden die worden vormgegeven door gevestigde gemeenschappen?
Ik analyseerde de activiteiten van de marginale Human Factors (HF) gemeenschap om een 
radicale verandering te bewerkstelligen in de offshore industrie in de Noordzeeregio in de 
nasleep van de Macondo ramp. Overtuigd zijnde van hun superieure kennis probeerde de 
HF gemeenschap om twee gevestigde professionele gemeenschappen – booringenieurs 
en senior managers van oliebedrijven – over te halen om hun kennis van de psychologie 
van besluitvorming over te nemen. Ik ontdekte echter dat hun poging bemoeilijkt werd 
door de aanwezigheid van verschillende kennis- en politieke barrières. Allereerst stelde ik 
vast dat de gevestigde gemeenschappen bevoorrecht werden door geïnstitutionaliseerde 
leermechanismen en –verantwoordelijkheden. De HF gemeenschap had daardoor minder 
mogelijkheden om leerprocessen in het veld vorm te beïnvloeden. Tevens legde het een 
semantische barrière bloot tussen de gemeenschappen die was geworteld in verschillende 
aannames en overtuigingen over menselijke fouten en oorzaken van incidenten. Dit leidde 
tot uiteenlopende verklaringen en oproepen tot actie. Dit bemoeilijkte vervolgens de 
pogingen om de gevestigde gemeenschappen te overtuigen van de noodzaak voor een 
radicale verandering. Daarnaast ontdekte ik hoe politieke barrières ontstonden toen de HF 
gemeenschap probeerde om meer gevestigd te worden in de boorindustrie. Zij gebruikten 
strategieën voor erkenning van hun discipline, maar deze persuasieve strategieën waren 
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voornamelijk ‘zelf-referentieel’. Zij benadrukten bijvoorbeeld het succes van de HF discipline 
in andere risicovolle industrieën. Echter pasten zij hun specialistische kennis en taalgebruik 
niet effectief aan aan de dominante discourse en waarden van de booringenieurs en senior 
managers. Dit ondermijnde de legitimiteit van de HF gemeenschap in de ogen van de 
gevestigde gemeenschappen.
Deze studie geeft de noodzaak aan voor marginale gemeenschappen om strategische 
politieke acties te gebruiken om in de nasleep van een ramp leerprocessen te beïnvloeden. 
Tegelijkertijd is het belangrijk dat zij zich bewust zijn van potentiele institutionele 
beperkingen, zoals geïnstitutionaliseerde waarden, discoursen, en leermechanismen 
en –verantwoordelijkheden. Als marginale gemeenschappen falen om kennis- en 
politieke barrières voor kennisdeling tussen henzelf en gevestigde gemeenschappen te 
overwinnen, zullen leerprocessen in een organisatieveld de gevestigde kennis en praktijken 
aanscherpen en daarmee dieper verankeren. Radicale verandering van diepere aannames, 
overtuigingen, en waarden zal dan onwaarschijnlijk zijn. Technische expertise leek het 
leerproces te domineren ten koste van psychologische expertise van HF specialisten. 
Vandaar dat ik betoog dat het dominante technische paradigma de leerprocessen gevormd 
heeft, en hier vervolgens dieper door verankerd werd in de industrie.
Hoofdstuk vier – Leren van rampen op veldniveau – een dynamisch proces 
van betwisting na spillover van een crisis
Het doel van dit hoofdstuk was om het politieke karakter van leren van rampen beter 
te begrijpen in de context van spillover van een legitimiteitscrisis naar een ander 
organisatieveld. Ik beargumenteer dat leren op veldniveau bijzonder urgent en politiek 
wordt als een ramp een legitimiteitscrisis genereerd die zich verspreid over een hele 
industrie. In dit hoofdstuk conceptualiseer ik leren op veldniveau na spillover van 
een crisis als een dynamisch proces van betwisting waarin tegenpartijen continu hun 
belangen proberen te bekrachtigen in reactie op elkaars acties. Als leren van rampen 
plaatsvindt in een extreem gepolitiseerde omgeving beïnvloedt dit hoe ramppreventie- en 
herstelmaatregelen aangepast worden. Ik heb voorgesteld dat spillover naar een andere 
regio specifieke dynamieken van betwisting introduceert in leerprocessen op veldniveau. 
De onderzoeksvraag is: Hoe betwisten veld actoren elkaars’ leerinitiatieven in het geval van 
spillover van een legitimiteitscrisis na een ramp naar een ander organisatieveld?
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Net als in hoofdstuk drie is het startpunt de risicomanagement crisis in Europa die ontstond 
na de Macondo ramp. Ik onderzocht hoe een nieuwe actor in het veld in opstand kwam 
tegen gevestigde veiligheidspraktijken en radicale verandering in veiligheidswetgeving 
wilde bewerkstelligen. In tegenstelling tot hoofdstuk drie, welke liet zien hoe een relatief 
zwakke gemeenschap streed om een radicale verandering door te voeren, focuste 
ik in hoofdstuk vier juist op een bijzonder machtig actor: de Europese Commissie. Ik 
bestudeerde de politieke strijd tussen: de Europese Commissie versus een driedelige 
coalitie uit de Noordzeeregio bestaande uit actoren uit de olie industrie, nationale 
toezichthouders, en vakbonden. Met een longitudinaal onderzoek ontwerp illustreerde 
ik hoe de twee actorgroepen verschillende leerinitiatieven organiseerden in de nasleep 
van de Macondo ramp en hoe zij elkaars’ initiatieven betwistten. Deze studie liet zien hoe 
deze strijd de vorm aannam van een conflict tussen narratieven, welke geworteld waren in 
tegenstrijdige institutionele discoursen over risico governance. De betwisting draaide om 
essentiële kwesties zoals: ‘Wie zou er verantwoordelijk moeten zijn voor risico governance?’; 
‘Op welk niveau moet risico governance georganiseerd worden?’; ‘Wat is de juiste verbeter 
filosofie?’; en ‘Wie zou er controle moeten hebben over risico governance en de extractie 
van natuurlijke bronnen?’
Het conflict hield aan gedurende meerdere jaren door de dynamische interactie van 
discursieve strategieën. Deze studie identificeerde drie kern praktijken van betwisting die 
de coalitie gebruikte om de beoogde interventie van de Europese Commissie te beperken: 
de Commissie in diskrediet brengen; zelf-idealisering; en het verkondigen van een verenigd 
standpunt tegen de Commissie. Deze discursieve strategieën dienden om gezag over de 
leerprocessen in het veld op de eisen, ten koste van de Europese Commissie. Ik zag dat 
de Europese Commissie na een periode van intense betwisting hun voorstel voor nieuwe 
offshore veiligheidswetgeving aanpaste om tegemoet te komen aan de bezwaren van de 
coalitie.
IMPLICATIES VOOR THEORIE
Bijdragen aan de literatuur over het veroorzaken van rampen
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de literatuur over industriële rampen door een institutioneel 
perspectief te ontwikkelen over hoe rampen ontstaan (hoofdstuk twee). Een institutioneel 
perspectief op ramp ontwikkeling wijst onderzoekers erop om voorbij intra-organisationele 
oorzaken te gaan en de invloed van de institutionele omgeving te onderzoeken. Ik liet zien 
dat overtuigingen over risico en training die als vanzelfsprekend worden beschouwd een 
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gevaar kunnen vormen voor veiligheid als ze niet veranderen terwijl de werkomgeving 
steeds complexer wordt.
Bijdragen aan onderzoek over leren van rampen
Dit proefschrift draagt op meerdere manieren bij aan de literatuur over leren van rampen. 
Het benadrukken van concepten als ‘organisatieveld’ en ‘instituties’ helpt om te begrijpen 
hoe leerprocessen in de nasleep van een ramp beperkt worden door geïnstitutionaliseerde 
praktijken, discoursen, en machtsrelaties. Ik introduceerde de notie van ‘leren van 
rampen op veldniveau’, wat deze factoren erkent en de aandacht richt op een hoger 
analyse niveau dan het dominante organisatieperspectief in de rampliteratuur. Daarnaast 
draagt dit proefschrift bij aan een politiek perspectief op leren van rampen door te 
onderzoeken hoe gevestigde- en marginale actoren in een veld elkaars’ verklaringen en 
voorgestelde oplossingen betwisten, alsmede hun belangen proberen te beschermen. 
Eerder onderzoek lijkt de politieke aspecten van leren van rampen af te schilderen 
als een proces dat gedomineerd wordt door machtige en gevestigde actoren, zoals 
bedrijven en overheidslichamen. Deze actoren beperken de zoektocht naar oorzaken 
en zullen proberen om gevestigde instituties en machtsrelaties in stand te houden 
(Brown, 2000; Elliott & Smith, 2006). Dit proefschrift benadrukt hoe marginale actoren en 
gemeenschappen strijden om radicale leerinitiatieven te organiseren en de verdedigende 
houding van gevestigde gemeenschappen te overwinnen. Echter, als marginale actoren 
niet in staat zijn om gevestigde actoren te overtuigen om nieuwe kennis over te nemen, 
zullen leerprocessen waarschijnlijk ‘paradigmatisch’ zijn (Deschamps et al., 1997) – oftewel 
gefocust op het aanscherpen van gevestigde kennis, praktijken, en doelen, terwijl 
dieperliggende aannames, waarden, en overtuigingen onveranderd blijven. Hierdoor 
biedt dit proefschrift nieuwe inzichten in de mechanismen die een culturele verandering 
voorkomen na een ramp (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).
IMPLICATIES EN AANBEVELINGEN VOOR DE PRAKTIJK
Dit proefschrift heeft ook praktische implicaties. Het draagt bij aan een beter begrip van 
hoe rampen ontstaan en hoe leren plaatsvindt na een ramp. Het verschaft dus nieuwe 
kennis over hoe rampen kunnen worden voorkomen.
Zoals genoemd in hoofdstuk twee betoog ik de noodzaak voor het professionaliseren 
van training van bemanning in de offshore boorindustrie om risicomanagement te 
verbeteren. Ik beargumenteer dat de aard van training dient te veranderen om offshore 
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bemanning beter voor te bereiden op de toenemende complexiteit van booractiviteiten. 
Een breder begrip van competentie is nodig, welke zowel technische als niet-technische 
vaardigheden omvat, alsmede begrip van dynamieken in complexe systemen. Daarnaast 
is standaardisering van training op het gebied van niet-technische vaardigheden en 
systeemrisico kennis nodig om variabiliteit in de industrie te verhelpen.
Hoofdstuk twee gaf ook aan dat een institutioneel perspectief op het ontstaan van rampen 
belangrijke implicaties heeft voor leren in de praktijk. Industriële rampen hebben deels 
institutionele wortels. Deze institutionele factoren zijn niet uniek voor de bedrijven die 
betrokken zijn bij een ramp, maar zijn wijdverspreid over de linie van organisaties in een 
industrie. Deze institutionele factoren kunnen bijdragen aan een herhaling van vergelijkbare 
rampen en incidenten bij organisaties in een industrie. Deze bevinding impliceert dat 
onderzoeksteams, naast het identificeren van intra-organisatiefactoren, zich moeten 
richten op institutionele factoren. Dit kan gerealiseerd worden door de oorzaken van een 
bepaalde ramp te vergelijken met andere onderzochte rampen en incidenten, zowel binnen 
als buiten de betreffende organisatie. Daarnaast hoop ik dat deze inzichten managers en 
veiligheidsprofessionals zullen motiveren om rampen in andere organisaties te zien als 
mogelijkheden om veiligheid te verbeteren in hun eigen organisatie. Een gebruikelijke 
reactie na een ramp is ‘het zou bij ons nooit kunnen gebeuren’ (Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
Hoofdstuk twee laat zien dat zulke beweringen de invloed van de institutionele omgeving 
onderschat, en zijn duidelijke illustraties van een gevaarlijke ‘mythe van onfeilbaarheid’ 
(Sagan, 1994). Recente incidenten in de Noordzee regio, zoals de Bardolino near-miss en 
de Elgin gas blow-out hebben aangeduid dat rampen zoals de Macondo blow-out ook 
plaats kunnen vinden in de Noordzee.
Dit proefschrift heeft ook implicaties voor hoe actoren leren van rampen. Ik stel dat leren 
van rampen per definitie geen neutraal proces is maar gekenmerkt door een strijd tussen 
tegengestelde belangen en perspectieven (Coopey, 1995). Leren wordt vaak vormgegeven 
door bevoorrechte actoren. Dit heeft belangrijke consequenties voor wat er uiteindelijk 
wordt geleerd, en wat niet. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat de technisch georiënteerde 
boorgemeenschap een sterke invloed had op leerprocessen in het veld naar aanleiding 
van de Macondo ramp. Vandaar dat de meerderheid van geleerde lessen in de Noordzee 
zich richtten op technische verbeteringen: van preventie en beheersingsuitrusting; 
technische procedures; en technische training. Echter, de marginale HF gemeenschap 
had minder mogelijkheden om leerprocessen te beïnvloeden. Als gevolg zijn er weinig 
veranderingen geïmplementeerd die menselijke en organisatiefactoren van veiligheid 
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adresseren, ondanks overtuigend bewijs dat deze factoren een fundamentele rol spelen 
in het creëren van veilige en veerkrachtige organisaties (e.g. Reason, 1997). Vandaar dat 
de boorindustrie een belangrijke mogelijkheid hebben laten schieten om hun gevestigde 
kennis te testen en hun eigen technische perspectief te verrijken met nieuwe inzichten. Op 
deze manier hadden robuustere lessen geleerd kunnen worden. Ik ontdekte dat marginale 
kennisgemeenschappen kunnen bijdragen aan leerprocessen in een veld als zij hun kennis 
en leervoorstellen vertalen om ze te linken aan dominante discoursen en waarden.
Een meer participatief perspectief op leren, in tegenstelling tot een technocratisch 
‘expert’ perspectief, kan een stem geven aan alternatieve inzichten en kennis (Beck, 1992). 
Rampen zijn complexe fenomenen (Perrow, 1999), dus is kennis nodig uit verschillende 
kennisdomeinen – zoals techniek, psychologie, sociologie, economie, antropologie, 
politieke wetenschappen, et cetera – om te begrijpen hoe rampen ontstaan en voorkomen 
kunnen worden. Ik beveel aan dat bedrijven en associaties uit de olie industrie een open 
discussie moeten stimuleren met andere actoren uit het veld, en actief op zoek moeten 
naar nieuwe kennis. Naast het feit dat dit kan helpen bij het vinden van blinde vlekken en 
het verbeteren van veiligheid, is er ook een ethisch argument voor pluralistische discussies 
over risico. De vraag ‘welke niveau van risico is acceptabel’ kan niet beantwoord worden 
met een technocratische aanpak van rationele berekeningen. Dit is bij uitstek een ethisch 
vraagstuk, welke uitsluitend beantwoord kan worden in democratische leer en risico 
governance processen (Beck, 1992; Renn, 2008)
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